UNBOUND TAIWAN:
CLOSEUPS FROM A DISTANCE

Marshall Johnson and Fred Y.L. Chiu, Editors

The Center for East Asian Studies
The University of Chicago
Select Papers Volume No. 8
UNBOUND TAIWAN: CLOSEUPS FROM A DISTANCE
解 / 釋 台 灣

SELECT PAPERS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON TAIWAN STUDIES 1985-1989

SELECT PAPERS VOLUME NO. 8
THE CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
## CONTENTS

**Introduction**  
1 A Semeiotic Analysis of Sajiao as a Gender Marked Communication Style in Chinese  
Catherine S. Farris  

2 The Japanese Ideal and Ideas of Assimilation in Taiwan, 1895-1945  
Ching-chih Chen  

3 Women, Work, and Development in Rural Taiwan  
Rita S. Gallin  

4 The Terms of Incorporation: Making Mainlanders and Taiwanese  
Marshall Johnson  

5 The Petty Capitalist Mode of Production  
Hill Gates  

6 Ch'ing Policies toward Taiwan  
Wen-hsiung Hsu  

7 Some Observations on Social Discourse Regarding Taiwan's "Primordial Inhabitants"  
Fred Y.L. Chiu  

8 Endnotes/Glossary  

9 Appendix
INTRODUCTION

The work that follows happened across barriers of language, field, space, and power. It happened in English and in Chinese to the end that even the title is an articulation of languages creating a new whole. The short English title “Unbound Taiwan” and the Chinese Chiehlshih Taiwan are not simply alternating translations of the same meaning. Only together do they convey what this collection is and what the International Symposium on Taiwan Studies was from 1985 to 1989. Chieh can be read as untying, cutting bounds. Shih can be read as releasing, setting free. Together as chiehlshih they mean to interpret, to explain, a movement both presuming and making a Taiwan unbound. This volume is the intersection of these three meaning for in the 1980’s explaining Taiwan required a loosening of bounds; the act of examination further sliced into the restraints.

THE SPACE OF SILENCE

Undistorted communication about research in the summer of 1985 required a space that could only be created by an act of chieh, of untying. When viewed from outside the space of direct control, outside the space of the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, pressing questions were individualized or made collectively unthinkable. While academic space in the era of nation states is everywhere officially recognized and therefore partially constituted by office, states on China and Taiwan were fairly extreme in their corruption of academics. They actively suppressed inquiry germane to their powers by denying work and forbidding certain questions in the space of control. Scholars outside their spaces of control were blacklisted, forbidden to return to their homes. Both sides resorted to murder. Both sides also promoted certain kinds of scholarship to preclude resistance inside their spaces of control and to extend their spaces of control by pressing their mutual posturings as delegates of a Chinese Nation.
At the beginning of 1985 both Beijing and Taipei were at work on new ways to struggle for Taiwan in academic space. At the same time Taiwan scholars resisting state control took the first steps towards making a space for open discussion. These tentative explorations suddenly became a call for a non-state conference with the announcement that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences would convene a meeting in Beijing on the study of Taiwan.

**NOWHERE WAS A SPACE; CHICAGO WAS ITS NAME**

The very different social space of open discussion required a different venue. Places inside the territories of the two states, most immediately Beijing, were unacceptable as each state would refuse entry and actively censor. Adjoining spaces such as Japan and Hong Kong were hopelessly compromised by state interests. Each geographically convenient place was a somewhere, a known entity and as such impossible for some participants.

Chicago became the space of discussion because it was nowhere. No Chinese state, no faction, no neighborly state claimed Chicago.

For a small group of potential attendees, nowhere was a frightening place. In the Taiwanese mode, a conference required big money: big money to pay off the presenters, big money for the space, big money for legitimacy -- on some occasions even the audience was paid! What was this Chicago? What power stood behind it? In the eyes of these scholars, the reality that the space was organized by a few graduate students with a little seed money from the East Asia Center was incomprehensible. Chicago was unknown and therefore dangerous.

For others, the fact that this was organized outside official field space by people with little capital meant that it was another kind of nowhere: outside the official space of fixed positions and rewards. Chicago was "nowhere" in the sense that Chang-hua or Peoria are "nowhere." They do not exist in terms of the official space of academic investment, production, and reward. Based on
fear in the first instance and power based on distinction in the second, a small number of potential discussants refused to attend.

For the great majority, however, nowhere was the perfect space. Nowhere was open to all. This included Chinese, Taiwanese, Europeans, blacklisted, and noncontroversial alike. Invitation to present research did not depend on position in the states' academic hierarchies and scholarly capital accumulated through collaboration with the dictatorships. The key distinctive feature of academic conference garb, the little plastic encased card announcing one's institutional position, the price tag proclaiming value in field space, was up to the individual. Although the great majority of presenters were officialized academics one could also hear artists, writers, film directors, architects, city planners, night soil collectors and clinical psychiatrists presenting papers.

In nowhere no one could be an affiliate or a delegate. Each person was deemed as making her or his own contribution. Yet the power to bound was still felt. Negatively, the KMT stalled the granting of exit permits (a fascinating concept) in 1987 and prevented several Taiwan scholars from speaking. Positively, the PRC authorities provided passports and funds to do state business with the Taiwan "compatriots." Both were exercises of power. Fortunately, the reception of presentations usually varied in inverse proportion to the amount of official investment in the speaker.

**SHIH IS TO RELEASE: THE CHICAGO SYMPOSIA**

The absence of resources paradoxically aided the release of discussion from direct state control. A different sort of scholarly conference filled this space of release. In contrast to PRC and KMT Taiwan's extravagant scholarly pai-pai replete with paid audiences, the Chicago meetings depended on the participants' interest. That most participants paid their own way to this international venue is simply unimaginable in Taiwan academic fields.
There taxpayer's money was lavished on expensive hotels for American professors attending conferences like "Taiwan, ROC: A Newly Industrialized Society," while the few people who received Chicago housing assistance shared the homes of graduate students and professors, or stayed at the International House. Parallel to the taxpayer shouldered banquets for official scholars at Taipei's Grand Hotel, the Chicago symposia trademark became catered Polish food eaten off of paper plates. People paid dearly to go to nowhere and do something.

The process, the discussions, and many of the papers presented in the summer heat at Ida Noyes Hall were remarkable for their topics, methods, and disciplinary foci. The ones chosen here, like the conferences, do not reflect a single viewpoint or a common subject. They are not assembled as an alternative survey purporting to summarize "Taiwan Today." What they do share is an effect, the effect of undoing through explanation the boundaries of silence, the taken-for-granted, the doxic.

EXPLAINING AGAINST BOUNDARIES: CHIEH-SHIH

The papers by Catherine Farris and Rita Gallin pushed back the boundaries with theoretically informed and empirically rich accounts of gender differences. Applying a Peircean approach to semiotics, Farris' highly original work finds that the gender marked communication style of "sajiao, as an attitude, a behavior, and a metalinguistic object of discourse, is a privileged site for the construction of gender and power relations in Taiwanese society."

Building on 30 years of patient field work in a Chang-hua County village, Rita Gallin takes us through the ways in which the transformation of state and economy has in turn changed the lives of rural women. Her meticulous household by household account shows a historical moment in which the meaning of farming in the family economy collapses and the gender labeling of work reverses. Her research shows that the shift away from land and towards wages leaves elderly women without the practical claims upon their sons that made for enforceable filial obligations.
Seeing the impoverishment of many elderly rural women, Rita Gallin asks the whether, in the absence of a social security system, "today's young women will be able to achieve a secure old age."

Homogeneity in space and time is an impression cultivated by nationalist states into a taken-for-granted among its subjects. Official narratives of Taiwan often begin with assertions of an eternal connection to the Chinese mainland, a connection whose logic obviates the need for choice about whether a space ought to be constituted as a particular nation with a corresponding state. Production of boundaries out of pasts draws on the work of history, a field subject to intense interest and interests. Wen-hsiung Hsu's paper crosses into sensitive territory by chronicling the ambivalent polices of a Chinese imperial state regarding the Taiwanese space. His account of the two-hundred year Ch'ing headache vividly conveys the contingent relation between states and territories.

If Hsu's paper shows the contingency of the relationship in space, Ching-chih Chen's chapter on Japanese attempts to assimilate the Taiwanese depict that contingency in time. His account suggests that while the Japanese state faced as many difficulties as the Ch'ing, it achieved a degree of success remaking nationality, especially in the pre-war years. Nationality appears not as given by nature but as socially constructed and having a history of change. The chapter by Chiu shows that Taiwan and Okinawa had once been lumped together by the Chinese in the name "Liu-ch’iu kuo." Had the Second World War not intervened, would the spread of Japanese nationality have continued, would Taiwan have assimilated to a Chinese category similar to Liu-ch’iu kuo with the Taiwanese displacing the Okinawans as the southernmost members of the Japanese nation?

The chapter by Marshall Johnson takes up a central research question that had been out of bounds: how do we classify the people living on the island? Declaring everyone to be Chinese, the KMT long blocked serious research on social divisions on the island. Examining occupational, labor, capital and marriage markets, Johnson finds that the terms under which the KMT
came to dominate Taiwan generated analytic classes labeled Mainlanders and Taiwanese, classes distinguished by their differential access to resources. He goes on to distinguish these classes on paper from self-conscious classes and finds the presumed necessity of the latter "naturalized" classification is an entirely political matter.

The chapter by Fred Chiu applies the methods of discourse analysis to naming the Aboriginal peoples on Taiwan. Chiu's meticulous history of classification shows us the pliancy of even the geographic space indexed by the names. And as a name denoting a space of peoples, he contends Taiwan is simply the latest in a series of names expressing and constituting a relation between inside and outside, between incorporator and incorporated. He suggests there will be others.

Freeing themselves from the presenting Taiwan as Taiwan Province has not led the authors to a new provincialism, ignoring commonalities across the Taiwan Straits. Hill Gates, a pioneer in pushing back the borders of silence, looked at Taiwan and China to develop the concept of a petty capitalist mode of production beyond the boundaries of its European origin. In doing so, she transcends another level of provincialism, a practical division of labor between the study of the other (here, area studies) and social science. Each of the papers presented in this volume could just as well be read as writing on gender, semiotics, political economy, discourse analysis, nationality, or history.

UNBOUND

The English "unbound" expresses accomplishment. By 1990 the particular bounds imposed by the KMT government had loosened. The Black List shrunk; a few Chinese academics could enter Taiwan space; the heterodox was now speakable on the island. The Chicago meetings gave way to journals, symposia, conferences, class room discussion, and film making -- all on the island, in Taiwan. While the overt means of suppression are weakened, the personnel, institutions and habitus of the dictator-
ship change more slowly and can transform those who start out seeking to transform them. Heterodoxy seeking power and sharing with orthodoxy a common doxa of assumptions can become a new machinery of bounding. More basic, whole classes of persons are still "naturally" excluded from authoritative talk and potential questions remain unimaginable. The articles from the International Symposia on Taiwan Studies presented here, dissimilar in so many ways, suggest a competing future, if never quite unbound still more open and tenacious in explaining, in untying, in releasing -- in the practice of chieh-shih.

Marshall Johnson
April 1994
A Semeiotic Analysis of Sajiao as a Gender Marked Communication Style in Chinese
Catherine S. Farris

INTRODUCTION

C.S. Peirce (1932; 1958) made the semeiotic claim that all knowledge is mediated through signs. In this approach, the objects of thought and discourse are signs in the semeiotic process. Human beings as signs themselves partake of this process and are symbol makers. This perspective is presented as particularly crucial in discussing gender differences in their social and historical contexts. Because knowledge of self and others is mediated by signs, gender identity is a matter of both individual and social interpretation. This paper focuses on some verbal and nonverbal correlates of gender display in Chinese society on Taiwan. Specifically, I will examine the communication style in Chinese known as saijao, which is linked, at the levels of stereotype and behavior, with a communication style of young women and young (i.e., preschool age) children of both sexes. A semeiotic interpretive analysis suggests that saijao, as an attitude, a behavior, and a metalinguistic object of discourse, is a privileged site for the construction of gender and power relations in Taiwanese society.

A SEMEIOITIC OF GENDER

I propose that gender be looked at as the culturally established correlates of sex, what Ray Birdwhistell (1970) refers to as "tertiary sexual characteristics", which are learned and are situationally produced. I agree with Irving Goffman (1979) that if there are behavioral styles or codings that distinguish how men and women act in social situations, we should ask about the origin and sources of these styles. If we look at the female behavioral style, not in the Durkheimian sense of "political ceremony", affirming the place that females have in the social structure, but instead in the Darwinian sense of ritualized gender display, then we can see their behaviors as an indication of the alignment females propose to take in the immediately following
activity. This alignment does not merely express subordination but in part constitutes it. In other words, gender displays are a set of practices (Bourdieu 1977) which structure and reproduce relations of gender and power.

In contemporary Chinese culture and society on Taiwan, the saijiao style forms a rich complex of verbal and nonverbal communication cues which native actors conceive as pointing to the essential nature of women and small children, rather than to the situationally produced desire to behave in such a way. The underlying assumption made by native actors is that people have essential natures and that we can know them. Following Peirce, I question the epistemological validity of the subject/object distinction. Women as social actors help create and in turn are created by the shared cultural rules underlying gender role behavior. I will argue that the saijiao style is both an indicator of women's indirect and informal power in Chinese society, and is a means through which their subordination—implied by a dependence on such forms of power—is created and maintained.

Birdwhistell (1970, 42) posits that humans, as well as other weakly (sexually) dimorphic species, "necessarily organize much of gender display and recognition at the level of position, movement, and expression." And because "Gender identity and relationship is only one of the several nodal points coded in a society's communication system," these behaviors never stand alone, but are always modified by other identification signals and by the structure of the context (1970, 45). This point is particularly clear in the case of saijiao behavior of young women, which by evoking the role of a young child vis-a-vis an older child or adult, simultaneously encodes relations of subordination and of gender. Birdwhistell concludes that "for human society . . . weak dimorphy creates an opportunity for the development of intricate and flexible tertiary sexual characteristics which can be variably exploited in the division of labor" (1970, 46). Thus, in Taiwanese society, young unmarried women must adopt the childlike saijiao poise to attract a suitable mate, as a woman's social identity and economic security is largely dependent on her role as wife and mother in her husband's family (Arrigo 1991; Farris 1990).

Gender identity and relationship are part of the cultural and linguistic codes. I propose that the communication of gender be understood as a semeiotic process. The nature of signification in
Semeiotic Analysis of Sajiao

the Peircean semeiotic is open-ended triadic structures. Peirce explains:

A Sign, or Representamen is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same object. The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by it in a way that does not consist in any complexes of dyadic relations. That is the reason the Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does (Collected Papers [CP] 1932:2.275).

Michael Shapiro (1983) notes that Peirce adhered to Plato's position that thinking is in the form of dialogue between different phases of ego, so that thinking, being dialogic in nature, essentially is composed of signs.² "All relations involving mind, cognition, and intelligence are genuinely triadic relations, for in Peirce's view all such relations are ultimately semeiotic, as all thought is in signs..." (1983, 47). Such a systematic realism is crucial, I believe, to look at how we structure and interpret reality via signs. In particular, the seemingly 'natural expression' of gender displays in each society should be deconstructed with reference to the semeiotic of cultural processes.

How can we know the object through its sign? Peirce states that "A sign is something by knowing which we know something more" (in Hardwick, 1977, 31-32). Thus, information conveyed by a sign "presupposes prior and independent information, which the sign extends" (Shapiro, 1983, 36). This prior information is what Peirce refers to as "collateral experience" or "collateral observation", defined as a "previous acquaintance with what the sign denotes" (CP:8.179). Collateral observation is not part of the interpretant. In order to know the object, one must have a previous experience of it, i.e., a 'habit' must have been established. E. V. Daniel (personal communication) explains that by 'habit' Peirce means the creation of a tendency to interpret the object in a certain way, that is, a predisposition to incorporate new observations into previous information. Although we may initially form incorrect interpretants when confronted with signs, additional collateral observation will lead us to correct these errors.
For instance, we see a person wearing makeup and a dress (the signs) and assume that the person is a female (the object) because of our previous acquaintance with these signs (i.e., gender-marked dress). If we then discover that this person is, in fact, a man "in drag", we not only have to correct the interpretant that we have just formed, the habit that led to this inappropriate interpretant must also be reformulated (Farris 1988, 10).

In applying a semeiotic analysis to a sign system to which the analyst is not privy as a native, there is of course plenty of room for forming false interpretants. Thus I hasten to explain what I mean by "culture" as a semeiotic system. According to Daniel (personal communication) what anthropologists come away with from encounters with natives of another culture is neither precisely the natives' maps of their culture nor the anthropologist's conception of that map; rather, it is a third thing, namely, a perspective on that culture created by the anthropologist and informants in the process of their intercultural communication. Because of the dialogic nature of the sign, it is dynamic, never at rest. So also is the cultural code, an open-ended process of signification. The anthropologist engages in a conversation with the informant and "This conversation is also the locus of the cultural process" (Daniel, 1984, 43). In reflecting upon my dialogues with Chinese people I came to know in Taiwan, I seek both the native exegesis of gender codes and my own understanding of that process.

SAJIAO: A METALINGUISTIC CATEGORY IN CHINESE

In this section I discuss how the sajiao communication style becomes marked for the feminine gender in Chinese language and culture. The section ends with some reflections on how contradictions in feminine gender identity are created and sustained by such sociocultural processes. Sajiao is a compound word in the Chinese language. It functions as a verb, formed from two words: sa, meaning: to caste away, sow, distribute, disperse, let loose; and jiao, meaning: tender, beautiful, graceful, or, to bring up delicately; indulged, petted (Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary, rev. Am. edition, 1943 [1931]). The compound sajiao means: (1) "to show pettishness, as a spoilt child," and (2) "(of a
woman) to pretend to be angry or displeased" (A New Practical Chinese Dictionary, Taiwan, 1972). A contemporary Chinese dictionary (Cihui, Taibei, 1984) defines sajiao as: "Relying on doting affection to bring forth an indulgent attitude" (my translation). Certainly we have such a concept in English, although not realized as a single lexical item. I would describe *sajiao* as the adorable petulance of a spoiled child or young woman who seeks material or immaterial benefit from an unwilling listener. Linda Gail Arrigo (personal communication) suggests that *sajiao* is best described as "a general linguistic form expressing wheedling with subordination" which is a strategy available to children and adults of both sexes. The form is particularly developed for older girls and women however, and for native actors the prototype of *sajiao* behavior is that of a young woman or girl, and not young boys. The fact that this communication style is encoded in the Chinese language with a cover term, *sajiao*, points to its high pragmatic salience for native speakers.

*Sajiao* is reminiscent of the adE relationship described by Schiefelbin (1984) for Kaluli (Papua New Guinea) society, in which a younger sibling learns to use verbal and nonverbal cues to construct a nurturing relation with an older sibling through "requests based on appeal". It is also close to the Japanese concept of *amae* (Doi 1974, cited in Clancy 1986) in which individuals "depend upon and presume upon another's benevolence" (Clancy 1986, 217). The prototype of the amae relationship is based on that between mother and child; conversations with native speakers suggest that amae behavior is more closely associated with girls and women than with boys and men. In light of Japanese colonial control of Taiwan for fifty years (1895-1945), it is interesting to speculate about cultural influences of Japanese amae behavior on the *sajiao* style of the Taiwanese speech community.

One of the most interesting aspects of *sajiao* is its metalinguistic quality. This behavioral complex is encoded in the language with a single lexical item, and is available to native speakers for metalinguistic discourse (i.e., speakers not only 'do' *sajiao* they also talk about doing *sajiao*). Speakers both label a communicative behavior that they perceive as an instance of *sajiao* and they talk about such behavior with other speakers, including myself, a non-native speaker. Native speakers discuss
at least some of the complex of features that constitute this behavior and describe its appropriate and inappropriate contexts of use. It is a pragmatic speech act that implicates both linguistic and cultural norms; the proper encoding and decoding relies on the speaker's "communicative competence", i.e., what a speaker must know in order to communicate effectively in culturally significant settings (Hymes; 1972, vii). *Sajiao* as a behavior and an attitude is also contested by adult members of the speech community. Most adult speakers acknowledge that adult men *sajiao*. Some men deny this, however, for to do so implies both intimacy and subordination. These men seek to evoke the former without implying the latter.

**Communicating and Metacommunicating**

For nine months of the year I spent doing fieldwork in Taiwan (1983-84) I attended an advanced, intensive Standard (Mandarin) Chinese training program at a large university in Taibei. As an anthropologist interested in language use, this provided an ideal context in which to learn simultaneously about linguistic and cultural norms in Chinese and to discuss those norms with members of the native intelligentsia who were my teachers. Many of these teachers are young, unmarried women who were recent college graduates and knowing of my interest in women's roles in Taiwan, kindly and graciously shared their insights with me. It was in the context of one such teacher-student discussion that I first became aware of the native category of *sajiao* as well as its voice and behavioral manifestations.

One day I questioned a teacher about the use of a sentential particle[^3] or clitic *ma*, in one of our texts. It can be used as a hesitation marker, to depreciate one's statement, or, less commonly, to express approval[^4]. Usually, it is used to 'soften' a remark made in a pleading style. In this use, all my informants said, it is used mostly by girls and young women. One teacher explained that without sentence final particles (*yuzhu ci*) to indicate the tone (*yúqí*) of a statement, that statement becomes more direct. According to her, men speak directly while women speak in a roundabout manner so they use *yuzhu ci* more often than men. These particles indicate the attitude of the speaker towards what they have just said; i.e., it is pragmatic information about how the statement should be 'read' (Y.R. Chao, 1968). Without these particles, the tone is unclear. Men's stereotypically direct
Semeiotic Analysis of Sajiao

style of speaking is therefore generally unmarked for expressive overtones.

Both as cultural actors and as signs in the semeiotic process of cultural and social construction, Chinese "men" and "women" symbolically partake of the pervasive dualism of yinyang cosmology (see Alison Black, 1985). For example, another teacher elaborated on the source of variation in men's and women's speech styles. Men are gang: tough, unyielding, inflexible, hard; while women are rou: tender, amiable, pliant, yielding, submissive, gentle. These are seen as men's and women's distinctive or defining characteristics (texting). Seemingly the old adage, yang gang yin rou, "yang, the masculine principle, is hardness; yin, the feminine principle, is softness", still informs the belief system of contemporary actors.

Historically, Chinese had a set of self-deprecatory words used as first person pronouns. These words were used by subordinates to refer to themselves in the presence of their social superiors. For instance, ministers would refer to themselves as chen (vassal) in speech to the emperor. In contrast, self-deprecatory pronouns which women commonly used to refer to themselves indicated a much lower station in life, such as the use of nujia, "slave" (cited in Shih Yu-hwei, 1984). These usages have mostly disappeared in modern Chinese, with some exceptions. Significant in a discussion of sajiao is the use of renjia, which usually means "other", but is also used to refer to the self (Chao, 1968). In the latter sense, my informants say, it is used primarily by young girls who are too shy (haixiu) to use wo, the regular, unmarked first person pronoun. In this use, I was told, girls are being sajiao. One person gave me an example of a child (of either sex) or a petted daughter, wheedling something out of a parent, using renjia and the particle ma, as a strategy to convince the parent to yield.

I once heard a man use the particle ma with sajiao overtones. He wanted his girlfriend to come out of the kitchen and join us at the table, saying "Lai, chifan ba" (Come eat, ba). Ba is a particle which indicates mild imperatives, advice, and supposition (Chao, 1968). When she failed to comply, he repeated his statement, this time with one substitution: "Lai, chifan, ma". This time the tone was audibly different. When I brought up this example in the context of discussing the use of ma with a teacher, she was non-
plussed at first, having just asserted that only women use it in such a manner. But she quickly recovered and said, while it is true that men occasionally use such a tone, normally only women and girls do. But surely this is an instance where communication between lovers metaphorically invokes an adult-child relation, by recourse to 'baby talk'. In such a metaphorical extension of baby talk, it is not clear whether the adult or the child role [possibly both simultaneously] is evoked (Ferguson, 1977).

One of the most perceptive informants and a person who became a personal friend is a woman near my own age (early 30's), married with one child. We were talking about an article in Chinese by Shih Yu-hwei (1984) concerning gender-linked differences in speech styles. I was attempting to isolate the features of the saijiao style and asked for her opinion. She easily imitated the saijiao tone, complete with the particle ma and accompanying facial kinesics such as eye-rolling, rapid blinking and extended, pouting lips. She thought about it further and said that it is a very nasal style, which young unmarried women like to use in interaction with boyfriends. Here we also see that saijiao as a metapragmatic category is easily accessible for discussion by native speakers.

Shih's analysis of gender-linked speech styles in Chinese is based on native introspection and on data collected from audiotapes made in men's and women's college dormitories in Taibei. She notes that the most clear manifestation of gender-linked differences are at the phonological level. Besides naturally determined differences in absolute pitch levels, socialization has created differences in yuqi (tone) and shengdiao (intonation, including the Chinese tonal system). The standard man's voice, Shih asserts, is inclined toward the low and heavy, thick and strong, while the standard woman's voice is inclined toward the young and immature, warm and respectful, sometimes having bashful overtones or even a petulant air (saijiao). At the phonological level of gender-linked differences in speech, Shih continues, natural and learned components complement each other. Women's voices seem even more feminine and men's voices even more masculine. Moreover, the more a woman's voice emphasizes natural and artificial feminine qualities, giving an impression of tenderness and warmth, the more it lacks authority. Whereas, a man's voice, which is low and deep, steady and calm,
Semeiotic Analysis of Sajiao

gives the impression of authority (1984, 22). That is, in order to gain stature as authority figures, women in Taiwanese society have to sacrifice, or at least modify, their self-presentation of Chinese femininity. But in using a soft manner of self presentation thought suitable for young children and women, men risk losing both their masculine identity and their authority. *Sajiao* behavior is also used to reflect and construct a temporary or situationally produced subordinate position, as opposed to an attitudinal predisposition to *sajiao* that many young women display. For instance, while doing my weekly shopping at the dry goods store in my Taibei neighborhood in 1990, I was disappointed to discover they had sold out of eggs. When I asked about them the store owner, a man, said softly to me, "*Mei you le la*" (There aren't any more.) using the childish particle construction *le la* (see below) with a soft, pleading tone, thereby making clear my situationally superior status of patron to his subordinate status of a store owner who could not fulfill my needs. Of course, he also might have behaved deferentially to me as a western foreigner; but previous interactions with him had not brought forth a fawning attitude on his part.

As most of my metacommunicating about *sajiao* was with other women, it was interesting when an occasion arose in which a man spoke to me about it. One day, the man for whom I taught English at a *buxiban* or cram school was driving me to a newly opened branch in the suburbs. We were waiting behind another car at the toll bridge when we noticed that the woman working the toll booth had a visitor inside, probably her boyfriend. The car in front of us, driven by a man, pulled up to the booth and she walked over to receive the money. She was obviously in a flirtatious mood, as we could see from her interaction with him. My boss turned to me and said, "*Ta zuo zuo*" (She acts affected), then, "*Ta sa-sajiao*" (She does a little *sajiao*) because her boyfriend was present. He next smiled at me, saying, "*Ni hui bu hui sajiao?*" (Can you *sajiao*?) in what I perceived as a slightly *sajiao* voice himself, i.e., he was flirting with me! I replied that I occasionally did so 'naturally' but that I disdained women who did so deliberately, and he agreed with that. On other occasions I have heard men express the opinion that they liked young ladies who could 'naturally' *sajiao*. The interesting aspect of this metacommunicative instance is the realization that *sajiao* cues can
be carried on non-linguistic channels, in this case, by means of kinesic and other nonverbal communication devices.

Children learn early not only to 'do' *sajiao* so as to get what they want, but also that this behavior has a specific label. All young children are described as "adorable" (*keai*) and boys especially are often described as "mischievous" (*tiaopi*) as well. One evening I was visiting the home of friends who have three children: a girl, nine years, and two boys, six and seven. The youngest boy was often described to me by his mother as *keai* and *tiaopi*, both of which were perfectly true. While she was trying to carry on a conversation with me, he constantly climbed on her back and implored her, in his best *sajiao* voice, to carry him piggyback. She finally complied, saying with a laugh to me: "*Sajiao!*" In another example, Shih Yu-hwei (personal communication) notes that *sajiao* is appropriate when there is already a close (*shou*) relationship between the interlocutors; one should not try to *sajiao* to a comparative stranger. Children need to be told that *sajiao* is acceptable in the privacy of the home, but is usually inappropriate in a public setting with people one doesn't know well. She mentioned that she cautioned her own daughter (13 years old) not to *sajiao* to people she doesn't know well, and in a public setting. It is acceptable however, for girls of any age to *sajiao* to familiar adults in intimate settings, such as the home. Whereas, older boys (i.e., school age) would be encouraged not to use *sajiao* as an interactive strategy, even with their parents. That is, children are instructed—both implicitly and explicitly—in the appropriate and inappropriate contexts of use for *sajiao*, including for what social contexts (intimate, familiar) and what social identities (young children and women) it is appropriate.

Impressionistic evidence and corroboration from native speakers suggests that *sajiao* as a gender-marked communication style of young women is something that mature married women grow out of. For the young bride, especially one who has not borne a male heir for her husband's lineage, *sajiao* remains a familiar strategy in her interactions with him. For example, one evening I was at the home of a woman who was recently married. Her husband called to say that he could not come home for dinner because he had to attend a 'working dinner' with his boss, a typical arrangement for businessmen in Taiwan. My friend was quite perturbed and with a very *sajiao* tone said, 'I've already cooked
dinner' ("Wo yijing zuo hao le la!"), 'It's all ready' and 'Why do you have to stay out tonight?', etc. In the end she got no relief. Besides the audible sajiao tone in her statements, most interesting was the use of the particle construction le la. Originally formed as an ellipsis of the 'currently relevant state' [CRS] particle le (Li and Thompson, 1984) and a, the most pragmatically neutral particle, indicating polite interest, la now appears to function as an independent particle in Standard Chinese as spoken on Taiwan. While the aspect marker le and the CRS marker le are collapsed into one particle for adult speakers, children will often mark both; with the added emphasis of a, this becomes le la, spoken with a lowered pitch (see also Erbaugh, 1986). The childish usage of la indicates impatience or disagreement, and has sajiao overtones. Adult use of le la to children constitutes baby talk; when adults use it to other adults it is coy, or at least intimate.

If the sajiao communication style is an indicator of nubile womanhood in Taiwanese society, it is an obligatory one in terms of social and cultural norms. In this regard, I recall one unmarried teacher who told me of a warning that she had received from an old friend and former classmate, a man. He told her that she acted too smart around men; she always knew the right answer, faster and in more detail than they. This made them regard her with a certain amount of fear. He suggested that she should back off around men, and let them express themselves in areas where they imagined they had some expertise, rather than compete with them to express how much she knows. She told me she was completely taken aback by these remarks, that she felt she was always hen roumei ("very soft, yielding"). This is a beautiful and charming woman with a soft, feminine manner of self presentation. The only thing out of place is her obvious intelligence. I asked her if she wanted to act stupid just to catch some man's fancy and she replied, not act stupid, just not be so adamant about asserting her opinion. Then I asked her if she wanted to marry a man less intelligent than she, and she replied emphatically that she did not! How do Chinese women resolve these contradictions in their lives?

Related to the contradictions inherent in being smart and feeling compelled to act stupid is a socialization process which tells girls on the one hand to act like children vis-a-vis significant males, and on the other hand to act toward men and boys as an
indulgent and loving mother figure. In exclaiming over tiaopi children, who are usually boys, mothers often say taoyan ("annoying"). My impression is that girls and women use this expression much more often than boys and men do. It is a commonly heard comment about annoying children and frustrating situations in general. Girls appear to emulate women in this usage, as if they were beginning to adopt the attitude of mothers toward their children, i.e., girls are learning to be mothers. Thus they act toward younger siblings and other children as they see their mothers acting toward those children. On the other hand, I once overheard a little girl of perhaps five years, say "taoyan!" to an adult male who was teasing her on the bus. It appears that girls are learning not only to 'mother' younger children, but also men in general. In fact taoyan, when used by girls and young women to male figures, is often used in a slightly flirtatious mode to express pretended pique. Mothers also often say taoyan to small children of both sexes, to express obvious pleasure in the child, but using a word which seems to mean the opposite. For example, I saw a young mother repeatedly say taoyan and taoyan ni ("How annoying you are!", read: "Oh you kid!") to her toddler son at the market, all the while smiling broadly at the child and cuddling him. This can also be read as slightly flirtatious, I would argue, and certainly blurs the distinction between the mother and lover roles.

The loving but authoritative role of mother, when combined with the flirtatious role of sweetheart, produces an interesting blend of communication styles when directed at the same individual simultaneously. On an overnight camping trip with two families, I noted with interest the interaction between the nine year old daughter of one family and the ten year old son of the other. With a mixture of petulance and secret admiration, she constantly insulted him, saying bendan ("stupid egg") and taoyan, repeatedly throughout the trip, while he remained superior and aloof. Here we see the contradictions inherent in the sex role socialization for girls, on the one hand learning to mother men and treat their behavior as childish and on the other hand being expected to adopt a childlike demeanor vis-a-vis them. These contradictions come into play as girls start training for their adult roles as wives and mothers. Gate's comments on this topic are illuminating:

Although most families hope their sons will be strong and responsible, and their daughters timid and submissive, they
often appear to raise children as though they hoped for the opposite result. Boys are given little responsibility at home compared to girls in their youngest years, so that girls receive considerably more practical training in useful tasks and taking responsibility, within the limited sphere of the family itself . . . A young wife learns her new role . . . from a mother-in-law who keeps the family purse, makes the ritual offerings, and dominates not just her, but the entire family. Men, conditioned from childhood to avoid closeness with their fathers but to rely heavily on their mothers for emotional support, guidance, and practical help, come in an established marriage, to accept their wives in a similar role (Gates, 1987, 297-98).

Yet to become a wife, a woman must first adopt the *sajiao* attitude and poise to attract a suitable mate, i.e., act incompetent, helpless, and childlike, at the same time, insinuating a reversal of these positions in time. It is as if women were saying to men, 'I will mother you, if only you will take care of me.' The *sajiao* communication style of young women, a 'soft', indirect power play, as an historical part of the Chinese cultural repertoire, is being adapted by contemporary social actors to fit modern day realities, in which a woman's economic security rests upon finding an appropriate mate.

**UNPACKING SAJIAO**

Daniel (1984, 30) explains that in unpacking the structure of the sign relationship, i.e., sign (representamen)-object-interpretant, "Peirce traces a sign from its point of logical and ontological deployment to its interpretive execution." Peirce divided a sign into three subcategories, "abstracting and isolating each correlate for the purpose of analysis . . . [inviting] the reader to examine the representamen as if it existed independently of the other two correlates, fraught with the potentiality of signification and yet freed for the sake of analytic scrutiny from the sign relationship" (1984, 30). For heuristic purposes then, we can consider the semeiotic nature of *sajiao* independently in its aspects of sign (vehicle), object, and interpretant. But one must keep in mind that understanding is always triadic (i.e., mediated) in nature.

Let us first look at the sign vehicle itself. It can quickly be divided into a cluster of signs ranging from verbal to nonverbal
and from linguistic to cultural. Each of these signs in and of themselves do not indicate *sajiao*; rather, it is their paradigmatic cooccurrence which signals the meaning. Whorf (1956) recognized the significance of this long ago. Sense or meaning does not come from isolated words but from the "patterned relations" between them which he termed "rapport." Even isolated words in the so-called mental lexicon derive their meaning from the patterned "potentials of linkage." It is rapport that enables words to work together to any semantic result. Whorf believed that this rapport constitutes "the real essence of thought insofar as it is linguistic." Ultimately, these linkage processes form a sort of psychic complex belonging to the linguistic and cultural orders (1956, 67-69).

Phonological, syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of the linguistic code, as well as kinesic aspects of the cultural code make up the *sajiao* complex. At the phonological level it is realized in voice quality, prosody, and relative pitch levels; syntactically it is realized in certain sentential particles and semantically in certain lexical items. Pragmatically, *sajiao* is realized contextually in its strategic use by specific social actors. Nonverbally, *sajiao* forms a rich complex of head, face and body kinesics, with head and face movements being the more important. These include eye, lip and head movements, as well as general body orientation. As Gates notes, "Chinese women, I came to understand, seem to tuck their head, limbs, and torso into a tighter, neater package than I was accustomed to doing; my relative looseness of posture appeared disrespectful or at least slovenly (1987, 1). *Sajiao* is indeed a complex sign in both the verbal and nonverbal codes of Chinese and is capable of being communicated through either one of these channels in the absence of the other.

Peirce's best known tricotomy is the relation of signs to their objects, ordered thus: icon, index, and symbol. That is, the sign can be related to its object along one of three modalities, iconically, by virtue of resemblance (e.g., as a map is to a territory), indexically, by contiguity (e.g., as smoke is to fire), or symbolically, by convention (as natural languages are to their referents). Daniel bids us consider not the polysemy or multivocality of the sign, but its "polychromy" or "multimodality" (1984, 40). I believe it is particularly important to consider the multimodality of gender signs. We can conceptualize primary sexual character-
istics as icons of gender, secondary sexual characteristics as indexes of gender, and tertiary characteristics as symbols of gender. The iconic representation of *sajiao* occurs through what Peirce refers to as "degenerate" forms of symbols and indexes. The exploitation of natural differences in relative pitch levels between the sexes iconically represents those differences. Body kinesics both play off natural differences in movement connected with anatomical differences and iconically represent relative size of men and women by accentuating the relative smallness of women. The *sajiao* style as a self presentation mode characteristic of young women vis-a-vis men is itself a metaphorical and therefore iconic representation of the child's behavior towards adults. I will address this issue of parent-child imagery in my conclusions.

Finally, one can not talk about iconicity in Chinese without reference to the iconic aspects of the writing system. Jiao is a compound character formed with the "woman" (*nu*) classifier, plus the phonetic element (*qiao*, as an independent character), meaning: tall, lofty, or, to disguise, pretend. In the phonetic compounds, the ancient Chinese hit upon a recursive rule which could generate an infinite number of new characters. A finite number of classifiers combine with characters already in the writing system to form new characters. The "woman" classifier was very productive in Chinese. Shih (1984) reports that the *Shuowen Jieci* of the Han dynasty (200 B.C -- 200 A.D.) lists over 250 compounds with this classifier. It is clear from the structure of the written character then, that *jiao* iconically represents itself as a feminine trait. That is, when the writing system was standardized, some 2,000 years ago, *jiao* was conceptualized (by male lexicographers) primarily as a feminine trait.

As for the indexical aspects of *sajiao*, these are realized in both the verbal and nonverbal codes. The particles (*ma* and *la*) and certain lexical items (*taoyan, bendan*) index a comment (through the particles) or situation (by means of the lexemes), i.e. they point to or index the speaker's attitude toward the speech event. Kinesically, head, face and body movements index the *sajiao*-ness of the utterance, and they can do so even in the absence of the auditory part of the message. At the phonological level, the *sajiao* tone indexes the speaker's intent in and of itself, i.e., without the propositional content of the utterance indicating what the
speaker's meaning is, which may never be directly encoded in the propositional content anyway. Cultural conventions which link sajiaoness to feminine behavior are arbitrary and therefore symbolic. This is evident in speakers' conscious manipulation of the style for their own strategic goals.

The object of sajiao (the speaker wants something from the listener) is encoded in various signs and deployed in the social realm. What is its interpretive effect? That is, what is the mode of appeal of this sign to its final interpretant? At one level, the sajiaoness of a woman seems an intrinsic part of her, i.e., the sign and object are merged. There are obvious problems with taking people to be objects, as Goffman argues:

There is a deep belief . . . that an object produces signs that are informing about it. Objects are thought to structure the environment immediately around themselves . . Thus, we take sign production to be situationally phrased but not situationally determined (Goffman 1979, 6).

Although signs can be read for what is merely momentary to phenomena-- e.g., an elevated temperature--we routinely seek information about an object's properties that are thought to be structurally basic, i.e., something about the object's 'essential nature', as reflected in its sign. We believe that objects (and people) have essential natures and that the signs they give off can be read as evidence of that nature. Femininity and masculinity are seen as the prototypes of essential expression (Goffman 1979, 7). But what we take to be iconic signs of femininity and masculinity are perhaps only indexical signs (which could point to an essential nature or to a social convention of gender). At a second level, the sign and its object are seen as separate, but the sign must, it is thought, point correctly to its object. In any instance in which one perceives the signs of sajiao one thereby deduces or infers the quality of sajiaoness and thus an underlying 'feminine' (and childlike) nature.

Sajiao also exists at the level of 'argument.' That is, sajiao is understood by native speakers to represent a general law or type. Sajiao exists at the level of metacommunicative awareness; people recognize and label instances of this behavior and they consciously call upon knowledge of this behavioral norm in their own communicative strategies. In addition, people both discuss some of the features or clusters of signs that make up the style
and they discuss the nature of the communicative strategy which it comprises.

Because of the multiple levels of native awareness of *sajiao*, unpacking this complex sign reveals the 'polychromy' or 'multi-modality' of its nature. Goffman wonders if the signs which humans express can tell us something about the essential nature of their producers. What we take to be natural expressions are intrinsically, not incidentally, a consequence of what is generated in social situations. Thus, "One should not appeal to the doctrine of natural expression in an attempt to account for natural expression..." (Goffman 1979, 7).

**CONCLUSION: SIGNS OF POWER**

The *sajiao* communication style is a means by which women wield indirect power in Chinese society on Taiwan. It is the soft, tender, pliant and yielding power that bends but does not break. An informant explained to me that the *sajiao* strategy of dealing with people to get what one wants is powerful -- although it is not direct as men's methods are -- for how can one refuse a charmingly petulant child/woman? *Sajiao* is clearly a pleading strategy of subordinates, but, for adult actors at least, it is always commingled with tender relations as well. Several Chinese women professors mentioned examples of female and male students who use *sajiao* to gain favors of some kind (e.g. a lighter assignment, homework deadline extension, etc.) from the professor. However, Shih Yu-hwei (personal communication) feels that *sajiao* is more appropriate for female than for male college students. She detailed several examples of male students using what she thought of as excessive *sajiao* in interacting with her. Yet, a female student who wanted to get into her class, which was closed, mentioned to another teacher that she would *sajiao* Professor Shih, and she would surely let her in. Indeed that is what happened. The girl called Professor Shih and pleaded, 'You said before I could take your class and now there's no room and why can't I, etc.' until Professor Shih relented.

The Chinese both recognize the consciously manipulative aspects of *sajiao* and are at the same time convinced that the signs of *sajiao* are indexical of and iconic with a woman's essential nature, as the Chinese define that nature. This is consistent
with Birdwhistell's research on tertiary sexual characteristics in seven societies in which he found that informants "either volunteered or without hesitation responded that young children matured into these behaviors and that as people got older they gave them up or matured out of them." Most of his informants agreed that although individuals can learn to accentuate or obscure these signals, "informants from all of these societies interpreted the differences as instinctually and biologically based" (1970, 43).

Goffman argues that a basic source of display and behavioral imagery is the parent-child relationship, as most people of both sexes ultimately experience life as both children and parents or older siblings. This parent-child complex is a common fund of experience which we draw on in a fundamental way in adult social gatherings, i.e., we invoke, through ritualistic expressions, this hierarchical complex. In American society, whenever a male has dealings with a female or a subordinate male (especially a younger one), some mitigation of potential distance, coercion, and hostility is quite likely to be induced by application of the parent-child complex...which implies that, ritually speaking, females are equivalent to subordinate males, and both are equivalent to children (1979, 5).

Like Goffman, Nancy Henley (1975) views gender display not as a celebration of men's and women's relative positions in society, but as a subtle and little attended means of creating and maintaining those positions. "In front of, and defending, the larger political-economic structure that determines our lives and defines the context of human relationships, there is a micropolitical structure that helps maintain it" (1975, 184). In observations of American society, Henley found that women and other persons of subordinate status are touched and stared at by superordinates more than vice versa. Women's personal space is encroached upon by men; they lower or avert their eyes, tilt their heads, and make other submissive gestures in interacting with men (1975, 184-199). In her discussion of gendered communication styles in Taiwan, Shih (1984, 226) cites Henley's work, noting that this submissive body language of women was a cultural norm of traditional Chinese society and is to a large extent also true today. Thus, the verbal and nonverbal sajiao complex is a set of practices which reproduce simultaneously, relations of gender and of power in contemporary Chinese society on Taiwan.
This society remains organized around a patriarchal cultural ethos, in which a patrilineal social structure continues to organize the relations between the sexes (Diamond, 1975, Gallin, 1984, 1986). In a penetrating marxist analysis of class differences in gender ideology in 1970's Taiwan, Arrigo (1991) argues that the rise of a "feminine mystique" among young urban women was precipitated by rapid industrialization, rural to urban migration, and the subsequent growth of a middle class and its attendant value system. With the transformation in the urban areas of the patrilineal extended family into "the new small romantic family", i.e., a nuclear family unit based on romantic love and not arranged marriage, upper working class and middle class women aspired to sex role differentiation in marriage with the husband as breadwinner and wife as dependent homemaker. While working class women may aspire to the dependent status of homemaker and therefore romanticize sex roles, they also contribute much needed labor to the family unit, in the form of marketing, childcare, and perhaps putting-out work. But for the middle class woman, and those who aspire to it, sex role differences are "mystified" and sexual manipulation by the woman is a strategy for making an economically prosperous marriage of relatively leisured dependency. This mystification, Arrigo argues, was in fact a rational response to lack of employment opportunities for well educated, middle class women in 1970's Taiwan (e.g., women were often forced by employers to quit work upon marriage or at the birth of their first child). A tight marriage market for women (who sought spouses from a smaller pool of men, i.e., men older themselves and who had already established careers) also probably contributed to women's strategies of using charm and seductiveness to attract a mate.\6 It is in this light perhaps, that we can see the cultivation of the *sajiao* communication style of young women in urban Taiwan today. Although the nature of women's indirect power stems from both their place in the social structure of Chinese society and their symbolic position in the cultural system, and is therefore an index of that position, displays of indirect power are perceived by native actors as intrinsic to and iconic of women's natures, so that women's place in culture and society is seen to be solely derivative of their intrinsic natures.

A number of Chinese and Western scholars have detailed various facets of women's continuing politico-economic and socio-
structural subordination to men in contemporary Taiwanese society. Gallin (1984) is concerned with how the world capitalist systems plays on the traditional patriarchal social structure to the benefit of both:

The marriage of patriarchal ideology and contemporary capitalism allows the family, the nation, and the international market economy to take advantage of women's unpaid domestic and underpaid public labor without altering cultural definitions of male and female roles or transforming the structure of male status and authority within the family (1984, 398).

Similarly, Diamond (1975) asserts that the shift from patrilineal extended to nuclear family households in urban Taiwan does not necessarily change the position of women in the household. "It only shifts more of the burden of control over women to the husband and to society at large" (1975, 34, emphasis in original). These scholars argue that the patriarchal social structure and the ideology that underpins it has inhibited the evolution of more egalitarian notions of femininity and masculinity, at the same time aiding and abetting the rise of market capitalism in Taiwan. Whereas, Margery Wolf (1972, 1978) is concerned with family dynamics, detailing the socialization process by which little girls come to know their place within the social structure. While some native scholars argue that at least the position of younger women within the household has improved (e.g., Hu Taili, 1985), most agree that cultural notions of female inferiority and gender complementarity act to inhibit further structural changes (Lu Xiulian, 1986 [1973]; Ku Yenlin 1989; Chiang and Ku 1985).

Clearly a socioeconomic perspective can illuminate aspects of gender role construction in Taiwan. And a neo-marxist analysis that more carefully considers the role of ideology in the construction of self and society than "vulgar" marxism does, is indeed promising. However, I believe that a materialist explanation in itself is inadequate to understand the signs of gender and sexuality as they are created by cultural actors and deployed in the public realm of society and in the private realm of mind. More serious scholarly attention should be directed to everyday, interpersonal structuring of reality by cultural actors "suspended in webs of significance . . . [they themselves] have spun" (Geertz, 1973, 5 paraphrasing Weber). The saijiao communication style,
intimately linked to strategies of both children and women, as an attitude, a belief system and a set of practices, is a privileged site for the reproduction of hierarchy, gender and power in Chinese society. A more complete understanding of culture and society can only come about through the recognition of the semeiotic nature of our existence. It is not by living in social groups or by transforming nature into products for consumption and exchange that we become human; rather, it is by virtue of our symbol making capacities that we systematize reality and order social relationships.

Because the semeiotic process is open-ended, it is capable of reflecting upon itself to the Nth metalevel. We have seen that sajiao as a gender marked sign in Chinese can be consciously manipulated and commented upon, and that manipulation and those comments can, in turn, be commented upon ad infinitum. Actors actively create and deploy these signs in intrapsychic and interpsychic dialogue for their own strategic ends. Women are not passive social actors, waiting for the forces of patriarchy to do with them what they will, as Margery Wolf has shown very persuasively in her writings. Instead, they are active participants in the unfolding dialogue which is cultural process. As Arrigo (1991) suggests, young women in 1980's Taiwan are less docile and more independent both emotionally and economically, than was the generation which came of age in the 1970's. For many middle class women in contemporary Taiwan, the problem as they see it is that their ongoing redefinitions of femininity have not been accompanied by men's redefinitions of masculinity. What might the final interpretant of sajiao be, were its full semeiotic effects to be achieved? The contradictions inherent in this sign will indefinitely defer its final actualization, perhaps changing it in the process. We can hope that both genders in Taiwanese society will participate in a dialogue leading to this transformation.
The Japanese Ideal and Ideas of Assimilation in Taiwan, 1895-1945
Ching-chih Chen

As a result of its military victory over China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan obtained the island of Taiwan and consequently became the first and only non-Western colonial nation in modern times. Through treaties and conquests, the Japanese later added Korea (1910), former German possessions in the Western Pacific (1914-1945), Manchuria (1931) and other territories to their empire. All these territories remained under the Japanese rule until Japan's surrender to the Allies in September, 1945. As Japan's first colony, Taiwan was the laboratory for virtually all Japanese colonial policies. Study of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan thus deserves special attention.

In most of their colonies the Japanese pursued a policy of direct rule of their colonial subjects and sought the eventual assimilation of these peoples to the Japanese way of life. This paper traces the evolution of the Japanese ideal and ideas of assimilation in Taiwan. Special attention will be given to the changing attitudes of the Japanese colonial authorities toward the policy of assimilation. Factors contributing to the adoption of the policy will also be discussed.

Immediately after the treaty of Shimonseki was signed in April 1895, the Japanese government ordered a study of major European powers' colonial policies, and sought the opinions of Western legal experts who were then in the service of Japan. The Japanese had to decide how to govern Taiwan. Was the island to be regarded as a colony? Was Japan to assimilate the indigenous people of the island? Two schools of thought emerged to provide answers to these questions: one supported assimilation while the other was against it.

The chief advocates of the assimilation policy were Michel Lubon, a Frenchman and a member of the Taiwan Affairs Bureau (Taiwan jimukyoku) which had been organized to formulate policies for the administration of Taiwan. Lubon submitted his "Suggestions for the administration of Liaotung and Taiwan" on April 22, 1895, less than a week after the signing of the Treaty of
Shimonseki. Japan was an island nation, Lubon observed, it would, therefore, be inclined to expand to neighboring islands. Hence, unlike Liaotung, Taiwan should eventually be classified as a prefecture of Japan. Meanwhile, the political system of Japan should be applied gradually to the island. In short, Lubon proposed that "from the theoretical standpoint it [Taiwan] should not be regarded as a colony." He believed that a well-planned and well organized Japanese immigration program would help make the inhabitants of Taiwan "resemble the Japanese" in a few years. Lubon, nevertheless, cautioned the Japanese against attempting any hasty assimilation.

Hara Kei shared Lubon's view. Shortly after the Taiwan Affairs Bureau was established in June, 1895, Hara, as a member of the bureau, submitted a proposal for the Bureau's consideration. He proposed that Taiwan be considered an integral part of Japan in the same fashion that Alsace-Lorraine was a part of Germany and Algeria was a part of France, that Japanese laws and decrees be applied to the island as much as circumstances would permit, and that military, postal, communications and customs affairs be placed directly under the supervision of the Japanese central government. Hara also proposed the appointment of a civilian official as the governor-general of Taiwan. Hara gave two main reasons to justify the adoption of an assimilation policy: Taiwan was not too far away from the Japanese underwater telegraphic cables and thus could be easily connected to the Japanese communications network; the Taiwanese and the Japanese "used the same script and were of the same race (dobun doshu)."

Montague Kirkwood, a British adviser, was the leader of the non-assimilation school. In his written proposal, Kirkwood noted that Great Britain, as the most experienced and successful colonial power in the world, was the country from which Japan should learn policies and methods of colonialism. He made the following major suggestions concerning the administration of Taiwan: the island should be made a colony; the island should be placed outside the jurisdiction of the Japanese Constitution; Japan's policies toward the island should be formulated and executed by the emperor instead of the Diet; the island's finance should be set apart from that of Japan itself; and the customs and institutions of the island's inhabitants should be preserved and
utilized in the administration of the island. Though the anti-assimilation proposal appeared to have won little support among the Japanese population, Kirkwood's approach did impress some influential Japanese political leaders who found it realistic.

The Japanese leaders soon learned from the difficulty in suppressing Taiwanese resistance to Japan's takeover of the island that it would be virtually impossible to govern the Taiwanese the way they governed their own nationals. Hara's proposal to place Taiwan under the central government in Tokyo thus appeared to be unrealistic and was consequently rejected by the Taiwan Affairs Bureau. While conceding the need for governing the island separately from Japan, the Japanese leaders, however, did not want to classify the newly acquired territory simply as a colony (shukuminchi). The Taiwan Bureau, therefore, also rejected a plan to make Taiwan a colony per se. Until its abolition in April, 1896, the Taiwan Affairs Bureau remained uncommitted to any clear cut position pertaining to the legal status of Taiwan.

In the meantime, public opinion in Japan was clearly in favor of the eventual assimilation of the inhabitants of Taiwan. Transformation of Taiwanese customs and manners was generally considered as the first step leading to the assimilation goal. For special consideration, the Japanese authorities singled out opium-smoking, queue-wearing and foot-binding as "the three major evil customs (sandai heifu)" of the Taiwanese. The prevailing sentiment in Japan was that if these three abuses were not eradicated quickly and completely, "the Taiwanese cannot be considered as Japan's new subjects." The troublesome situation on the island, however, soon compelled the Japanese authorities to for-sake their hope for drastically changing customs and manners of the people of Taiwan and instead to opt for their gradual transformation.

The development of a workable policy for coping with the opium problem in Taiwan best exemplifies the shift to a gradualistic approach. At the Shimonoseki, Ito Hirobumi, Japan's chief envoy, had vowed that the Japanese would eradicate completely the "evil habit of opium smoking" on Taiwan as soon as the island was transferred to Japan. For his declaration, he won from the London-based Anti-opium Association a letter of commendation praising him as "the savior of the day."
Ito declared his concern about the opium problem on May 10, 1895 in his written instructions to the newly appointed governor-general of Taiwan, Admiral Kabayama Sukenori. He unequivocally stated that "opium is a major abuse" in Taiwan, and commanded that "Japan's intent to prohibit opium smoking should be made known to the general public on the island." Ito, however, did not say how this prohibition was to be implemented; should it be a complete prohibition or should it be a limited and gradual one? Japanese public opinion overwhelmingly supported the strict prohibition of opium-smoking. The colonial authorities in Taiwan, however, soon found that the intended ban on opium-smoking was at least partly responsible for the Taiwanese resistance to the Japanese administration. They also learned that an effective implementation of the prohibition would require the stationing of a large military force for an extended period on the island. Unwilling to finance what might turn out to be a costly military campaign and apprehensive that an oppressive approach to the opium problem might have an adverse effect on Westerners' attitudes toward Japan, the Japanese decided to adopt a policy of gradual prohibition.

The decision to employ a gradualistic approach to the opium problem ended, at least temporarily, the debate over the question of how best to govern the Taiwanese and resulted in the adoption of a policy of gradual assimilation. By mid-1896, Japan had committed itself to the policy of " gradual assimilation" (zenka) of the island's population. This policy is explicitly and accurately illustrated in the important instruction entitled "Administrative Program for Taiwan" that Premier Matsukata Masayoshi dispatched to the third governor-general, General Nogi Maresuke, on August 2, 1897. It stated:

Japan is to annex Taiwan into the Japanese territory and not to make it an external dependency [colony] of Japan. In this respect, Taiwan resembles Alsace-Lorraine under Germany and Poland under Russia rather than British India and French Tonkin. However, because Taiwan was more or less a frontier province under the Ch'ing administration, is far from Japan, and because the culture of its inhabitants differs greatly from that of ours, its is only natural that systems employed for the island would have to be quite different [from those used in Japan]. As for the policy governing the inhabitants, it is
necessary to make a choice between swift assimilation (*kyuji*) and gradual assimilation (*zenka*)... If the goal could be attained, the policy of swift assimilation would indeed dazzle the eyes of many. In reality, however, it is extremely difficult to succeed [in this policy]. The reason is that changing the customs and manners of a country is not an easy thing to do. If, in order to gain temporary satisfaction, a radical reform is attempted and the administration turns out to be overly rigorous, the complaints and suspicions of the people may be aroused, the criticism of the foreigners may be incurred, and the administration's expenses may be temporarily increased and may lead to further financial distress. A gradual assimilation policy will not produce prompt results, yet it can be easily carried out because it follows the course of nature and there will be more advantages than losses. Consequently, in governing Taiwan, a policy of gradual assimilation has been adopted. The newly subjugated people should eventually be inculcated with a spirit of becoming loyal subjects of the imperial country, and then the perfect results can be anticipated.

This long quotation reveals two essential aspects of Japan's fundamental policy toward Taiwan during the early years of Japanese rule on the island. First, the Japanese aimed at incorporating Taiwan into Japan and ultimately assimilating its inhabitants. Second, the means to this end was gradual assimilation.

The Japanese leaders were frustrated by problems such as containing armed resistance of the Taiwanese. They began to wonder if even their gradualistic approach to assimilation was too idealistic. From the moment Japan took possession of Taiwan, Westerners were skeptical of the ability of the Japanese to govern another Asian people. To the Westerners of the nineteenth century, overseas colonial enterprises were strictly "the white man's burden." Westerners who had practical experience with the governing of overseas territories predicted that "Japan would, like Sparta of the past, certainly fail as a ruler in peace, though she might succeed in war." Moreover, these people questioned whether it was wise for Japan to be a colonial nation since it could hardly sustain the financial burden of governing Taiwan while striving to become a military power. They suggested that
Japan abandon the island of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{27} Japanese leaders, however, were too proud to swallow the Western verdict that the Japanese nation lacked the qualifications to a colonial nation.\textsuperscript{28} Since most of the colonial powers in the late nineteenth century were competing for the acquisition of overseas territories primarily for economic gains, the Japanese colonial authorities thus were determined to devote their effort to transform Taiwan into a profitable colony. Other goals consequently became subordinate to the economic ones.\textsuperscript{29}

The decision to emphasize Taiwan’s economic development was made by General Kodama Gentaro, the fourth governor-general, and his able assistant, Goto Shimpei, the chief of civil administration in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{30} As a pragmatist, Goto, who was generally considered the architect of the Japanese colonial system in Taiwan, took a cautious view about the feasibility of assimilating the Taiwanese. He pointed out that scholars of colonial studies throughout the world had doubts about the assimilation of the Taiwanese by other people. At any rate, Goto was of the opinion that the island’s inhabitants would have to be under the Japanese rule for at least a period of three generations before their attitudes toward the colonial rulers could be more accurately assessed.\textsuperscript{31} Since he was not sure whether the assimilation of the Taiwanese would be possible, he backed away from the policy of gradual assimilation that had been officially espoused by Matsukata Masayoshi and others.

Goto's approach to the administration of Taiwan thus constituted a marked change in Japan's colonial policy. An idealistic assimilation approach was replaced with a more realistic one. While the Kodama-Goto administration in Taiwan did shun the policy of assimilation, it was not necessarily opposed to the assimilation ideal. As a matter of fact, Kodama had explicitly favored the eventual assimilation of the Taiwanese. Even Goto, the pragmatist, revealed the same expectation.\textsuperscript{32} In the case of Goto, it is significant that he made this revelation in March 1906, eight years after he had begun his tour of duty in Taiwan and only a few months before he was to leave his post. Does this indicate that he had found a favorable Taiwanese reaction toward Japanese rule? There is no direct evidence to substantiate this. Nevertheless, one thing is certain: after Kodama and Goto departed from Taiwan in 1906, official talk of gradual and
eventual assimilation of the Taiwanese was revived and intensified over time.\textsuperscript{33}

Was the departure of Goto, who had deliberately tried to restrain the over-optimism and excessive zeal of both his colleagues and subordinates, responsible for the change in official attitude? This is possible, yet it does not seem to be a significant factor considering the fact that, by early 1906, Goto had allowed himself to lower his guard against excessive optimism and expressed the hope of eventually assimilating the Taiwanese. Consequently, the change of leadership had little to do with the shift in attitude. The success of the Kodama-Goto team in Taiwan was more likely the reason. Kodama and Goto accomplished more than had been expected of them. They had rid Taiwan of its financial dependence on Japan, established a firm and efficient administration, and suppressed armed anti-Japanese activities on the island.\textsuperscript{34} Under their leadership, Taiwan was quickly becoming Japan's profitable colony. The Japanese success was drawing recognition, even from Westerners.\textsuperscript{35} Thus it was the strengthened economy in Taiwan and the growing Japanese self-confidence that had enabled the successors of Kodama and Goto to express greater interest in the policy of assimilation.

This rising expectation had developed to such an extent that by 1918 General Akashi Motojiro, the 7th governor-general, was prompted to repeatedly remind his subordinates his utmost goal was "to make Taiwan a territory no different from Japan," and "to Japanize the Taiwanese."\textsuperscript{36} By Japanizing the Taiwanese, he meant "the transformation of the islanders [the Taiwanese] so that they will gradually come to possess the disposition of [Japan's] subjects."

On August 3, 1918, Akashi, in his address to ranking colonial officials, stressed the task of educating the Taiwanese and attaining a harmonious relationship between the Japanese and the Taiwanese. "The differences of languages and customs that have created barriers between them must be removed." To this end, Akashi continued: "the Japanese and the Taiwanese have to act in concert to achieve cultural advancement in Taiwan." And he stated emphatically that education would provide the Taiwanese with "the [kind of] spirit and ability that no Japanese citizen will be ashamed of."\textsuperscript{37}
The transformation of the local inhabitants of Taiwan was to be attempted cautiously. Education was to be the primary means for Japanizing the colonial subjects. Consequently, Akashi gave greater attention to the education of Taiwanese than had any of his predecessors. To implement this new policy, he issued new education law for Taiwan on January 8, 1919.

The colonial authorities had thus revived enthusiasm for the integration of Taiwan into Japan and the assimilation of the Taiwanese. This trend, however, was greatly aided by the drastic political changes that were taking place in and out of Japan immediately following the end of World War I. In September 1918, for the first time in modern Japanese history, a genuine party cabinet was formed under the premiership of Hara Kei. An ever-increasing number of party politicians and other civil officials were consequently appointed to important government posts in the 1920s. What concerns us here is the employment of civil officials as chief executives of Japan's overseas territories. Such appointments were part of a deliberate move made by Hara Kei, who had been a strong advocate of the assimilation policy since the days he served in the Taiwan Affairs Bureau in 1895, to make the character of the administration of Japan's overseas territories a civil one.

The widespread anti-Japanese movement in Korea in early March of 1919 further convinced Hara of the need to change Japan's policy toward Korea and other colonies. Hara foresaw the following reforms for Korea: substituting the system of civil governors-general for that of military governors-general; adopting an identical education policy for both the Japanese and Koreans; enforcing the local government system; ensuring Korean representation in the imperial Diet; and employment of Koreans as government officials. Above all, he regarded "Korea as an extension of Japan (naichi no encho)" and resolved "to integrate Korea (Chosen o doka suru)."

Unlike Korea, which had been an independent nation prior to the Japanese rule and had merged with Japan as a result of "mutual agreements," Taiwan had been a part of Ch'ing China and was ceded to Japan after Japan's military victory over China in 1895. Hara acknowledged this difference, but he still believed that the same principle of assimilation should be applied to Taiwan as well as Korea.
Hara implemented some of the above-mentioned reforms during his years as the premier of Japan despite opposition from some powerful political leaders in Tokyo.42 One of the reforms made civil officials eligible for the governor-generalship in Taiwan. Hara chose Den Kenjiro as the first civil governor-general partly because Den was a key member of the brain trust of Yamagata Aritomo, who had initially opposed the idea of appointing a civil official to head the colonial government and thus was likely to approve only a civil nominee whom he could trust, and partly because Den had shared Hara's view on assimilation policy since the days when both of them served in the Taiwan Affairs Bureau in 1895-1896.43

From 1919 on, the guiding principle for the administration of Taiwan was, in theory at least, the integration of the island and the assimilation of its inhabitants. To understand the essence of this policy, we must study the policy statements and writings of Den Kenjiro, the man who was responsible for officially initiating the policy and for setting the course for the island's administration during the second half of Japanese rule, particularly for the period between 1919 and 1936.

On Taiwan's relation with the Japanese empire, Den declared: "Since Taiwan constitutes a territorial component of the empire, it is definitely under the jurisdiction of the imperial constitution." He compared Taiwan to the colonies of European nations: "It [Taiwan] cannot be equated with the colonies belonging to the European countries that are administered and maintained for political and economic reasons."44 Den also offered reasons for Japan's pursuing a course different from that followed by most contemporary colonial powers:

The Formosan natives have inherited the civilization of the Chinese people and employ the same script as is used by the Japanese, and are practically the same in race and . . . religious and moral ideas as the Japanese. Such being the case, it has not been necessary for Japan's administrative policy toward Formosa to follow that of other colonial countries.45

Japan's fundamental principle for the administration of Taiwan, according to Den, was the assimilation of the people of that island.46 Den believed that acculturation (kyoka) was the means for Japanizing the island's inhabitants.47 Den emphatically stated that the Japanese would have to develop political, social and
educational approaches to acclimatize the Taiwanese. First of all, in the political sphere there had to be sufficient mutual understanding between the Japanese authorities and the Taiwanese people. To remove barriers between the two, it was necessary, for instance, to open the door of officialdom to men of talent, in other words to appoint "well-qualified and superiorly-behaved persons including the Taiwanese" to positions of considerable significance. Den also suggested that plans had to be made to abolish the institution of flogging, which was applicable to the Taiwanese but not the Japanese.48

Secondly, in the social sphere, Den wanted to secure and maintain harmony between the Japanese and the Taiwanese. He felt that intermarriage was the simplest way to ensure social harmony; however, because there were no laws regulating intermarriage between the two peoples, intermarriage had never been legally sanctioned. Consequently, Den thought that a revision of the Regulations Governing Family-Registration (kosekiirei) to accommodate intermarriage would encourage such a practice. Moreover, the government had to urge the two peoples to engage in friendly and nondiscriminatory social intercourse. Den believed that frequent social contacts with the Japanese was a convenient way for the Taiwanese to learn and practice their Japanese. Finally, the authorities had to take precautions to forestall the development of conflicts and frictions between Japanese employers and Taiwanese employees.49

Thirdly, education, in Den's opinion, was the foundation of the whole process of acculturation. It was therefore essential for the government to enforce compulsory education in the future and to draft plans to institute a system of higher learning. In the meantime Den planned to carry out a reform of the existing education system. Since the school-age children of Taiwan could not all be accommodated by the existing public elementary schools established exclusively for Taiwanese children, he aimed to increase the number of such schools and to spread elementary education as widely as possible. Moreover, Den said, it was essential and expedient that the government adopt a program of integrated education (kyogaku) for the Japanese and Taiwanese. The Japanese language problem of the Taiwanese children made it difficult to carry out integrated education at the primary school level. Den's decision was thus to implement integrated education
at and above the middle school level. Through the integrated schooling in middle schools and colleges, Den hoped that the colonial government would be able to provide Taiwanese youth with greater educational opportunity above the primary school level.\textsuperscript{50} In framing the education program Den insisted the Japanese authorities take cognizance of the need to inculcate in the Taiwanese people a sense of loyalty to the Japanese imperial family and of duty to the Japanese state.\textsuperscript{51}

Den declared that the acculturation or assimilation of the islanders was to be a gradual but steady process. No satisfactory result could be expected in a short period of time, he cautioned his subordinates. In addition to providing regular schooling for the people, particularly the youth, the Japanese officials should make efforts to change the languages, customs and manners of the indigenous populations. A successful spiritual union between the Japanese and the Taiwanese could be forged through these means and would have a tremendous impact on the lives of the people.\textsuperscript{52}

Den also said that the government intended to civilize the aborigines, who were not of Chinese descent and accounted for about two percent of the island’s population. To achieve this goal, the Japanese planned to educate them, to employ them in peaceful economic pursuits, to provide them with free medicine and medical care, to supply them with arable land, dwelling and draft animals, and to adopt other measures for their protection. The most important of these was the program to make agriculture the primary gainful activity of the aborigines, for the Japanese believed that by involving the aborigines in agricultural pursuits even the most militant and backward aborigines could be civilized.\textsuperscript{53}

As a concomitant of his policy of acculturation, Den wanted to gradually extend the "benefits of civilization" beyond the confines of the metropolitan areas. Ever since the Japanese takeover of Taiwan, according to Den, major cities had received great attention from the authorities and had been so steadily improved that "they have almost surpassed even Tokyo and Osaka in terms of general [physical] establishments" while the "conditions in the villages still remain virtually indistinguishable from those during the period of Ch‘ing rule." In the attempt to extend modern facilities to the countryside, the government would have to establish public
schools, improve roads and bridges, and introduce sanitary facilities to the rural communities. Other measures should also be adopted one by one. To prepare the ground for the aforementioned projects, Den reasoned, it was imperative that the authorities introduce the appropriate system of local government (*chiho seido*) for the island of Taiwan. The local governments, when organized, would be entrusted with the responsibility of undertaking various public enterprises.

According to Den's time-table, the Taiwanese would be allowed to progress to "the stage of political equality" with the Japanese only when they had finally become "truly Japanese." Thus, Den clearly had made political rights the reward in inducing the Taiwanese people to accept Japanese acculturation. Unquestionably, the Japanese were slightly more willing to accord the indigenous people social and educational equality than political equality. This is probably understandable, since, in the view of the colonial rulers, political rights can easily be employed by colonial subjects as effective weapons against colonial rule.

After Den Kenjiro had left Taiwan in September, 1923 for a ministerial post in the newly formed Yamamoto cabinet, those who succeeded him in the post of Taiwan governor-general continued to accord top priority to Den's acculturation or assimilation policy. The dissimilar temperaments of the later governors-general as well as the changing political atmosphere in Japan, however, contributed to different emphases on various aspects of the policy.

Izawa Takio, the third civil governor-general, for instance, embraced a more liberal version of the assimilation policy. He was greatly influenced by his deceased elder brother, Izawa Shuji who was the first education chief in Taiwan and until his death in 1917 had been a strong advocate of the assimilation ideal and had favored an all-out educational effort to facilitate the assimilation of the people of Taiwan. Izawa Takio's concern for Taiwan was so great that instead of accepting an invitation to join Kato Komei's cabinet in the summer of 1924 he had requested the governor-generalship of Taiwan. Before departing for service in Taiwan, Izawa Takio gave a press conference and said, among other things, that the subject of his mission to the island concerned the three million Taiwanese rather than the much smaller number of Japanese nationals in Taiwan. His statement
aroused much criticism from influential Japanese in Taiwan for they thought that Izawa was concerned with the welfare of the indigenous people and not that of his own fellow countrymen.

In the policy statement he delivered on September 21, 1924, Izawa stressed the importance of "the imperial virtue of impartiality (isshi dojin no seitoku)." Unlike most Japanese, who used the term for its propaganda value, Izawa appeared to mean what he said. In the aforementioned speech, Izawa stated that "the imperial virtue of impartiality has no bounds, and the peace and happiness [that stem from it] will be equally enjoyed by people far and near." He made known his belief that "It is necessary that the welfare of [the people of] Taiwan and that of the nation [Japan] be advanced simultaneously, and the Taiwanese sentiment and its Japanese counterpart be allowed to influence each other so as to ensure thorough reconciliation (konzen yuwa) and lasting coexistence and co-prosperity (kyoson kyoei)." Izawa saw that the island was strategically situated in East Asia and rich in natural resources and thus was the subject of an important cultural and economic mission. To fulfill such a mission, he said, it was imperative that the Japanese officials and the people of Taiwan be in compliance of the spirit of the kingly way and engage in cooperation.

It is not difficult to see why Taiwan held economic importance for Japan, but the island's cultural significance to the Japanese requires comment. The Sino-Japanese relation had not been amiable since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, but it grew worse after Japan handed the Chinese government the notorious Twenty-one Demands in 1915. In Japan, a proposal was advanced for forging a united front with China to counter the Western influence in East Asia. Supporters of this doctrine assigned a special role to Taiwan and expected the Taiwanwse to help bridge the differences between the two East Asian nations. It is in this sense that Taiwan was of particular cultural value to Japan. In order to fulfill the mission expected of Taiwan, Izawa believed that Japanese officials and the Taiwanese must cooperate with each other. To secure Taiwanese support, the Japanese government had to end its discriminatory treatment of the people of Taiwan.

Kamiyama Mitsunosuke succeeded Izawa Takio as the governor-general in July 1926. Like Izawa, Kamiyama was a lib-
eral chief colonial executive and was considered by many Taiwanese intellectuals to be sympathetic toward Taiwanese sufferings and complaints. And, like Izawa, Kamiyama stressed "imperial impartiality." In addition, he considered the fusion of different ethnic groups or what he termed the "ethnic fusion (minzoku yuwa)" as the means for advancing the culture and economy of Taiwan and aspired to make the island a permanent and integral component of the Japanese empire.\(^\text{63}\)

It is significant that Kamiyama advanced the concept of "ethnic fusion" rather than acculturation or even assimilation, the latter two terms which connoting the absorption of a supposedly inferior race by a supposedly superior one. According to Kamiyama "the concept of fusion is based on [racial] equality." There was no distinction in the quality of the three races in Taiwan: Japanese, Taiwanese and the Takasago people (Takasago zoku), a value-free term Kamiyama coined to refer to the aborigines whom both the Japanese and Taiwanese regularly called "savages (seiban)." Kamiyama believed that it was history and the environment that had contributed to cultural differences among peoples. Even when one race was considered either as superior or inferior, Kamiyama argued, it still had both its strength and shortcomings. Consequently, there was no need to praise one and belittle the other.\(^\text{64}\)

"Ethnic fusion" could not be attained by resorting to coercion.\(^\text{65}\) For a complete fusion of the three peoples of Taiwan, Kamiyama proposed three major peaceful means.\(^\text{66}\) The best and ultimate method was to promote the practice of interracial marriage. Kamiyama acknowledged that it would not be easy to convince the people, particularly the Japanese since they considered themselves to be of superior racial stock, but he view the spread of intermarriage as a goal worth striving for.

The second method for bringing about an "ethnic fusion" was the immigration of a significant number of Japanese settlers to Taiwan. Kamiyama was well aware of the probability that an ill-planned large-scale Japanese migration to the island would lead to keen competition with the indigenous inhabitants for employment opportunities. Hence, to protect the interests of the Taiwanese and aborigines, Kamiyama considered it imperative to first investigate suitable locations and appropriate economic pursuits for the Japanese would-be migrants.\(^\text{67}\)
Japanese Assimilation

The last, but not the least important, method was the utilization of education to bridge the language gap between the Japanese and the indigenous people. Though he was not sure about the wisdom of having written Chinese taught in school, he, nevertheless, suggested that the ability of an individual to comprehend both the Japanese and Taiwanese languages would not only be advantageous to the individual himself but also contribute to the eventual fusion of different races in Taiwan.68

The doctrine of "ethnic fusion" was doubtlessly the most progressive one that had been advanced for coping with the indigenous inhabitants of Taiwan. Kamiyama, the chief proponent of this theory, however, was realistic enough to qualify his own proposal. He was of the opinion that, due to differences in cultural level, customs and manners among the three peoples of Taiwan, there was no way to assure absolute equality for these peoples right away. Consequently, the government, first of all, had to mitigate the cultural differences among these three peoples. Kamiyama proposed the promotion of a spirit of mutual respect as a way to lessen the frictions stemming from cultural differences. When encountering problems, officials as well as private citizens should strive to settle disputes on the basis of justice rather than on the basis of their racial biases. Unrestrained racial consciousness would inevitably lead to racial hostility of one toward the other and thus endanger public order. Consequently, speeches and activities inciting racial prejudices must not be tolerated.69 Kamiyama instructed the indigenous people of Taiwan that they should observe Japan's constitution, laws and regulations and strive to obtain full rights and fulfill the duties of imperial subjects. On the other hand, he urged the ultimate abolition of institutionalized discrimination against the island's indigenous people.70

The idea of fusing the peoples in Taiwan was reiterated time and again by some of Kamiyama's successors on the island. There was, however, a noticeable shift of emphasis in their attitudes toward the assimilation policy. For them, the essential and most urgent matter was the transformation of the people into "loyal imperial subjects (churyo naru teikoku shimin)." They talked about instilling in the people the Japanese "national spirit (kokumin seishin)" and to strengthen their understanding of the Japanese "concept of national polity (kokutai kannen)."71
The increasing militarization of Japan dictated the shift of focus from "ethnic fusion" to "Japanization (Nihonkokuminka)." This major change began around 1929. The essence of "Japanization," a new version of the assimilation policy, can best be seen in the policy statements and writings of Kawamura Takeji, the fifth civil governor-general who began his assignment in June 1928. To him, the fundamental principle for governing Taiwan was "the extension of Japan (naichi encho)." Kawamura interpreted this as "making Taiwan into [an integral part] of the homeland (Taiwan no naichika)" and "Japanization of the Taiwanese (Taiwanjin no Nihonkokuminka)." To be more specific, the governor-general was not content with merely effecting superficial changes in Taiwan, but aimed at making the island "a territorial component of the homeland" with a status "equivalent to [that of a prefecture in] the homeland." As for the local inhabitants, he aspired to make them Japan's imperial subjects who would "dress, eat and live the way the Japanese do, use the Japanese language regularly, and embrace our national spirit like the Japanese."72

Japan had a promising decade in the 1920s when liberalism was the spirit of the times and internationalism was the means in Japanese foreign policy.73 In the 1930s, however, political situations, both in and out of Japan, changed. Japanese state and society were becoming more militaristic and expansionistic. In the early 1930s Japan's attention was directed chiefly to Manchuria, but from the mid-1930s on Japan began to divert part of its energy southward toward South China and Southeast Asia. In this process, the Japanese adopted the "southward advancement policy (nanshi seisaku)" with Taiwan as the major base of Japan's operations in the south.74 Taiwan was labelled "the key to linking Japan with South China and the South Seas [Southeast Asia]," "the stepping stone of Japan's southward advance," and so on.75 The colonial authorities in Taiwan invariably granted high priority to the execution of this southern policy.

To entice the local population to support the Japanese programs, particularly those geared to the implementation of the southward advancement policy, the colonial authorities exerted ever greater efforts to assimilate the Taiwanese. Assimilation then became even more closely tied with the Japanese patriotic notion of loyalty and devotion to the state while liberal tendencies
previously associated with assimilation matters faded from the local scene. After the full-scale war between Japan and China had broken out in July, 1937, assimilation became less a local endeavor fostered by Japanese authorities in Taiwan and more a Tokyo-inspired imperial program under which the colonial subjects of the Japanese empire were regimented. As utilized in the Japanese patriotic movement of kominka (literally, "imperialization of [colonial] subjects"), assimilation entailed stringent wartime duties for the Taiwanese, as well as the Koreans and the people of Manchuria.\textsuperscript{76} While previously they adopted a gradualistic approach, the Japanese now attempted to drastically transform the Taiwanese into "reliable and loyal imperial subjects" who would not only refrain from posing a threat to Japan's security but would also contribute directly to the Japanese war effort.

As has been shown, changing situations both in Japan and, to a lesser extent, in Taiwan affected the attitudes of the Japanese colonial officials toward the policy of assimilation. Overall, however, the Japanese authorities had stubbornly clung to the assimilation ideal during their fifty-one-year administration in Taiwan. What makes the Japanese experience rather unique is that the policy of assimilation had been losing its popularity among the Western colonial powers when Japan acquired in 1895 its first colony, Taiwan. Of all the colonial nations, France had been the staunchest advocate of the assimilation policy but by the early 1900's it too replaced assimilation with a policy of association that encouraged the retention of the indigenous people's customs and institutions -- and allowed a large degree of local administrative autonomy.\textsuperscript{77} The reasons for Japan's embracing what appeared to be an out-dated, if not impossible, cause are to be found in the factors that had contributed to Japan's original adoption of the assimilation policy.

The Japanese were excited with the acquisition of their first overseas territory and wanted to retain it permanently. They regarded the assimilation policy as the only effective means to achieve their goal because if the Taiwanese were not made to become loyal and dependable subjects of Japan, Japanese control over Taiwan could never be secure. National pride also had played a role, particularly in the early years of the Japanese rule in Taiwan. Westerners had expressed doubts about Japan's ability. The Japanese leaders were determined to demonstrate to the
West that Japan could and would succeed in its colonial enterprise. In order to impress the West, some Japanese political leaders, including Ito Hirobumi, rhetorically urged that the Taiwanese be treated "equally" and assimilated. 

More importantly, the Japanese entertained the view that the rulers and the ruled in Taiwan belonged to the "same race (doshu)," shared the "same script (dobun)," and followed the "same religion (dokyo)." Colonial rulers governing alien lands were invariably plagued by the language problem that obstructed communication between themselves and their subjects. The same problem troubled the Japanese in their administration of Taiwan, and consequently compelled them to devote considerable effort to popularize their language among the peoples of Taiwan. This problem, however, was significantly minimized by the fact that the Japanese written language was developed from the Chinese script. A large number of Chinese characters were used in written Japanese. The use of what was basically the same script, therefore, made it easier for the Taiwanese to learn Japanese.

Aside from sharing the same script, both the Taiwanese and their colonial masters observed the "same religion." The Taiwanese lived by Confucian ethics while the Japanese were regulated by a value system that was highly imbued with Confucian moral values. Though the Japanese colonial officials frowned upon the Confucian tradition of literary pursuits that they considered impractical, they had little reason to be unhappy with an ethical system that, when adroitly employed, could aid the maintenance of social and political stability.

Finally, unlike almost all other colonial cases where the ruler and the ruled belonged to different racial groups, Taiwan was unique in that the Japanese and the Taiwanese were both Mongoloid. The racial and cultural similarities between the Taiwanese and the Japanese helped considerably to bridge the gap that invariably existed between the alien rulers and the indigenous people. This was the advantageous factor that no Occidental nation could dream of in governing an Oriental people. And, in the final analysis, this is no doubt the most important reason why Japan embraced the assimilation ideal in Taiwan.
When I was asked by the organizers of this conference to prepare a paper about the "changing role of women in rural Taiwan" I was reluctant to accept. The subject had been the focus of my research and writing for the past ten years and I questioned whether I had anything new to say. I the effort to convince me to accept, one of the organizers said, "Compare younger women and older women -- younger women/modern roles, older women/traditional roles." This paper is the product of my test of his hypothesis.

This paper is based on data collected in Hsin Hsing, a village that has changed over the past thirty years from an economic system primarily based on agriculture to one founded predominantly on off-farm employment. As I began analyzing these data, it became clear that I needed some operational definitions. What did I mean by "young" or "old", and what was a "modern" or a "traditional" role? In answering these questions, I adopted the following definitions. First, I defined young as 20 to 39 years of age--most married women in the village begin and complete child bearing during these years--and old as 50 years of age and over; villagers consider the marriage of sons and the birth of grandchildren to mark the beginning of old age, and most Hsin Hsing women achieve this status by age fifty. (Middle-age, then, became 40 to 49 years of age.)

Second, I defined a women's role as the work she identified as her primary activity, that is, the activity to which she devoted most of her time. Third, I defined a "traditional" role as work associated with the management and maintenance of the household, and a "modern" role as work traditionally dominated by men -- that is, farming and off-farm employment, with or without remuneration. It might be argued that farming and helping with a family business fall within the traditional definition of the female role. But in Taiwan, such activities had been secondary to women's primary responsibility for the household. Finally, because I assumed household structure would be related to women's roles, I defined an extended household as one in
which two married women of different generations were in residence, and a conjugal unit as one in which only one married woman was in residence.\textsuperscript{2}

Having adopted these definitions, it became apparent as I began to work with the data that I could neither support nor reject the hypothesis. The women in the village did not fall into neat, dichotomous groups. Patterns emerged but so did exceptions. My attempt to explain these exceptions led to the retitling of the paper and to the inclusion of, what I considered, the critical variable -- the process of development.

The impact of this process varied across households, and its effects were experienced differently by women in different age cohorts and women in the same age cohort. Some young women and some middle-aged women were working and constructing hopeful futures. Others were working to secure their subsistence. Almost half of the old women, however, were struggling to survive.

The purpose of the paper, then, become a discussion of the impact of development on the work and lives of women in Hsin Hsing. In the paper, I begin by describing the village in 1958 and showing how it changed in response to development. Then, I examine how the assumption of roles by women was conditioned by the circumstances in which they were embedded. In the final section, I discuss the results of my analysis and consider what the povertization of elderly women in Hsin Hsing suggests about the futures of today's young women in Taiwan.

**DEVELOPMENT IN HSIN HSING**

Hsin Hsing, one of 22 villages in Puyen township, Zhanghua county, is a nucleated village located beside a road that runs between the market towns of Lugang and Qihu. Its people, like most in the area, are Hokkien (Minnan) speakers whose ancestors emigrated from the Chuanzhou and Zhangzhou areas of Fujian several hundred years age.

The registered population of the village in 1958 was 609 people in 99 households (\textit{hu}) or economic families (\textit{jia}). Approximately four-fifths of the population was between the ages of one and forty-four years, and slightly less than half was male (see Table 1). Conjugal families predominated, accounting for 66 per-
Women in Rural Taiwan

percent of village families (56 percent of the population). In contrast, only 5 percent of village families (10 percent of the population) were of the joint type, while the remaining 29 percent of families (35 percent of the population) lived in stem families.

During the 1950s, no significant industries or job opportunities existed locally and land was the primary means of production. Almost all families were agriculturists, deriving most of their livelihood from two crops of rice, marketable vegetables grown in the third crop, and, in some cases, wages from farm labor. Men worked in the fields, taking care of tasks such as plowing, harrowing, transplanting, irrigating, and harvesting, and assumed responsibility for the care of oxen which provided the major draft power in plowing and hauling as well as "backyard fertilizer" to meet agricultural demands. Women managed the house and children, helped with agricultural chores such as weeding fields and drying rice, dried and preserved crops, raised poultry, and, in their "spare time," wove fiber hats at home to supplement the family income.

Wet rice cultivation, however, required cooperation beyond the family to meet labor demands at various stages of the rice production process: extra laborers were needed to transplant and harvest so that these tasks could be completed within a short time span; cooperation was also required to ensure an adequate water supply from the irrigation system. Men, therefore, exchanged labor with male kin and neighbors to work their family farms.

The situation in the village began to change in the 1950s and early 1960s as the growing population pressure on the land created problems of underemployment and farms too small to support family members. Increasing numbers of men began to migrate to the larger cities of the province to seek jobs and supplemental income (Gallin and Gallin 1974). The stream continued throughout the 1960s and labor shortages became acute, farm profits decreased, and agricultural production declined. (In Taiwan as a whole, production leveled off and varied by a small amount from year to year in the late 1960s (see Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1979:59). The stream of migration and decline in production might well have continued in Hsin Hsing but for certain national and international developments in the 1970s.

The government's policy of export-oriented industrialization had brought about rapid urbanization and migration from rural
areas to cities during the 1960s. Large segments of the rural population had been absorbed by urban industry, and the value of a farmer's production in 1972 was only one-fifth that of an off-farm worker's production (Huang 1981:3). To stem the stagnation of agriculture, in 1972 the government abolished the rice-fertilizer barter system and in 1973 it instituted a guaranteed rice price and enacted the Accelerated Rural Development Program (Yu 1977). The implementation of these policies created a climate in which farmers believed they could derive profits from the cultivation of their land, and accelerated the move of industry -- which had begun in the 1960s -- to the countryside.4

These attempts to invigorate agriculture were followed by the oil crisis of 1974 and the world recession and inflation of 1974-75. The pace of industrialization in Taiwan's cities slowed (Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1979:78), and more than 200,000 urban workers lost their jobs (Huang 1981:163) as some factories shut down and others cut back production. The city began to lose the aura of El Dorado and the countryside began to acquire one of promise.

A comparison of structure of the village population in 1979 with the population in 1958 suggests one outcome of these developments. By 1979 only 382 people lived in Hsin Hsing, but the proportion of males had increased to 50.9 percent (see Table 1). In part, this increase reflected a decline in male emigration and a rise in the migration of unmarried females to urban areas. But the difference also indicated the return of earlier emigrants in response to rising costs and intense competition for jobs in the cities, relative to rural areas.

Further examination of the data suggests another way in which the villagers responded to national and international developments. By 1979, conjugal family households no longer predominated in the village; only 45 percent of households (30 percent of the population) were of the simple type. Fully 18 percent of family households (34 percent of the population) were of the joint type, while the remaining 37 percent of family households (36 percent of the population) were of the stem form.

The reasons for this increase in joint families have been documented in detail elsewhere (Gallin and Gallin 1982a; Gallin 1984a and 1984b). Suffice to say that villagers believed that this type of family provided the means for socioeconomic success in a
changing world. A family that included many potential wage workers, as well as other members who could manage the household, supervise children, and care for the land, had a better chance of diversifying economically than did a family of small size.

Economic change also accompanied national and international developments. Labor-intensive factories, service shops, retail stores, and construction companies burgeoned in the local area. By 1979, seven small satellite factories, three artisan workshops, and twenty-six shops and small businesses had been established in the village, and resident families derived eighty-five percent of their income from off-farm employment. Fully 83.6 percent of village households continued to farm, however, and households engaged in both farming and off-farm work were by far the most common.

The change in the villagers' mode of employment was not simply a response to rural industrialization. Despite implementation of new policies, agriculture remained an unprofitable venture; on average, Hsin Hsing farmers realized less than NT $2,000 (US $55) from the rice they grew on .097 hectare of land in 1979. Nevertheless, they continued to cultivate the land because: (1) it was a source of food, i.e., rice; (2) the mechanization and chemicalization of agriculture had obviated the need for either a large or a physically strong labor force (see R.S. Gallin and A. Ferguson 1988); and (3) the decreased size of family farms -- in 1979 the average acreage tilled per farming household was .63 jia -- required less labor. In the next section, I turn to my attention to the way the demographic and economic changes described were related to women's work.

**WOMEN'S WORK IN HSIN HSING**

In 1979, 34 single women, age 16 years and older, were considered members of Hsin Hsing households. Their mean age was 19.9 years, suggesting that most village women married by the age of 23. Prior to their marriages, however, almost all single women worked off-farm (see Table 2). Only two unmarried women were students -- although three others worked during the daytime and attended school at night -- and thirty-two worked for salaries or wages.
The earnings of these single women, with the exception of a small amount retained as pocket money, were given to their parents to be used to supplement their families' incomes and to purchase their future dowries. In the view of their parents -- and in their own -- the young women worked either to advance the family's fortunes or to help subsidize its subsistence. They were sent by their parents to work, and few had a voice in the decision. As the father of two young women who assisted him in his small enterprise reported, in explaining his daughters' roles, "The family can make more money if they work in my business rather than in a factory."

Given women's lack of autonomy prior to marriage, did the structure of their lives change after they joined their husbands' families? An examination of married women in Hsin Hsing suggests one answer. In 1979, 98 married women lived in the village as members of either extended or conjugal households (see Table 3). Their mean age was 47.4 years and approximately half fell either below or above this average. The majority identified their primary activity with roles non-traditional for women: over one-quarter said they were wage laborers and entrepreneurs, and slightly fewer listed themselves as farmers or assistants in family business (see Table 4).

A woman's assumption of a role reflected a constellation of factors, including the economy, the structure of the household, and familial considerations. Some young women were off-farm workers, while others were farmers or housekeepers. And not all female workers were working off farm for similar reasons. The focus of the sections which follow is how being an off-farm worker, farmer, or housekeeper was conditioned by the circumstances in which a woman was embedded.

Off-farm Workers

Twenty-nine women identified work off farm as their primary activity; fifteen were members of extended households, while fourteen lived in conjugal units (see Table 4). Almost all female workers were members of households in which others in the family tilled the land. But fewer extended (1 out of 11) than conjugal (3 out of 14) units were landless, and extended households tilled more land on average (.82 jia) than conjugal households (.3 jia).

Workers living in extended households tended to be young (mean age 33.6 years) and to be married to men who also were
employed off farm. Twelve of the fifteen female workers had been encouraged to enter the industrial labor force by their parents. Realizing that employment off farm furthered the social mobility of the family, their mothers-in-law -- for example, supervising their role responsibilities during the daytime -- released them to work for remuneration.

Two young workers from extended households, however, lacked such a supportive family structure, and they worked off farm to secure their families' sustenance. One of these women was a 35-year-old deaf mute; her mother-in-law was retired, her four children were in school, and her husband, a farmer 25 years her senior tilled the family's .3 jia of land. "If it were not for her," he reported, "we would starve." The second woman was a 38-year-old widow who lived with her two school-age children and mother-in-law who was retired. In addition to working in a factory eight hours a day, twenty-eight days a month, this woman kept house and farmed the family's 1.6 jia of land with occasional help from her brother-in-law and father.

One other woman living in an extended household worked for wages, but she was 56 years old and a member of landless family. Her son was a carpenter, her daughter-in-law a housekeeper who cared for her infant son, and her 60 year-old husband was retired. It is unclear why the division of labor between the women of the family was organized as it was. Perhaps it reflected the fact that most daughters-in-law took seriously their obligation to produce heirs, and the majority (54.5 percent) of young married women did not enter the off-farm labor force until they had produced two sons. It also is unclear why the woman worked for remuneration while her husband did not. Perhaps this division reflected the fact that the demand for cheap labor is high in the rural area and women -- because they are more willing than men to accept low pay and lackluster jobs -- are the preferred employees.

Support for this reasoning can be found by examining the lives of the fourteen female workers who were members of conjugal households. In contrast to their counterparts in extended families, these women were middle-aged or older (mean age 47.6 years), and being old was associated with being married to a man who was not a member of the off-farm labor force.

Two women in their sixties worked for wages while their husbands farmed their small landholdings (mean .25 jia), and one
women in her fifties -- a member of a landless family -- labored in a factory to support herself and her unemployed husband. Contributions to the family treasury from unmarried children, in the case of two women, did augment their meager earnings. But the cost of this contribution was high. "I have no money to marry off my son," said one woman. "We need his wages to survive." One other women in her fifties also worked in a local factory. She was a widow and her two married sons lived and worked in Taibei with their families. Neither sent money to her -- "They live in poverty" she reported -- and she survived at a subsistence level.

Not all female workers in conjugal units, however, lived as precarious an existence as these four old women. Four wage laborers in their forties were married to men who also worked for remuneration, and their unmarried adult children were employed off-farm as well. These women were from land-poor families (mean .25 jia), but they were securing comfortable livelihoods and constructing hopeful futures off the land. A fifth woman, a 48-year-old widow, operated one of the three village stores. Her married sons worked and lived in Taibei with their families. But they regularly remitted money home to her, and one had sent his preschool-age daughter to live in the village so that, she said, "I could have company."

The remaining two wage laborers in their forties were both married to farmers who worked the families' small landholdings (mean .4 jia). Neither woman had children old enough to enter the off-farm labor force and both considered themselves the mainstay of their families. One in fact, when asked what her husband did most of the time replied, "He doesn't do anything." While this was not entirely true, the resources she provided in behalf of the family far outweighed his small contribution.

Only three women in their thirties who lived in conjugal units worked off farm. One woman was a 38-year-old barber who operated a small shop at the front of the village. Two of her unmarried sons worked for wages and she and her husband, a factory worker, tilled the family's .77 jia of land. The second woman was a 36-year-old factory worker. She was married to a mainlander, an army officer stationed in a large city, and she lived in the village with her three school-age children and 69-year-old father who tilled the family's .15 jia of land. Her husband remitted money to her regularly and her father reported that he helped by "cooking lunch and dinner and feeding the livestock."
The third young woman working off farm was a 38-year-old landless widow. Her husband, a policeman, had died in 1973, and she had migrated to Taibei to seek employment, leaving her eight-year-old son in the village with her brother-in-law and sister-in-law; they charged her for his room and board. She returned to the village in 1976 and, after working in a factory for a short period, she purchased a sewing machine so that she could earn money working at home. In 1979, she and her son subsisted on the NT$ 1950 (US $51.30) a month she earned and a small government pension. "I have to rely on myself," she said. "I don't want to ask my brother-in-law for help."

To summarize, female off-farm workers were not a homogeneous group. Some women worked to promote their families' futures, while others labored to secure their livelihoods. The families of young women who were members of extended households and of middle-aged women who were members of conjugal units tended to pursue the first strategy; the families of older women were likely to adopt the second.

These decisions were conditioned by both demand and supply factors. The needs of employers in the Hsin Hsing area for cheap labor are large, and women -- both young and old -- provide the ideal pool from which to recruit workers. Female villagers thus could easily find employment locally. Familial considerations acted as supply-side factors. Landless families (4 out of 29) were dependent on the industrial sector to maintain their economic solvency, while those who farmed harvested little more than food for consumption from the land they tilled. Relatives thus pressed women into remunerative activities to guarantee the family's survival or to advance its fortunes. Young women with mothers-in-law resident in the household worked off-farm because the older women assumed some of their role responsibilities. Women without mothers-in-law available waited until they were in their forties, and all their children were in school, to pursue paid employment. Old women abandoned their dreams of occupying the traditional mother-in-law role and went to work as wage laborers.

Farmers

Twenty-two married women identified their primary activity as farming. Twelve lived in extended households which tilled an average of .78 jia of land. Ten were members of conjugal units
and their families farmed approximately the same amount of land (mean .73 jia).

Half of the female farmers in extended households were mothers-in-law and, as might be expected, they were older than daughters-in-law who farmed (54.0 and 44.3 years, respectively). Five of the six mothers-in-law had daughters-in-law who worked off-farm (see Table 6). The sixth was the mother of a 37 year-old woman, said to be slow mentally, whose adopted-in-husband worked in the city and sent remittances to the family in Hsin Hsing.

The village-resident sons of four female farmers, like their wives, worked off-farm; one woman's son was in the army. In addition, two of the farmers' husbands worked for wages; the husbands of the other four identified themselves as farmers. What this means is that two-thirds (4 out of 6) of the mothers-in-law farmed in partnership with their farmer husbands -- thereby releasing married children to pursue employment off farm -- and one-third assumed primary responsibility for the farm while all other adults in the family worked off-farm.

Daughters-in-law who farmed, not surprisingly, had mothers-in-law who identified themselves as either retired or housekeepers (see Table 6), and who were older, on average, than mothers-in-law who farmed (72.5 and 54.0 years, respectively). Three of these farmers were married to men who worked off-farm, while the husbands of the three others identified themselves as farmers who earned wages as farm laborers and were working at odd jobs.

The families of the three daughters-in-law those husbands farmed, tilled on average, more land than those in which the women's husbands worked off-farm (.86 jia and .59 jia, respectively). Yet these three farming families did not consider their earnings from the land sufficient since the women's husbands also took occasional jobs to earn income. The decision to remain a farming family may, in two instances, have reflected the fact (1) that the husbands in these families were only sons whose fathers had "died many years ago," and/or (2) that the wives were relatively young women who had preschool-age children. Perhaps when their children enter school, these women will join the off-farm labor force to augment their families' incomes. In the meantime, they farm in partnership with their husbands to secure the families' livelihood.
The factors that underlay the third family's decision to remain a farm family are unclear; it tilled only about half as much land as the two other farming families (.6 jia in comparison to 1.0 jia). Small remittances from the family's two unmarried, migrant sons did little to supplement income from the land, and their married son rarely sent them money. "How can he send money home to his parents," his mother asked rhetorically, "when he earns only $80.00 (US $2.10) a day and must spend much of his earnings to repair his old truck and to pay the doctor's bills for his two children who are frequently sick"? The family had never attempted to rent additional land, as had the two others, to augment its meager landholdings. Perhaps the decision to remain a farm family had been based on the hope that the mother would raise filial sons who would assume responsibility for supporting their parents in their old age. This wish, however, had not been fulfilled and the woman faced an old age similar to that of the two old female farmers who lived in conjugal households.

One of these women was 60 years old, married to a farmer, and the mother of two married sons who lived and worked in Taibei. The old couple farmed .3 jia of land but, reported the woman, "We don't produce enough to sell or eat and we have to depend on my sons to send money home to meet expenses." In the changing world of the 1970s, however, remittances were not always forthcoming and the old woman and her husband eked out a precarious living from the land, one of eleven families in the village which did not own a refrigerator: "we have nothing to put in it," she said.

The second old farmer was 50 years old, also married to a farmer, and did not own a refrigerator. She and her husband tilled .4 jia of land, did not produce enough rice to sell, and subsisted on income from a variety of sources, as the following quote illustrates.

Our daily expenses to live come from the sale of vegetables in the third crop. But we make little profit since we must pay trucking and marketing charges. My daughter [16 years old] works in a factory in Lugang and earns $2,000 a month [US $52.63] . . . and my sons are in the military. One was conscripted but the other enlisted in the Air Force Academy so we get a subsidy of 22 kilograms of rice a month. Soon we'll apply for a 50 percent reduction in our electricity bill which
costs about $135 a month [US $3.55]. We can apply because I've got two sons in the military.

This woman's account provides empirical substance to the villagers' belief that farming is an unprofitable venture -- and helps explain the roots of the sexual division of labor in the eight other conjugal households in which the women were farmers. These eight women were young (mean age 35.9 years) and tilled an average of .83 jia of land, and six were married to men who worked off-farm. The husbands of the two other female farmers identified their primary activity as farming, but both men were diversifying economically in the agricultural sector: one raised over 500 chickens for wholesale sale, and the second plowed other people's land for wages using his own power tiller.

In actuality, then, none of the ten conjugal households depended solely on the land to live. They derived their livelihoods from a combination of sources and, in three-fifths (6 out of 10) of these households, women's assumption of primary responsibility for the farm had enabled their husbands to work for wages in the industrial sector.

In addition to these 22 female farmers, twenty-two other women reported that they farmed as their secondary activity. Seventeen of these women participated in the cultivation of both rice and vegetables, while five -- daughters-in-law who worked off-farm -- were drawn into the agricultural labor force only to help harvest vegetables in the third crop. With the exception of these five women, the secondary farmers appeared to do no less than female farmers who tilled the land in partnership with their husbands. There were differences, however. First, none of the secondary farmers, in contrast to the primary farmers, exchanged labor when the third crop was harvested. And second, the families of the secondary farmers tilled less land, on average, than those of the primary farmers (.58 and .76 jia, respectively).

To summarize, half (11 out of 22) of the female farmers worked in partnership with their husbands to till the land, and four of these eleven women were mothers-in-law who had assumed the role responsibilities of their daughters-in-law to release them for work off farm. The other eleven female farmers were farm managers in households where all other adults worked off-farm. These women hired people to plow, to transplant seedlings, and to harvest the rice crop, and they spent a great deal of time in the
field checking the flow of irrigation water, and applying herbicides, insecticides, and fertilizer. During the third crop, they planted and tended the vegetables exchanging labor with female relatives and neighbors. In short, these eleven women had become a primary rather than an auxiliary labor force within agriculture, participating in the public sector formerly dominated by the men of the village.

Housekeepers/Retirees

Thirty-nine women identified themselves as housekeepers -- 17 were living in extended units and 22 in conjugal units -- and eight women identified themselves as retirees. As might be expected, retired women lived in extended households and were among the oldest women in the village (see Tables 4 and 5). One of the eight women summed up the meaning of retirement when, in response to being asked what she did most of the time, she replied, "Eat and play [with pocket money married children supplied]." These women, because they had married children in the village, enjoyed the prerogatives of old age.

Having married children in the village, however, did not guarantee that an older woman could command the labor of her daughters-in-law to lighten her own workload. Six elderly women (mean age 65.2 years) also had adult children living in Hsin Hsing. But these women identified themselves as housekeepers. Four lived in extended households -- their daughters-in-law farmed or worked off farm -- and two lived in conjugal units.

The lives of the two women living in simple-type units were similar to, but in important ways different from, those of women who considered themselves retired. Like retirees, these two women neither cooked -- since they ate with the families of their daughters-in-law on a rotating basis -- nor farmed, and both also received "pocket money" from their sons. (One complained, however, that the NT $900 (US $23.68) she and her husband received monthly "was not enough.") In contrast to retirees, however, these two women lived in conjugal units, and they thus were required to maintain the household and to do piece work on a part-time basis to earn money they believed they needed.

Five other elderly women (mean age 66.4 years) also identified themselves as housekeepers, but they had no married children in the village. Their lives provided stark evidence that support of parents was not automatic in a changing world. Three, in addi-
tion to keeping house, helped their husbands farm the land (mean .76 jia) their city-based children refused to till. Two were from landless families: one woman wove straw hats to supplement sporadic remittances, which her sons provided, which she and her husband depended upon for their sustenance; the second woman helped her husband manage the small grocery store they operated in the village.

They had established the business, she openly reported, because "We have to depend upon ourselves." Her husband, however, was embarrassed to acknowledge the unfiliality of their children, as the following quote illustrates.

I was a junk peddler in Taibei for seven years [1967-73] but I returned to the village because I was too old for the work. While I was away my wife stayed in the village tilling the land, but when she could no longer farm we sold it and she worked for others weeding and harvesting vegetables. We opened the store because we thought we could help our sons by making our own living -- we wouldn't have to eat with them. We don't want to bother them for food and pocket money. We make enough to live on. Our profit is about $2,000 a month [US $52.63] and sometimes we can make almost $50.00 [US $1.32] a day cleaning snow peas.

In addition to the eleven housekeepers in their sixties, eleven women in their fifties (mean age 54.7 years) also were housekeepers: six were members of extended households and five lived in conjugal units. Two of the housekeepers living in extended households were mothers-in-law who kept house and cared for their grandchildren while their daughters-in-law worked off farm. The third was the daughter-in-law of the 86-year-old retiree. Her two sons were students and, in addition to keeping house, she farmed with her husband who operated a small trucking business.

The remaining three housekeepers living in extended households had daughters-in-law who also identified themselves as housekeepers. In one case, the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law were members of Hsin Hsing's wealthiest family (it operated a large rice mill). In the second, the daughter-in-law and her infant son lived with her mother-in-law, while her husband worked in a nearby city and remitted money home. In the third case, the mother and daughter kept house while the younger woman's adopted-in-husband farmed the family's 1.0 jia of land.
The five housekeepers in their fifties who lived in conjugal units also had married children, but they had no daughters-in-law resident in the village. One woman kept house and cared for her four grandchildren while her widowed son worked for wages. The other four women managed the village house, in addition to helping their husbands with the farm, while their daughters-in-law maintained homes in the city for their husbands and children. In contrast to housekeepers in their sixties who had no adult children in the village, however, these women’s lives were not fraught with uncertainty. Their married sons sent them money on a regular basis. The women were from land-poor families (mean .42 jia), but they had secured themselves material support by providing capital for the enterprises their sons operated.

Four housekeepers were in their forties (mean age 46.0 year) and, although their lives were different, they shared two characteristics: none had married sons, and all earned income doing piece work in their homes or working at odd jobs on and off the land. Two of these housekeepers were married to men who identified themselves as farmers, and their families were among the most land-poor in the village (tilling .2 and .3 jia, respectively). They subsisted on rice they produced, remittances from unmarried daughters, and money the women and their husbands earned working part-time. The third woman also was from a land-poor family (.3 jia) but her husband, three of her unmarried sons, and a single daughter worked off farm. The fourth woman, the youngest in the cohort, was married to a farmer who was diversifying economically in the agricultural sector. She worked under his direction tilling their 1.4 jia of land, and wove straw belts at home on a part-time basis to supplement their income.

Finally, thirteen women in their twenties and thirties (mean age 29.6 years) identified themselves as housekeepers. Seven lived in extended households and six were members of conjugal units. The three housekeepers living in extended households had mothers-in-law who also kept house, while two others had mothers-in-law who either worked off-farm or farmed (see above). The remaining two housekeepers living in extended units were the daughters-in-law of retirees. Both women had preschool-age children and, in addition to keeping house, they farmed the land (mean .63 jia) with their husbands who worked full time for remuneration off farm.
The six young housekeepers living in conjugal households were, with one exception, also the mothers of preschool-age children. The childless woman was the 20-year-old wife of an 18-year-old wage worker; she had been married to her husband when his brother, to whom she was engaged, was killed in a motorcycle accident. Her family was the second largest landholder in the village and she worked the unit's 1.7 jia with her father-in-law, who identified himself as a farmer. ²⁷

The families of three other young housekeepers also had land, and the women tilled it with their husbands who were off-farm workers. In contrast to the families of the six women in their age cohort who identified farming as their primary activity, however, the families of these three women were land poor. On average, they tilled .38 jia in comparison to female farmers in their twenties and thirties whose families tilled an average of .83 jia of land. The fourth and fifth young housekeepers were members of landless families. One was married to an entrepreneur who operated a machine shop in the village -- much to the annoyance of their neighbors -- and she occasionally helped him in his business. The second was married to a man who manufactured inexpensive suitcases for the domestic market.

To summarize, retirees and housekeepers were not a homogeneous group and their different lives reflected a constellation of factors. Women 60 years of age and older who had married children in the village enjoyed -- to a greater or lesser degree -- the rewards of old age. Their counterparts without village-based children, in contrast, lived lives of drudgery and loneliness, and survived at a subsistence level. Housekeepers in their fifties experienced a variety of life styles. Yet, while most held responsibilities which, in 1958, their daughters-in-law would have assumed, they were physically secure. They had constructed this security by controlling the resources necessary to fulfill the goals of adult children in their families. Housekeepers in their forties had no married children and they depended on a variety of sources of income either to subsist or to build toward a secure future. Finally, young housekeepers in their twenties and thirties had preschool-age children, and because most were from landless or land-poor families, they assisted their husbands in their businesses or in farming, and put their hope for their futures in the sons they were raising.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The focus of this paper has been the impact of development on women’s work. Data collected over a thirty-year period showed how women who primarily had performed domestic roles were transformed into workers in the agricultural and industrial sectors; almost all of the unmarried women in the village worked for salaries and wages, and the majority of the married women were employed outside the home. The data also showed that the impact of development on women’s work differed across households.

Young married women in extended households were off-farm workers, while middle-aged women were farmers. Young married women in conjugal households, by contrast, were farmers, while middle-aged women were off-farm workers. Fewer old women occupied non-traditional roles. Nevertheless, the experience of development for old women who occupied non-traditional roles also differed across households: in extended units, old women tended to be farmers; in conjugal units, they were more likely to be off-farm workers.

The entry of women into the farm and off-farm labor forces was a response to both changes in the economy and the needs of the family. The mechanization and chemicalization of agriculture led to a shift from human to fossil energy, and the dispersion and expansion of rural industry created a demand for low-cost labor. Both changes acted as centripetal forces, drawing women into activities formerly dominated by men. Familial considerations, in contrast, acted as centrifugal forces that propelled women into agriculture and industry. Relatives pressed women into non-traditional roles either to guarantee the family’s economic survival or to advance its fortunes.

While it might be argued that familial considerations such as these also were a force in decisions governing men’s lives, I contend that females had fewer life options than males. Despite the enactment of laws to enhance opportunities for education and to alter customary inheritance patterns, traditional rules continued to be applied in practice.

Women received less education and fewer family resources than men; their dowries -- to which they made substantial con-
tributions -- were their patrimony. Because they married out, an investment in them had little future value for the family. Provided with only a modicum of training and lacking control of the means of production, they were dependent on the family and their goals were defined for, not by, them.

Men, in contrast, ideally remained in the family and an investment in them was an investment in the family's future. But with rural industrialization, security was derived from income earned in a capitalist economy, not from land controlled by family elders. Once armed with skills and knowledge, men could sell their labor power and, if they chose, provide for a life independent of the larger family. Accordingly, they were neither as dependent on the family nor as consistently faithful to the norms of familism as were women.8

That the unpredictability of male conformity to traditional norms was not uncommon in Hsin Hsing can be seen from the fact that, with only few exceptions, the poorest villagers were old women (and old men) who had no married children living in the village. These women were unable either to provide services -- such as childcare while a daughter-in-law worked off farm -- or to rely on public criticism to pressure their adult children to discharge their filial responsibilities. In the absence of such supporting features of filial piety, the "shoulds" and "oughts" of xiao were compromised, and remittances to pay for their basic needs were not always forthcoming. Most survived at a subsistence level, a stark reminder that support for parents was not automatic in a changing world.

A key issue, then, is whether today's young women will be able to achieve a secure old age. Without a public welfare system, women know they must depend on children to support them in old age. Most therefore work to build their sons' tomorrows. Those women in their forties and fifties who had invested capital to help their sons establish businesses had provided their male offspring with very good reasons to fulfill their filial obligations. Whether women in their twenties and thirties will be able to construct a similar pattern of security is unclear.

Taiwan is dependent of foreign capital and trade, embedded in the world economy, and extremely vulnerable to international market fluctuations. To ensure that capital does not seek elsewhere for a labor force that is low cost and responsive to the
demands of business cycles, the government must maintain political stability and low wages. The ideology of patriarchal familism it encourages fosters the values and behaviors necessary to meet these goals.

By socializing women in norms of hard work, responsibility, and subordination to the interests of men and the family, the ideology perpetuates the female dependency and "family contracts" which serve the needs of the state. It presumes (1) that women will accept poorly-paid jobs in industry and till land that is no longer the mainstay of the family's livelihood in order to attain security and upward mobility through advancement of the family economy, and (2) that children, in exchange for the resources their parents invest in them, will assume responsibility for their mothers and fathers in their old age. The ideology thus produces the labor force necessary to maintain the employment practices that underpin the economy, and it allows the government to allot money from the budget -- money that might otherwise have to be spent on a social welfare infrastructure -- for investment in security and defense.

To the extent that Taiwan continues its current policy, economic development may continue to perpetuate the povertization of old women. The unpaid agricultural work and underpaid industrial labor of most women in Hsin Hsing are unlikely to produce sufficient capital to enable them to influence, in any appreciable way, their sons's employment opportunities. In the absence of this primary supporting feature of filial piety, today's young women may find their situation in old age as fraught with insecurity as that of the female elderly in Hsin Hsing.
Over a century ago, a philosopher spoke of the "dead hand of history" weighing upon and holding back the present. In Taiwan the dead hand comes with an authoritative voice, the voice of the nation-state academic. One needn't search out a shaman at the local temple to commune with this spirit world; National Taiwan University's sociology department seems to have the requisite psychic powers. Although dead for four years, its departed department chairman presented a paper in the state-sponsored 1987 "International Conference on Taiwan, ROC: a Newly Industrialized Society."

In perfect English the spectral sociologist professed that there is but one genuine national or ethnic category on Taiwan: Chinese. Those of us attending the seance "heard" him say that some so-called 'China experts' assert that the Chinese and the Taiwanese are two different ethnic groups. In other words, they do not consider the Taiwanese as Chinese. This is a gross error, probably due to their ignorance of Chinese history, or their political bias, or their misunderstanding of the words 'ethnic', 'Chinese', and 'Taiwanese.'

To understand the tension in his voice, the listener had to know the power of names. Once one has accepted the names of ethnicity and nationality as objective qualities, the transformation set ethnicity:nationality:nation-state indexed by the names Chinese and Taiwanese, can be invoked to protect or topple states. State owned sociology spared no effort asserting that Chinese is an ethnicity and Taiwanese is a subset of Chinese; so long as the names are rectified, the spirits will be content.

The agitated state that speaks through Professor Lung repeated these proper categories through the mouths of every school child, every organ of mass communication. Every simple act of birth and death fell into one of the two bowls, Taiwanese or mainlander. State orchestrated practice makes these words stand up solid, as if they were categories found in nature, obedience to whom dictated that the islanders and the new immigrants be understood as subordinated to a non-existent spa-
tial polity -- the Republic of China. What had been no more than the lifeworld contrast of migrant-native that could, indeed must, change became frozen into nature through the spatial units of the imaginary polity -- *sheng*, province. Every person was of either Taiwan *sheng* or Other *sheng* as much as she or he had a sex, an age, and a name. The true source of consent to KMT rule lay temporarily out of reach in the absent cluster of *sheng* that is China. Difference between persons labeled Taiwanese and mainlander was made to testify to the existence of that unconsummated consent in the bodies of the second and third generation -- mainlanders who by the patrilineal inheritance of a native place were of provinces they had never seen.

Yet their were Others neither of this province nor the others. As I wondered "What about the aboriginal peoples?" the academic apparition seemed to read my mind:

> Some of their boys have become well-known athletes, and one of their girls has become a popular singer and movie star not only in Taiwan but also in East Asia. Undoubtedly, things like these could never have happened to them if Taiwan had not been restored to China.¹

"They've got rhythm and their boys are good athletes. I've heard that somewhere before." Suddenly contact was broken. Unlike the normal process of presenting papers, there was no channel through which to question Professor Lung about what makes a real ethnicity, a real nationality. Instead I use this paper as the "medium" to address my own answer to interested friends and Professor Lung's heirs, the Chinese and the Taiwanese academic nationalists.

Today I want to present two conclusions from my research into social classification. First, the pattern of uneven resource distribution suggests two analytic classifications, an opposition, that did not exist before 1945. That opposition on paper flows in John Comaroff's general formulation from the terms under which formerly separate peoples were brought together into a single social division of labor -- the terms of incorporation.² Second, I suggest that both the Chinese nationalists and their Taiwanese reflections err in supposing that these analytically constructed categories imply a "natural form" of state domination, a Chinese or a Taiwanese Nation-State. The dead hand only works through
the living, and in that sense Professor Lung was as much in that room as anyone else.

I. WORK: SECTORS AND OCCUPATIONS

The imposition of categorical form, whether ethnicity, sheng-chi (provincial "origin") colored, or citizen, everywhere proceeds through officializing codification and producing-reproducing lifeworlds. The work of naturalizing artificial categories must by its centrality to the life-world happen in Work. At the time the mainlanders and Taiwanese were brought together in island space, the Chinese state was in flight. Much of the leadership had abandoned service to Chiang Kai-shek for safer if less glorious careers. A head of security became a chicken farmer in New Jersey, continuing his former specialty of dispatching the defenseless.

With the hard core of the Chiang clique forced into minority status in Taiwan, KMT documents show no trace of concern for what the islanders (people who had never been part of the Republic of China) would wish about their political life. They were to be made subjects of the KMT state. Complementing the White Terror, an array of symbolizing institutions forged a compelling historical (often prehistorical) category of Chinese nation to absorb Taiwan and obviate the need for discussion about peoples, states, and rights. In this atmosphere of internal terror, external warfare, and mythic majesty, the state sector became the refuge of the refugees. It made mainlanders.

STATE AND PRIVATE SECTORS

In the beginning, a "Taiwan Miracle" of capitalist export-led development was not in the cards. Taiwan's private sector at the time of incorporation collapsed in passage between states into the hands of KMT looters.

In the lived world macro trends appeared as the special experience of state employees. State employees received supplements of key commodities. Many were given state-owned housing. Major units had their own versions of the PX, Fu-li she, providing everything from scarce food stuffs to hair styling at a discount. Above all, state employees possessed the iron rice bowl. Unlike everyone outside the KMT embrace, their jobs were secure, so long as the state survived.
These jobs were largely given over to people who, like the KMT, came from the mainland. Central administration, party, and police were overwhelmingly mainlander. The pattern was only slightly more equitable at the provincial level. Between 1946 and 1951, the period of incorporation, the number of provincial employees (including teachers) rose by 40%. This expansion occurred mainly among persons over 25 years of age, largely persons from China. Although they were employees of Taiwan Province, nearly 2/3 of the staff were Chinese from other provinces who did not speak the first language of Taiwan Province.

In the decisive early 70's, this particular pattern was reversed. As the proportion of Taiwanese began to increase, the new hires came from those entering the work force. Conversely, the cohorts which had entered during the mainlander migration began to decline in numbers. The national level in particular and the state sector in general, however, remain the special preserve of mainlanders. Despite the growth of the private sector and some limited moves towards privatization of public enterprises, employment in government and state-owned enterprises declined only slightly through the mid-1980's.

Counter to the image of a shift towards a prosperous private sector and a half-full iron rice bowl, public enterprises and government work continued to pay well. The mean 1988 income for workers in the public sector was almost double that of workers in the private sector (336,137 NT dollars and 174,569 NT). Since the figures are for full-time workers, it is unlikely that including income from sideline employment in the informal sector would substantially change the balance. The income distributions of the sectors had fairly similar distributions as summarized by the standard deviations of 181,249 NT Dollars in the private sector and 178,983 NT in the public sector.

Experience in other societies suggests that part of the income difference between the public and private domains might stem from the concentration of better paying occupations in the public sector. For heuristic purposes OLS regression was used to ask whether sector has a bearing on income apart from the distribution of occupations between the sectors. The results are consistent with descriptive statistics and suggest that pay in the public sector may be higher on average than in the private sector,
The few with substantial economic or credential capital can earn a better income in the ceilingless private sector, but this analysis supports the view that the public sector is not a refuge of last resort.³

Today, Taiwanese outnumber mainlanders in the ranks of public employees by three to one, yet a larger proportion of recent mainland cohort enters these positions. This may sound puzzling until we shift our vantage point from that of the public sector to that of each group. In 1988, 20% of the mainlanders and 10% of the Taiwanese were employed in government or state-owned enterprises. Direct discrimination has faded in the process of gaining a public job, but having appropriated objective differential probabilities of success to practical consciousness, members of each group reproduce ethnic distinction in strategic choices.

An age breakdown of mainland state employees reveals the continuing effects of the peculiar age and class structure of the settler population. Mainlanders are the majority of state employees in the oldest group of workers. Near age 50, the proportion of mainlanders in the public employ suddenly drops. These men mark the wartime and migration gap in the mainland age distribution; they were the greatly reduced group of men who would have been 15 and under at the time of flight from the Mainland. At the time of settlement on Taiwan, adult mainland men constituted over a third of their age groups and passed their native place or chi-kuan to a new generation. With the entry of these children into the labor market, the proportion of mainlanders in public employment rises again to reach 29% in the youngest age group (IE88).

If we consider only those who grew up on Taiwan, the proportion of mainlanders in the public sector actually increases. Using probit analysis to calculate the likelihood of being in the public sector for persons working outside of agriculture, we find that they have a better chance of getting in above and beyond the advantage which we might expect from their higher levels of education.

The coefficients express the change in standard deviation units for probability of access to public sector jobs, given years of education and chi-kuan. During the early days of incorporation, mainlanders often could enter government and public firms on the strength of chi-kuan or sponsorship. Given the shift to highly
competitive examinations and a narrowing of the education gap, it is somewhat surprising to note that probit coefficients remain fairly constant when analysis is restricted to Taiwanese and main­landers who grew up together in the new order. Weakened, ethn­icity as an analytic category still works through transfer mechanisms, cultural capital, and a sense of the possible as a transformational principle, in Lieberson's terms, bending various inputs into the same outcome -- a greater probability of main­lander entry into the public sector.4

OCCUPATIONS

Occupation in the late 80's, especially the division between mental and manual labor, forms another axis of objective differ­ence between mainlanders and Taiwanese. An occupational distribution calculated from the Income and Expenditure Survey for 1988 shows the distribution of each group across occupa­tional categories. Technical, managerial, supervisory, and profes­sional occupations, the domains of mental work with their attached prestige, autonomy, and authority, are occupied by mainlanders far in excess of their proportion in the population. Taiwanese have achieved some parity in managerial positions, although Sheu has shown this to be confined to the private sec­tor.5 To go beyond these appearances, trends over time must be considered. How to measure these trends in relative advantage presents a difficult problem.

The conventional methods of status attainment are inappropria­te to this problem as they focus on individual variation and leave out the system in which individual variation happens, the social context which makes a certain attribute capital or liability.6 Lieberson's heuristic analogy - the status attainment approach to gravity - helps distinguish these two kinds of pro­jects. Gravity is most obvious in the falling of objects. Analog­ically, the occupational mobility approach would be concerned with the different velocities (read social economic status [SES]) of different bodies such as a feather and a brick (read sons). Factors such as density and shape of the object (read parental income and father's education) are considered until all of the variation in velocity (SES) between the objects (sons) is "explained." The explanation is of differences in velocity, not what causes the movement itself and "[s]omething must be wrong if social
researchers think they have a full grasp of falling objects without ever invoking gravity [read division of labor]."7

Our discussion of the social structure underlying the value of work requires that we know the degree to which the categories pen-sheng and wai-sheng are in fact distinct in the world of work. Here I use measures based on Lieberson's (1975) Index of Net Difference (ND).8 The index used here is modified from the version developed by Fossett and South9 as

\[
ND_{mt} = 100 \times \left( \sum C_i T_i - \sum T_i C_i \right)
\]

The first product in parenthesis is the probability that a mainland selected at random will be in an occupation ranked higher than that of a Taiwanese similarly selected at random. The second gives the probability that a Taiwanese selected at random will be in an occupation of higher rank than the occupation of a mainland selected at random.10 The difference between these probabilities is NDmt, the degree of advantage enjoyed by being classed as a mainland in allocation to occupational positions. A score of minus 100 would tell us that every Taiwanese has a better job than every mainland. Conversely, a score of 100 indicates that every mainland is in an occupation ranked higher than that of every Taiwanese. A score of 0 means that neither group enjoys an advantage in access to jobs, that they are equal and therefore not useful analytic categories in the occupational world.

The likelihood of people registered to other provinces having a superior occupation ranges from a score near 40 in 1970 to a low of about 24 in 1988. A sizable settler advantage in access to occupations with the highest degrees of authority, autonomy, and prestige continues at least into the late 1980's -- so long as we take mainlanders to be a homogeneous group. The changes in NDmt, however, suggest that this advantage is shrinking with the shift in structural principles (towards market forces and popular legitimation) and the realized forms of the changing society - an expanding and increasingly Taiwanese private sector.

Part of this narrowing stems from a narrowing of the credential gap. In the early 1960's the first Taiwanese schooled entirely under the KMT entered the labor market and the median number of years in school began to rise, until by 1980 the medians for mainlanders and Taiwanese converge at the high school level.
The median employed above should not be taken to show equality of outcomes in the credentialling process -- it treats all years of education as essentially the same. For access to the better occupations in mental labor, post-secondary education is a common requirement and it is exactly at this point that a difference in years of schooling begins to be significant. Looking at persons who reached maturity in the 1980's, the Taiwanese showed little improvement. While 24% of mainlanders had post secondary training, only 14% of the Taiwanese maturing in the 1980's were similarly credentialed in the 1988 income and expenditure data.

ND_{mt} can tell us the probability of finding a person of one or the other group in a highly ranked occupation. It assumes the two homogeneous categories. That assumption made solely for the purpose of distinguishing analytic groups ought not preclude research into how much difference exists within groups. My research in 7 enterprises in traditional mainlander domains indicates that recent changes pose special difficulties for some mainlanders who do not attain the credentials or connections to a job in mental labor. While well positioned enterprises such as China Airlines continue to be attractive mainlander concerns, mainlander manual workers in other firms studied are deficient in important resources. These workers seem to have fewer and more formal sources of job information. They generally do not speak Taiwanese, yet many mainlanders in these firms noted that T'ai-yü is an important language in their department or would be useful on the job. This preliminary work suggests that without access to the public sector and the top occupations, the category mainlander may actually mark important disadvantages.

II. MARRIAGE MARKETS

Marriage being a means of social as well as biological reproduction, patterns in the flow of partners between groups can tell us something of how distinct the categories really are. First we consider marriage formation as an object of competition. Marriages where groups are hierarchically incorporated along class, ethnic, race, and national lines tend to follow a pattern of hypergamy whereby females (the subordinated object of exchange) are sent upward in the hierarchy. Men from the groups with greater
resources take wives from the subordinate group. To the degree that borders between analytic classes are weakened, hypergamy will fade.

Marriage denoted sharp borders between migrants and natives incorporated into the new state-society of the 1950's and 1960's. A 1985 sample of a thousand marriages contracted by people born on Taiwan shows only 2% of all marriages happening between these two classes. Age grouped data from the 1988 Income and Expenditure Survey allow us to look back in time and show that what early intermarriage there was followed the expected pattern of hypergamy. Among the men who likely married in the late 1950's, about 15% of the mainlanders took Taiwanese brides. Only about 1% of Taiwanese men married mainlander women. Until the last few years, the total number of intermarriages seems to actually decrease over time and is consistent with Hill Gates' finding for T'ai-pei in the mid-1970's. Intermarriage remained low and the "buffer population" small.

It should be noted that hypergamy does little more than describe an outcome. One contributing factor of import here is the remarkably uneven age distribution of mainlander men. At one point they comprised nearly a third of the men in the marriage market while mainlander women were scarce. While the lowest class of mainlander soldiers may have been non-competitive in this market, the majority did well.

If ethnic classification reflected in the colonial inflected marriage markets is to be significantly blurred by a buffer population, actual rates of intermarriage, forms of intermarriage and trends over time should provide some evidence. That change is just beginning. The 1988 Income and Expenditure survey allows examination of small age gradations and thereby can reveal trends over time. In examining this data, we go beyond the frame of all marriages and consider the proportions of women and men within each group who marry across ethnic lines.

First, we find that mainlander men choosing Taiwanese brides in the youngest age groups appear to be doing so despite the availability of mainlander women. A third of the youngest mainlanders in the late 1980's were marrying pen-sheng women. Although most marriages continue to happen within the groups, this is an important preliminary sign of the blurring of boundaries.
Considering intermarriage in terms reducing women to objects of exchange adds support to this view. Virtually all Mainland women born before the early years of incorporation, the rarest and most valuable category in the market of their time, married mainlander men. By the late 1980's one in every four young mainland women was marrying a Taiwanese man. As in the other arenas, the once clear analytic distinction between categories has suddenly weakened.

The "settler society" marriage pattern has several distinctive features of significance for the future. The location of mainlanders in the social as well as physical space of the city is a result of the political terms of incorporation that produces endogamy by reason of contact as well as by reason of hierarchy. The intermarriage that does occur is necessarily concentrated in the urban working class and the among office workers, the shang-pan-tsu. The "buffer" population will grow mainly within these groups.

This buffer population is as yet little examined. The patrilineal transmission of chi-kuan automatically provides a classification; because intermarriage has largely been in the settler mode of outsider husband-local wife, the buffer population is of mainlander chi-kuan. Working to undermine the salience of ethnicity, the children of these unions share with other mainlanders born on Taiwan the difficulty of imagining themselves as meaningfully of a place they (and with more recent cohorts, their parents) have never seen. The buffer classification experiences an additional challenge to the salience of ethnicity: ties to typically larger Taiwanese family networks build affective and practical relations crossing the boundaries of chi-kuan. And as the trends noted for the youngest age groups continue, the increasingly class differentiated ethnic groups in the white collar and industrial worlds should find chi-kuan ever more remote from their experiences of family formation and person definition. Perhaps I ought to substitute "could" for "should" for just as the categories originated in politics, so their salience can still be recreated in politics.

III. ECONOMIC CAPITAL

In the act of incorporation, the most valuable chunks of capital passed to mainlanders in both the state and private sectors. From
extortion at gun point and the rigged sale of Japanese assets to
the channeling of American AID funds, the state placed major
enterprises in the hands of mainlanders. As in the cases of work
and marriage however, the political and economic changes that
bought the KMT time have undermined the ethnic division of
labor.

When data from 1976 and 1985 are combined to produce
class categories along the lines suggested by Wright and Perrone,
Taiwanese capitalists outnumber their Mainland counterparts by
about 9 to 1, a difference that reflects category size. If we look
within each group we find that non-agricultural employers account
for between 1 and 2 percent of the category.13 The meaning of
the category is somewhat obscure on two counts: as with all
classifications in Taiwan, the cooperating family (chia) ties many
capitalists to persons who are not themselves capitalists (Green­
halgh 1979 and 1985). Second, the category encompasses small
business persons and major owners alike. We have seen that the
initial incorporation and the subsequent import substitution period
advantaged large mainlander capitalists while Taiwanese capi­
talists (some very large and many very small) found a new arena
during the export platform phase.

The Taiwanese continue and will continue to dominate the field
of small and medium capitalists. Flexibility and information
networks of small producers and subcontractors give the
Taiwanese a clear advantage. As Hamilton and his colleagues
have pointed out, loose integration and duplication of positions
central to the system "suggests the weakness or boundedness of
authority structures in that economy and the necessity for main­
taining face-to-face relations in order to sustain control."14 In a
world of small business where curb market financing, networks,
familiarity, and trust are essential, the markers of mainlander
advantage in other sectors are often neutralized or inverted.

Human capital models of rational investment leading to dif­
ferential returns appear totally unable to account for Taiwanese
success in this sector. The ability to speak T'ai-yu, to feel at
home in the body language of the local male culture, to present
the self as belonging, are cultural equipment not acquired by cal­
culation but quite useful in business. This equipment viewed
negatively in the institutions imparting human capital passes natu­
ally to the great majority of Taiwanese men in the course of pri­
mary experience. For most mainlander men (the most prominent exceptions being those with Taiwanese mothers), this equipment can be acquired only with conscious effort. Conventional (ethnically organized) wisdom and state attempts to block standardization of the native languages, however, channel efforts aimed at "upgrading human capital" onto official academic paths.

There the second language of success is English, and if one is to allocate time to pu-hsi or cram, English appears to force itself on student and parents alike. And if one is to consciously increase a child's cultural capital, violin lessons are experienced as far more compelling than studying the marked culture. These limitations are not necessarily fatal to a career as a small or medium sized businessman, but after 40 years of KMT rule, many of the dominated are quite at home in either the urban Mandarin Speaking or the Min-nan and Hakka cultural worlds. Mainlander men are less likely to possess this familiarity and are disadvantaged by the high degree of interpersonal negotiation that distinguishes Taiwanese capitalism.

Among capitalists at the highest level, the hundred largest business groups, mainlander advantages are fading and the position of mainlander groups is declining. Looking at net profits of the hundred largest companies from 1980 to 1987, we find that the absolute size of the gap between the two groups has doubled. While the absolute amount of surplus returned to the owners is important, the rate of profit is also a crucial indicator of the strength of the firms surveyed. Examining the trend in rate of profit for mainlander and Taiwanese firms from 1979 to 1986 we find that in four of the years the profitability of mainlander firms seems to follow the general trend of Taiwanese firms, suggesting that they are responding in similar ways to similar markets. However, even in these years the rate of profit falls below the rate for Taiwanese firms. In the other four years, settler firms dropped far behind local firms. From 1979 through 1981, both groups faced a relatively adverse environment, but the effects on mainlander firms were more dramatic. The degree of decline may be partially explained by the smaller number of mainlander firms in the top 100 (hence the effect of one company has a greater weight for mainlander firms), but the pattern of difference is not random. Return on investment in mainlander firms always trails
the rate in Taiwanese firms. Only the magnitude of difference varies.

Capitalists in both communities agree on two reasons for the pattern. The largest mainlander firms grew in an environment of state protection and intervention while Taiwanese firms (with a few large exceptions) have emerged more in response to market forces. Second, greater knowledge of the local (and increasingly the international) environment keep Taiwanese profitability stable in difficult times and enable them to respond more efficiently to emergent profit opportunities in better circumstances.

The changes of the 1980's presage a further decline in the position of mainlander firms. Future performance is in part dependent on available resources - information, financing, and capital. Over the course of the 1980's the total capital of Taiwanese firms increased dramatically and mainlander groups fell further behind in this respect.

This trend has its origins in the daily market activity of individuals, but the state affected environment has also played a part. The decisions to open local economy to greater international penetration, permit export of Taiwan capital, privatize part of the state sector, and give greater reign to market principles in finance have undermined the protected position of mainlander firms. The mounting pressure to lower import duties is certain to further erode the position of enterprises such as the automaker Yuelong which owe a part of their profits to a tariff policy still influenced by the import substitution regime.

IV. CLASSIFICATION STRUGGLE

In each of these three arenas -- work, marriage, and economic capital -- the Taiwanese and mainlanders appear as analytic classes owing to the terms of their incorporation into an ethnic division of labor. By the 1980's the analysis above shows an objective reincorporation was underway, a reincorporation in which the salience of ethnicity could be undermined. I am cautious and emphasize "could be" for my analysis has not dealt directly with the fundamental political aspect of ethnicity and nationalism on Taiwan. Whether an objective distribution like pen-sheng/wai-sheng disappears along with objective difference or resolves into two classes both of and for themselves depends as
much on the *incorporation through terms* as it depends of the dis-
tribution of other powers.

Beginning in the moment of incorporation, the KMT waged a
massive symbolic war on the island to constitute the absent China
as space of politics. From birth through death and -- in Professor
Lung's case -- beyond the grave, the state engineered a system of
classifications to naturalize domination. Each person was born
into a national temporal and spatial code that related the person to
imagination of a China. The logic of that domination advantaged
a portion of the settlers from the mainland and their children.

As that advantage fades or even becomes a liability in some
arenas, the national code may not fade with it. Both heterodox
Taiwanese nationalism and orthodox Chinese nationalism share a
great doxic common ground, the assumption that society and
polity must exist in a ethnic and national mode. Like the
academic apparition, those whom he suppressed with the terms
of ethnicity could easily miss the simple fact that there is no
"real" ethnicity and substitute their own reification. Simply inverting
the national terms would leave the basic logic of domination in
place. In the end, the constitution of work, marriage, and capital
as ethnic and national return to their origin point in politics,
material-symbolic struggle to make what is not given by nature.
In March, 1895, China was weak and exhausted from its current war with Japan, and from a demoralizing half-century of western imperialist intrusions. While the war rolled over Manchuria in the north, the Japanese were also preparing to attack the prosperous island of Taiwan -- "Formosa" -- off the southwest coast of China. Into that steamy frontier province came a young American war correspondent, James W. Davidson, to follow the action on what was clearly soon to be a new warfront.

Davidson found that there was very little background material available on which he might draw for information about the current condition of Formosa. He therefore set himself to write its history from the year 1430, when Chinese immigrants began to colonize the island. His book, The Island of Formosa, was published in 1903, and contains, as well as historical research, many anecdotes and personal observations gathered during his several years' stay.

At that time, the people of Taiwan had seen few foreigners, received almost no western products, were innocent of the effects of highly mechanized industrialization -- were, in fact, very different from what they are today, their economy unlike western economies in some interesting and sometimes subtle ways.

One of the earliest mechanical intrusions from the west into that very Chinese society was the building of a railroad in 1887 between Taipei, the capital, and the small port of Jilong. Davidson rode on this railroad several times in 1895, and gives us the following description of its operation:

now the conductor awakened to his duties and commenced the collection of fares. But few were provided with tickets, the others desiring to pay, or as it proved, not to pay, on the train. I had already been treated to much that was novel in railroad management, but I think the collecting of fares was the greatest revelation. The conductor first went through and collected tickets and fares from such as were willing to deliver or pay the equivalent in full, and then started after the delinquents. They comprised a large proportion and appeared greatly opposed to adding their mite to the collection. Still our
conductor was obdurate and stuck to each one until he got something out of him. The passengers commonly produced a small string of cash which they handed to the conductor who made a rough estimate of their value, ordinarily to find a great shortage. He then demanded the balance due and the wrangling commenced. At it they went at the top of their voices until the passenger by dealing out a few cash at a time had paid somewhere near the amount, or by greater vocal power had worn out the conductor. It is quite safe to say that not a single individual of this class paid the full amount nominally known as the fare. But regardless of this labor, the conductor was no doubt pleased; it permitted him to abstract his "squeeze" which would not have been possible had all provided themselves with tickets. Having disposed of this, the conductor next tackled the destitutes; at least such they were according to their own distressing tales. Three or four of these refused absolutely to produce anything, and the wrangling recommenced. The conductor now searched the clothes of the offenders, and to me it appeared that affairs were coming to a crisis. But I was wrong. From a gesticulating, raving madman whom it appeared nothing but blood would satisfy, the conductor instantly assumed a most perfect composure, as though his work had been one round of pleasure, and then seizing a chicken from one of the delinquents, a sort of combination pillow and small trunk from a second, and a roll of filthy clothing from a third, he returned to my small compartment, tranquil and apparently satisfied. Whether or not the stuff was redeemed on the arrival of the train at Keelung, I cannot say (1967, 251).

Davidson further informs us that freight was consigned to this railroad only after various neighboring station masters had bid on it, and that the rates depended principally upon this competition between employees of the railroad, rather than on any fixed schedule. The lowest bidding station master, of course, got a cut of the money paid in as shipping charges.

Davidson came from a part of the world where railroads had existed for many years, and where they had grown up naturally from small, unsophisticated beginnings to large, complex organizations. He therefore made an error that perhaps most people make on first reading this patronizing description: he assumed
that the importation of track, cars, and engines automatically carried with it the importation of a system for organizing people's activities, and of values, habits, and assumptions on the part of those people. He assumed that every reasonable, honest person would accept the idea that he must buy a ticket if he wished to ride the railroad; that he would be deeply embarrassed to be publicly berated for not paying; that he would feel a certain obligation, completely contrary to his own immediate interests, to the railroad -- that, after all, "they have to make a buck, too;" and, ultimately, that, "if everyone did that," the railroad would fail (as Taiwan's did, rather soon).

In fact, Davidson had a much oversimplified idea of what a railroad is, and how it runs. Certainly, track and cars do, in one sense, make a railroad, but without certain rules, habits, and attitudes on the part of the employees and passengers, those mechanical items alone do not keep a railroad running, get people and freight moved, and constitute an impersonal capitalist corporation.

The Taiwanese had received only the hardware of railroading. Passengers and employees brought to their transactions a set of attitudes and values suitable for the small, independent businessman, because these were the commercial circumstances with which they were most familiar. Business pursuits in China at that time were nearly all run on these principles -- that the buyer should buy as cheap, and the seller sell as dear as possible, and the gain from the transaction should go directly into their respective pockets. Most employees in these businesses were relatives -- who, one assumed, could be trusted -- or apprentices -- who were closely watched to make sure they put the company's interests before their own. Large impersonal corporations where employees, through a combination of conscience and complex regulation, for the most part do not put their hands in the till, were simply unknown.

To a surprising extent, businesses based on similar principles and practices continue to flourish in Taiwan (and Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea) and are reasserting themselves in the PRC. In Taiwan and the rest, they coexist with, sometimes benefit from, but are not deeply changed by the capitalism brought from the west. This study examines the place of this "petty capitalism" in China's history and in Taiwan's present.
In the hundred years since that railroad was built, Taiwan has become a "newly industrialized country," a model of economic development, whose people have the highest living standard in Asia after Japan's. Remarkably, much of this development has taken place since the early 1960's. Like South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan itself, Taiwan success has stimulated an outpouring of academic analyses (S. Ho 1978; Barrett 1980). While some of these attempt to generalize Taiwan's developmental experience, often concluding, as does Amsden (1979), that a strong state is a highly important element in the mix, most present an eclectic picture emphasizing sinitic culture (or "Confucian culture") as an unduplicable (and often undefined) but significant contributor to East Asian development.

Analyses of the Chinese world as a whole, including the surprising acceptance of formerly anathema capitalist practices in the People's Republic of China since the late 1970's, present an even less clear picture of recent Chinese economic history. According to Dwight Perkins, growth in the East Asian region cannot be easily accounted for. Attempts to explain the phenomenon in terms of policies pursued (export-led growth versus import substitution) or economic system employed (laissez-faire capitalism versus socialism) have all foundered on the unavoidable fact that the rapid growth has occurred under a wide variety of economic systems pursuing very different kinds of policies. What these rapid developers do have in common is a historical or cultural heritage (Perkins 1983, 360). Similar arguments have been made for South Korea (Koo 1981; Mason and Kim 1979-1981), Japan (Morishima 1982), and for the five "neo-Confucian" systems.

These conclusions have been turned on China proper as well, with Ramon Myers (1980) concluding that its cultural characteristics make China a special case which sheds little light on development elsewhere. Dwight Perkins, by contrast, notes a new academic interest in "positive elements" in China's economic heritage (1983, 361) which, we may assume, will contribute to its future development as they have to those of the other sinitic systems.

What then is the "Chinese heritage" that may be such an advantage in economic development? Why has it not worked as well in the PRC as in the other sinitic systems? Can we specify the "Confucian" nature of those systems?
The attempts that have been made to do this are generally unsatisfying, consisting of laundry lists of "traits" after the fashion of nineteenth century anthropology. Hard work, respect for education, experience with complex organizations -- the list could be extended indefinitely. Traits that at one time were viewed as obstacles to development, like kinship and the small scale of business organizations (Li, K.T. 1976, 314-315), sometimes come to be seen in a more positive light as Buck now views lineage corporations (1984, 463) and some Japanese authors have long seen small businesses in Japan (Shinohara 1962, 23-25; Kiyonari 1983). But such lists remain lists, not the set of systematically related ideas which constitute theory.

Outside of the analyses developed by theorists of the Chinese Communist Party, the most theoretically sophisticated approach that has been applied to this general problem is Frances Moulder's *Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy* (1977) which attributes China's underdevelopment to its increasing incorporation into the world economy, on others' terms, and Japan's economic success to its ability to control the terms of that relationship. Although her argument explains only Japan's success, it ascribes that success to systematic, "Confucian" patterns of political-economic and cultural organization common to both systems but disrupted in China by western imperialism.

The world-systems paradigm which Moulder employs has been fruitful for recent China studies (see contributions by Winckler, Basu, and Kraus in Goldfrank 1979); but it its proponents fail to give sufficient attention to the precise nature of the Chinese social formation as it was when China came into contact with external capitalism. Moulder, following Chinese Marxists, calls it "feudal," a term which is not only problematical for the equation it creates between China and western Europe, but because it entertains a series of historical "stages" whose application to China is transparently unapt.

The Marxist paradigm of historical change in which societies evolve, struggling and resynthesizing, from primitive communism through ancient, slave, feudal, and capitalist societies to socialism applies poorly to China. Its rejection by most western sinologists is not due solely to political antipathy; even scholars sympathetic to Marxism have been unwilling to force history into these categories (e.g. Philip Huang 1985), while others have flirted
briefly with, and then abandoned them (e.g. Ho Ping-ti 1954). Many who work in the Chinese Marxist tradition remain caught in a solipsistic regionalism that contributes little to general social science theory, just as China's revolution has not itself greatly influenced the political decisions and trajectories of the rest of the third world.

At the heart of both the intellectual and political sterility of China's recent uses of Marxism, I believe, is the failure thus far of Marxists to analyze adequately the social formation from which modern China and Taiwan have emerged, and to interpret its class structure. Most essential, perhaps, is the need to ask what, in Marxist terms, was the mode - or modes - of production that shaped late imperial and early Republican China, and Republican Taiwan? Without an answer to that question, I believe, social scientists will fail to understand the disparate development of Taiwan (and the other East Asian successes) and the People's Republic of China. Without and answer to that question, those who decide the future of the Chinese people will be less well prepared for their task than they could be. And, thus far, there is no convincing Marxist description of this important social base line.

This will sound curious, even impertinent, for the Chinese revolution was inspired by Marxism and impelled by a Marxist class analysis of Chinese society. More recently, the 'sprouts of capitalism' analyses of various Chinese historians have explored aspects of China's indigenous commercialization. But these analyses err, I believe, in following too closely the particularities of the European model of historical transformation, and have failed to reveal the real dynamic of late imperial Chinese culture. Chinese Marxists assumed that the primary contradiction in Chinese society was that between the capitalist and the laboring classes. During the moment of time between the demise of the dynasty in 1911 and the emergence of a new state apparatus around the Guomindang in the 1920's, this view must have seemed to fit well. The old state and its ruling class were gone, foreign capitalist imperialism was becoming more aggressive with every year.

China's revolutionary leaders were misled as well by an unusual aspect of their own social formation. Capitalism, of a sort, was already a significant mode of production in China, but it
was neither the only nor the dominant one when western capitalism arrived. It seems best denominated a petty capitalist mode of production (PCMP). The indigenous PCMP and the intrusive foreign capitalism shared many features, but they were not identical.

The PCMP was embedded in, and complexly articulated with, a "tributary mode of production" (TMP) (Amin 1972; E. Wolf 1982) which differed from those of feudal Europe, pre-Meiji Japan, Inca, early Mesopotamia, and the many other pre-capitalist, state-level social formations not only in the details of its means of extracting tribute from the peasantry, and its management of large-scale productive activities on non-market principles, but in its unique long-term containment of a subordinated PCMP. In this subordinate mode, factors of production such as capital, land and labor were exchanged primarily on market principles within a pattern of relations of production that generated capitalist-like class relations. Exploitation of both hired laborers and female family members were crucial. These relations of production had an economic dynamism which, although different from that of the CMP, was nonetheless an important and enduring feature of the Chinese economy.

Both the TMP and the PCMP influenced Chinese culture, for each presented a different economic, political, and ideological model to the Chinese people, who participated in both. Institutionally, and in human minds, the two modes articulated with and influenced each other. And, through human actions, the two modes competed for hegemony over the whole. Unless we examine the struggle for hegemony between the TMP and the PCMP, we will fail to see the fundamental contradiction of Chinese culture, the contradiction that has been the motor of China's history.

Elements of what was to become the PCMP appear to have been present in China from the time of the first empires (221 B.C. to 220 A.D.). This early period lies so far beyond my academic reach that I shall offer no further comment on it. The socio-economic pattern of the expansive Song (960 to 1279), however, appears to have emerged from an epochal struggle between state and private control of the economy. This struggle influenced the bureaucratic civil service selected through an examination system, the neo-Confucian synthesis of ideologies, and China's much-
mystified class structure. The most lasting effect of Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century may have been to strengthen the role of the state and of the TMP, producing the pattern of Ming/Qing times that historians now generally agree to call late imperial China (Rawski 1985, 3).

Capitalist practices affected late imperial China not merely from a niche (the PCMP) in the indigenous system, but also through the impact of western imperialism in the nineteenth century. The impact of imperialism on East Asia, viewed comparatively, was unique. After the expanding western capitalist mode of production (CMP) began to articulate (often forcibly) with the kin corporate modes of production of Africa, Oceania, and North America, and with the tributary modes of India, Central and Andean America, and Southeast Asia, the resulting economic disruption was not succeeded by independent, self-sustaining economies and cultures. Unable either to fight off capitalism or to capture it from invading imperialists, the economic and cultural systems of these regions remain today in the grip of exploitive foreign forces.

China's response has been different. While those who benefited primarily from its tributary mode resisted western capitalism as long possible, those who benefited from its petty capitalism embraced the new commerce and industry, often in flagrant contravention of ruling-class wishes. Because the PCMP had never attained hegemony in the Chinese system, the primary capitalist contradiction between capital and labor was subordinated to other, more insistent contradictions. Capital did not come to wear the fiendish face that the people of Europe's colonies (Taussig 1975) and working class could sometimes see. The pursuit of profit was idealized in China as a virtue, and the use of money as capital -- invested at a profit -- was sanctified in popular religion by the gods (Gates 1987). People steeped in a petty capitalist tradition often responded with unqualified enthusiasm to the market opportunities of western capitalism. It is difficult, though perhaps important, to distinguish between the influences of imperialism in nineteenth century China and the operation of a native petty capitalist tradition.

With western capitalism as an ally, between the Opium Wars and the beginning of Guomindang rule indigenous elites gradually unseated the hegemony of the ruling class. The PCMP, with all its cultural and organizational limitations, was loosed from many of
its historical restraints. From the mid-nineteenth century to 1949, capitalism existed in China in two forms: one, the CMP that Marx understood, which influenced society through both action and reaction; the other, the PCMP, peculiar to China, shaped by at least a thousand years of truncated existence in the world’s strongest, most enduring ancient state. The economic realities of Taiwan and the rest of China are built on the older contradiction between the TMP and the PCMP. In the words of Kate Currie,

For Marx it is the tribute raising state which appropriates the surplus product from the direct producer and which stands in the same objectively antagonistic relationship to that producer as does the . . . capitalist to the wage laborer [in tributary modes of production] (Currie 1982, 16).

In class terms, the principal contradiction in Chinese society lay between the class of shi, the degree-holders, from whom all government officials were drawn, and the min, China’s “commoners.” While among the commoners, the operation of the PCMP engendered classes of wealthy landlords and merchants, nearly self-sufficient peasants and craftspeople, and laborers, the shi stood above them all both in cultural esteem and in the material advantages of their special role in the dominant TMP, the economic framework of the empire.

THEORIES OF MODES OF PRODUCTION

Marx was not very knowledgeable about China, his writings indicate, although he followed the forcible intrusion of imperialism there with interest (Avineri 1968). He appears to have known little about the economic complexity of late imperial China, which he lumps with India (e.g. 1974 333) when he mentions it at all. Moreover, I believe he misread the significance of its indigenous commerce by classing it with that of other precapitalist petty commerce. This he saw as sharply differentiated from capitalism itself because it did not involve the exploitation of labor (1968, 925-940). Marx (and Engels) placed China, along with all the other non-European ancient empires, in a broadly-sketched Asiatic mode of production (AMP) (1965). Two of the AMP’s defining characteristics, the absence of private property and of free markets, were actually fairly common in pre-capitalist state-level societies, however. Late imperial China especially had extremely
well-developed markets for the capital, land, and labor on which agricultural and other forms of production depended. And Marx saw China, in an ugly mixed metaphor, as utterly stagnant, "a giant empire....vegetating in the teeth of time" (Avineri 1968 323), a view which recent scholarship refutes. While societies structured around an AMP may have existed, China's was clearly not among them.

The AMP has been the subject of considerable political and scholarly debate (see Hobsbawm's Introduction in Marx 1965; Tokei 1966; Garaudy 1969; Kahn and Llobera 1981). Its original formulation implied economic and social equilibrium (or stagnation) so complete that only external forces could impel change. As this suggested that societies like China's were unable to make their own revolutions without preliminary imperialist intervention -- which put imperialism in a positive light -- Stalin prohibited further explorations into the AMP, merging all pre-capitalist state-level formations as the feudal mode of production (FMP).

Since the resurgence of historical materialist studies among western academics began in the late 1960's, analysts of many non-European state-level social formations have attempted to specify the modes of production actually present in such "AMP" societies. Some emphasize local uniqueness, finding their subjects of study worthy of such terms as the "Inca mode of production" (Roel 1981). Others combine the AMP, FMP, and other archaic modes into a single, generic TMP to make it applicable, at a high level of generality, to all state-level social formations in existence prior to the emergence of the western capitalist mode of production (CMP) (Amin 1972, E. Wolf 1982). The TMP, defined by Eric Wolf as one in which "the primary producer . . . is allowed access to the means of production, while tribute is exacted from him by political or military means" (1982, 79-80), is a more useful formulation for understanding China than Marx's original AMP.

A mode of production, in the broad formulation of Rob Stevens, is "the mechanism which regulates the activity of human beings in producing what they need to sustain life" (1983, 4). Marx put it more discursively, though without using the phrase directly: a mode of production is

The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers . . . [This] determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of produc-
tion itself and in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this . . . is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows out of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form. It is always the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers . . . which reveals the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social structure" (Marx 1967 III, 791).

Marx used the terms "social formation" and "mode of production" in several, sometimes overlapping ways. I refer the interested reader to the excellent summary of the semantics of these phrases to Legros, Hunderfund, and Shapiro (1979, 243-249), and to the entry on "Modes of Production" in Bottomore (1983). Legros et al.'s definition of a "mode of production" as a "whole composed of (1) an economic base [both technical and social] and (2) the superstructural apparatuses required for the replication over time of the economic base (1979, 23) makes too much of the heuristic distinction between "base" and "superstructure." A view of modes of production with a greater emphasis on the mutual influences of material, social and ideological elements is found in Himmelwert (1983). Legros et al. relate the mode of production to the wider entity, the "social formation," which is "a geopolitical entity" seen as "a complex whole which may be composed of several modes of production (1979, 248). A definition by Cutler, Hindess, Hirst, and Athar of a social formation as "a set of relations of production together with the economic, political, and cultural forms in which their conditions of existence are secured" comes usefully close to the traditional anthropological usage of "a culture" (Cutler et al. 1977).

A social formation may consist of more than one mode of production; indeed, many social formations do so consist. In every known class society, kin groupings within which joint production and generalized reciprocity govern economic relations coexist with other patterns of economic relations between persons who are not members of the same kin group. The unpaid labor of food production/processing, childcare, etc. performed in households is a necessary element in the social production and reproduction of the American social formation, for example. This element is no more capitalist in nature than is the basic tax-collecting, benefit-
distributing activity of the state, although in the American social formation, the CMP is clearly dominant over and influential in these other modes of production. The periodic attempts under "high tides of socialism" to create a Chinese socialist social formation made up of only one mode of production have been experienced by unsympathetic observers as attacks on the family, whereas they might more accurately have been interpreted as attacks on a subsidiary mode of production. More complete empirical illustrations of social formations containing more than one mode of production can be found in Wolpe (1980). In such analyses, what matters most is the insight that can be gained into the overall nature of the culture from the mutual effects of the two (or more) modes as they articulate, producing a cultural hegemony of the dominant class of the dominant mode of production, which is influenced as well by class pressures from the subordinate mode(s).

THE CHINESE TRIBUTARY MODE OF PRODUCTION

Before arguing for the existence and utility of the concept of a PCMP, it will be necessary to review the relatively familiar Chinese TMP, giving proper emphasis -- which is sometimes omitted in discussions of the role of the Chinese state -- to the essential economic functions of officials. Just because, as Feuerwerker has recently argued, the state was not able to control the late imperial economy very effectively (1984, 298 ff.) does not mean that controlling the economy was unimportant to state functionaries and to the central meaning of state ideology. On the contrary, in this as in any state, the power of the state to draw on economic resources was indispensable to the state's very existence. Official exhortations to the populace often referred to the duty of paying (Hsiao 1960, 188-189).

In late imperial China, as throughout Chinese history, most people made their livings directly in agriculture, and to do so needed access to land. While many of these agriculturalists were tenants who rented from landlords, all ultimately depended for the conditions of that access on state officials. Officials taxed the owners of property (and sometimes their tenants), upheld land contracts, created or improved arable by building irrigation works or reclaiming wasteland, allocated such new land and land left
vacant after the frequent catastrophes of the era, confiscated property from criminals, and seized or purchased land for roads, cities, and city walls by a kind of eminent domain. The historically-minded Chinese were well aware too that these officials, in the name of the emperor, had many times in the past entirely restructured the agrarian economy, including basic relations of production. Even illiterate workers in Taiwan often know from folklore of the imposition of the medieval "well-field" system, for example. The emperor, acting through the officials, was the ultimate controller of all land, with the authority, if not always the power, to determine the relationships that should exist between people and land. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same could be said of official control of commercial and industrial property as well.

Most direct producers in the TMP were the *nong*, or agriculturalists, who made up perhaps eighty-five percent of the late imperial population. "*Nong*" is best rendered as "agriculturalist" rather than "peasant" or "farmer," because in general anthropological usage (following Wolf 1966, 2), these latter terms imply political economic contexts -- a precapitalist social formation for "peasant," and a capitalist mode of production for farmer whereas it is my intention here to argue for a more precise characterization of the Chinese social formation than the residual "precapitalist" category.

By late imperial times, agricultural households were ideally owner-operators of small farms who produced for their own frugal subsistence and to meet the officials' demand for taxes and corvée labor.Officials extracted taxes to meet their own needs for subsistence and the accumulation of private fortunes, an expected consequence of official service; to build and maintain regional public services, within the limits of their own judgment and capabilities; to pass on to higher levels of officials, including the emperor's court. Agriculturalists were constantly exhorted to produce enough for both taxes and subsistence, and to consume frugally so that the proportion of the fruits of their labors that could be given up would be large (Hsiao 1960, 188-189). To assist them, officials managed and improved irrigation systems, roads and canals, and maintained substantial reserves of grain (L. Li 1982, 689, 694-699) to alleviate famine in a population apparently not expected to be able to retain sufficient reserves to
survive economic shortfalls. Between taxes in kind and relief grain, mid-Qing officials controlled perhaps twenty percent of all grain consumed (estimated from L. Li 1982, 697-8), certainly enough to give them enormous economic power in addition to the administrative, military, and ideological power they also wielded.

While officials sometimes attempted to increase productivity through the dissemination of agricultural innovations, they traditionally viewed the economy as stable or static (Huang R. 1969, 77, 112; 1974, 229). Qing China in fact appears to have reached a plateau in agricultural involution (Elvin 1973). In consequence, officials could increase their share of the exploitable surplus only by gaining rights over more agricultural households -- individually through rising in rank or, from the point of view of officials as a body, by territorial expansion. Official concern for political control over persons and territory was firmly rooted in fundamental economic interest.  

Officials as a class also controlled large industrial and commercial enterprises, acquiring products and resources needed for public activities -- e.g. traditional armaments, porcelains for imperial use, bricks for a city wall -- through non-market mechanisms such as state factories, monopolies, and corvee. And finally, the state was in no way limited from squeezing the wealthy for extraordinary contributions (Huang R. 1974, 229, 230, 232, 236; 1969, 103, 105, 125).

The large market in the products of nonagricultural labor, although it may have produced, in late imperial times, as much as thirty percent of the national per capital value added (estimated by Feuerwerker 1984, 299), lay outside the primary concerns of those who administered the TMP, except insofar as its products could be taxed. Artisans and merchants in official ideology were both anomalous in and nearly irrelevant to TMP political economy. They were officially viewed as troublesome elements outside the fundamentally agricultural integrity of the TMP. At least one Qing emperor is remembered for measures that intentionally benefited small commerce while suppressing the "self-seeking" gentry who, presumably, were accumulating too much wealth through the private economy (Huang, Pei 1974, 269-270).

In the TMP, one class, the officials, was clearly dominant. Although the autocratic emperors in theory were all-powerful and in practice made important policy decisions, the power of adminis-
tration belonged to office-holders among the *shi*, or "scholars." While not all scholars were officials at any given time, the only legitimate route to becoming an official was through the degree-granting system. Officials were drawn from the ranks of the upper degree-holders, who therefore constituted the politically significant scholars; lower degree holders, far more numerous and often quite impoverished, were not eligible for official posts (Chang 1955, 6-32).

While both upper and lower scholars formed an honored, privileged elite, "marked out from the ordinary run of men" (Van der Sprenkel 1962, 51), exempt from conscription (Fei 1953 2), corporal punishment, and corvee, lower scholars were sometimes treated less gingerly than upper in lawsuits and punishments (Chang 1955, 35-36). Upper scholars found it easier, in taxation, "to resist excessive charges, to gain partial or total exemption, or to participate in the sharing of public revenue." (Chang 1955, 7, see also 37-40). Government regulations distinguished between the forms of marriage, funeral, and sacrificial ceremonies allowed upper scholars' families and those enjoined on lower scholars and commoners (Chang 1955, 7-8); Ho Ping-ti classes the lower with commoners as "scholar-commoners" (1962, 35).

Fei Xiaotong considers that officials with their relatives formed "a special class not affected by the laws" (1953, 27). High-ranking *shi* were either officials in fact, or potentially officials; they were men prepared by education and personal commitment to be the tax collectors and supervisors of labor conscripts in a mode of production in which taxes and corvee constituted the principal economic relations between the rulers and the ruled. Of this class, Fei Xiaotong has said,

From the monarch, power is entrusted to the hierarchy of officials. On the vast continent, with bad communication systems, power is centralized only in name but not in fact. Officials of every rank enjoy such an amount of authority as their immediate supervisors will tolerate. The monarch is as remote as the heaven itself (1984, 138).

Officials made up not simply a Weberian status group, but an economic class integral to, and dominant in, a TMP which formed the enduring framework of Chinese culture.

Within this mode, the key economic unit was the *jia*, or patriarchal household. The bureaucracy of scholar-officials
served its own administrative convenience, exercised its sense of cosmological order, and simplified its task of extracting taxes and labor by standardizing the jia through the use of the simplest possible underlying rule of kinship: membership, descent, inheritance, power were to be transmitted to men through men. Legal and ritual practice ensured that most people, most of the time, would adhere to this model, for the state reliably protected the property rights of patrilineal kin corporations only.

Not only did this simple-minded patrilineality make the system easy to understand and apply, but it could be used, and I believe was used, to inculcate the political virtues on which state control of the enormous population depended so heavily. The hierarchy of age, sex, and kin relationship so precisely specified by law and ritual for the "natural" relations of kinship provided a powerful prop to the belief that hierarchy was a natural political condition as well. Submission, loyalty, accepting one's place in family, society, and the universe were learned at a mother's bound foot, and under the heavy hand of a father who might sell or even kill his children without incurring serious social disapprobation. The Chinese family was microcosm of and school for the greater polity, essential to TMP hegemony, and largely a creature of the state.

THE PETTY CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION

While the TMP is familiar as the economic aspect of China as a primarily agrarian, tax-driven cultural entity, the PCMP has not, I believe, been explicitly recognized by theoreticians as a significant element of the "traditional" Chinese (or any other) social formation. Recent analyses of China as an Asiatic or tributary social formation by John Gledhill (1984, 138) and Eric Wolf (1982) contain no hint that the complexities of the system might be resolved by the use of such a concept; Karl Wittfogell's treatment of the TMP seems hardly to notice the role of private property in China, though he refers to the rarity of peasant possession of land in agrarian societies generally (1957, 276).

We may describe the PCMP as a mode of production of agricultural and other low-technology commodities in which household enterprises own or control the means of production, such as farmland or workshops. These means of production can
The Petty Capitalist Mode

be bought and sold, as can labor power. While private, ownership is not individual. A household enterprise is managed by men who ideally are agnatic kin, but since labor is as important as means of production under conditions of low technology, the co-residential household -- the jia -- is adjusted through marriage, divorce, birth, infanticide, adoption, sale, and purchase to meet the potential for absorbing labor of the available means of production. At the same time, household surpluses are reinvested in expanding the enterprise's means of production, and hence its base for supporting additional members. While legal title to land or shophouse is desirable, partial ownership or secure, long-term tenancy also provides the economic base for petty capitalist households, through their capacity for expansion or even stability will naturally be less.

In the PCMP, laborers may be hired, typically in small numbers and for long, fixed periods such as the agricultural year, or the customary three to five years of the craft apprentice (Morse 1966, 33). But the household enterprise depends first, and heavily, on its own members for labor. Outsiders are hired primarily to make up for deficits in family labor. Household members come very close to being openly considered ownable factors of production by the corporation of mature men who own its property, for wives, daughters, and immature sons can be sold by the household head, or persons purchased to take up such positions for the productive and reproductive advantage of the household as a whole.

The labor power of both hired workers and household members is owed without restriction or limitation to the household enterprise, that of the laborer for a set period, that of the household member until death, outmarriage, or family division. There is no hourly or piece-work pattern of return to labor. Tasks are organized by an age/sex hierarchy in which those with the least status -- young females -- are kept most constantly busy, and those with the most -- old males -- have the greatest leisure. Characteristically, households aim at self sufficiency in labor and in means of production, a golden mean which seems like wealth to those without them, and is at least acceptable to households which through accident or demographic cycling, are reduced from rich to ordinary.

Production in these households is, at least in part, for market, as when an agricultural household sells grain or vegetables or a
tofu manufactory sells beancurd. Their products enter a market in which much evidence indicates that, despite the personalism of many Chinese petty capitalist activities, concern for profit dominates other considerations in setting prices except in transactions between a seller and her small circle of kin and friends (De Glopper 1972, 311; M. Wolf 1968, 20-22). While petty capitalist households, especially agricultural ones, produce for their own direct use, and also maintain non-capitalist relations (gift exchanges with inlaws, mutual hospitality with distant kin at village festivals), the existence, from Song times onward, of relatively large-scale regional marketing systems (Skinner 1977) has made production for the market a real possibility and an attractive ideal that powerfully shapes many household decisions.

The operation among competitive household enterprises of capitalist principles of profit-making results in the formation of the classes made familiar by Communist Party analyses: landlord/merchants and rich peasants, who own means of production and employ non-family labor; middle peasants and the urban shopkeeper/artisans who own at least a part of their means of production and employ mainly family labor; propertyless rural and urban workers. Surplus value is extracted from those who sell their labor by those who own resources through rent payments and wages whose value is less than the value of the worker's product.

While the TMP was dominated by a class of non-hereditary scholar-officials whose separation from all other classes was strongly socially marked, the class structure of the PCMP is blurred. PCMP class patterns that are capitalist-like in the ways discussed above nevertheless differ significantly from those of societies dominated by the CMP. Landlords and merchants, who are often moneylenders as well, exploit both the owner-operator "middle peasants" and the propertyless, but they do not dominate the mode of production as capitalists dominate in a CMP. The class that most clearly characterizes the PCMP is not that of the landlord, but of the small owner-operator, using household means of production and household labor.

To the degree the late imperial economy was stable -- i.e. did not experience capitalist-like technical innovation and a resulting sharp expansion -- landlords and merchants were essentially the recipients of the benefits of inequalities deriving from market competition combined with family cycle variation. Where there were
few market opportunities, or where the influence of the TMP was especially strong, such potential capitalists appear often to have acted in most uncapitalist fashion, consuming their surpluses in the support of ever-larger households and (relatively) luxurious living rather than frugally accumulating and reinvesting. Many of them also invested money and potential family labor in the expensive and painful processes of traditional education, hoping through success in official examinations to tap not only into the glory and power, but also into the wealth that came from membership in the class of scholar-officials that dominated the TMP. The intense competition for places in this class assured that most would fail. Abandoning the core PCMP values of frugality and manual work for the leisured lifestyle of a would-be scholar-official before one gained access to TMP resources was a likely road to loss of all. Downward mobility of such families was one of the important sources of motion within the PCMP.

To the degree that the late imperial economy was expanding, which it was most able to do in geographical regions where the TMP was weak, landlords and, especially, merchants were more likely to act like proper capitalists. Long-distance trade, of the sort described in Ng Chin-keong's *Trade and Society in China: The Amoy Network* (1983), produced great fortunes and investment in regional development in southeast China which transformed agricultural and handicraft production and commerce in its hinterland. But this activity swiftly engendered official attempts to tap and control it. A proto-mercantile capitalism was restricted and forced to develop organizational forms concealed under the guise of kinship. As Ng notes for south Fujian in the seventeenth century:

... [M]aritime trade was the most important factor affecting the lineage organization. With capital derived originally from land and backed by large lineage organizations providing manpower, the prominent local families were able to monopolize the great profits from trade (1983, 29).

The need for re-organization of lineage and strengthening of its bargaining position in the locality often ... led to the phenomenon of pseudo-lineage[s] (30) ... [which] were accepted as such by the local authorities and scholars who recorded the events (31) ... [B]ecause the authorities would be suspicious of local associations of this kind, the new
aggregate functioned under the officially acceptable form of 'lineage' (1983, 31). Here "petty" capitalism, squeezed between the possibility of state attack and the necessarily non-capitalist logic of kinship, operated on a very large scale indeed.

The commercialization that flourished in pre-Japanese Taiwan, imported directly from coastal regions where the PCMP directly confronted the TMP, was not capitalism proper, but Chinese petty capitalism. Class relations in this mode of production, when analyzed from Marxist premises, are necessarily different from those that develop under a CMP.

PCMP class structure is blurred too in Chinese perceptions. Especially in regions with active markets for large-scale trade, family social mobility was considerable, a reality which impaired popular perceptions of class inequality. In addition, official practice and terminology divided the people into occupational categories based on the relations of class to objective output.

In contrast to the scholar-officials or shi, all other members of society -- the commoners, or min -- were the ruled: those whom the state governed, and on whose productive activities it rested. By late imperial times, the official categories into which the common folk were divided were the nong, agriculturalists; gong, laborers and artisans, and shang, merchants; and xiao min, "mean people," or outcastes. Xiao min held a hereditary position of social disesteem which not only limited their contacts with the rest of the commoners, but prevented them from competing for scholarly degrees. They thus stood "outside" of society, and were, in fact few in number and of little political-economic consequence. The other three categories made up the great body of the Chinese population, free to move between occupations (though this was naturally difficult to do in practice) and to compete for scholarly degrees. Relationships among persons in these categories were governed to a great extent by the economic dynamics of the PCMP.

At the same time, official ideology and practice did much to assign them differential prestige. The Chinese elite, describing the merchant system considered many of the subcultural characteristics of merchants and artisans as inferior aberrations of a cultural standard supposedly set by the elite. For example, a lecture to the populace by the eighteenth century Salt Commissioner
Wang Yu-pu characterized petty capitalist behavior in the following exhortation:

Merchants and shop owners are even worse [in their behavior than farmers and craftsmen]. When you see me earning money, you become jealous; when I see you making a profit, my eyes turn red with envy. When a particular kind of trade is profitable, you want to engage in it, and so do I. When trading conditions are good in a certain place, you will conceal it from everyone else and secretly hurry there yourself. Knowing that a certain kind of goods is losing value, a merchant will trick people into taking them off his hands and afterward go and insist on getting the payment. There are others who, beginning trade with empty hands, borrow money at high rates, but are a long time in repaying their bills. This is what is called "You seek high [interest], while I seek delay [in repayment]." Others get into disputes about the scales used, or the quality of coins. There are so many sources of disputes that it would be an endless task to mention all of them. To sum it up, people will not yield to each other on anything; if only they would yield, they would all become honest and generous men (Ebrey 1982, 205-206).

Intriguingly, some overseas Chinese, abroad and thus disengaged from the TMP and encouraged by their characteristic articulation with imperialist capitalism (Willmott 1970), have assumed the characteristics of the PCMP to be the essence of Chineseness: "in Iloilo [the Philippines], to cease to be a merchant is to cease to be Chinese" (Omohundro 1981, 12).

In short, the PCMP in China was an economic system for the production of simple commodities by property-owning work teams whose members related to one another in the idiom of kinship, and who sold to an impersonal market. Ownership of means of production on a scale that permitted the exploitation of hired labor, ownership of means of production worked largely by household labor, and propertylessness defined three significant classes, but their significance was obscured both by the gradations possible among them and by the state's ability to impose occupational categories that crosscut class lines. The actions of these classes and families were governed by relations of production which are nearly identical to those of capitalist systems: land, labor, and capital were freely bought and sold, surplus value was
extracted from the propertyless by the propertied, and from women by men, and accumulation of capital permitted localized, if not global economic expansion.

Perhaps most importantly, this mode of production did not operate either hegemonically or in isolation. Its economic, kinship, political, and ideological practices were monitored, influenced, and sometimes firmly controlled by the officials of a comparatively powerful state. Resources flowed first into the TMP, when the state was strong enough, rather than accumulating in private hands. Those who did successfully accumulate large amounts of capital were often persuaded to disperse much of it in an effort to move, through the examination system, into the ruling class. Those who persisted in making and keeping capital for themselves stood unprotected against the state, subject to extortion or confiscation. Ultimately, the motion in the economy generated by partially capitalist relations of production was damped and involuted by the operation of a hegemonic mode with a prior claim on producers' resources.

Is the pattern just described sufficiently different from orthodox Marxist categories to constitute a new mode of production? In what ways did this mode resemble and differ from established precapitalist modes and from the CMP? We may begin by examining the resemblances between the PCMP and the CMP as it emerged in western Europe.

Marx defined the CMP in two main ways: in terms of its characteristic relations of production, and in terms of its historical tendencies. Capitalist relations of production are those of the marketplace. All major factors of production can be freely bought and sold in an impersonal market so that the relationships between persons engaged in production too become impersonal money transactions. Those who own the means of production confront those who have only labor power to sell from a position of superiority which enables the former to set the terms of the exchange. By being able to pay in wages less than he expects to realize from commodities manufactured by a worker, the owner of the means of production extracts surplus value from, or, technically exploits the laborer. Employer-employee or landlord-tenant social relations are an inherent part of capitalist production, and they are relations which transfer value from laborers, who merely subsist on what they receive to capitalists, who accumulate and reinvest that value.
First, then, we may inquire whether the non-TMP part of China's late imperial economy was one in which a free market in the factors of production produced class inequalities, exploitation, and capital accumulation? I will argue that China had a free market for the sale of the major factors of production: money capital, land, and labor. Market competition for these factors and capitalist-like relations of production produced the classes into which the non-official "commoners" were divided. Exploitation occurred, and capital accumulated.

A high degree of monetization has characterized Chinese society for two millennia. A high point in that development was reached in the Song dynasty when widespread urbanization, expanded commodity markets, and money taxes made the use of money a necessity even in rural areas (Elvin 1973, 148; Kishimoto-Nakayama 1984). Money became so much a part of ordinary life that it entered ritual use as an early form of the paper "spirit money" still so central to folk religion (v. Hou 1975, and Gates 1987). At the same time, banking flourished as new forms of money -- paper bills of exchange -- and new means of transferring and manipulating it were invented. Lent at interest, and invested in productive enterprises, it was clearly capital for which a ready market existed. Although it is apparent that in troubled periods thereafter, or when the state taxed in kind, many remote regions must have returned to barter and near-subsistence economies, by late imperial times, money and its market had become a permanent part of China's economy.

While the existence of a free market in land in recent times is so well known as not to require documentation, Elvin has shown that the extent of this market has varied with different state policies for centuries (1973, 24, 61-62, 248). Parts of Taiwan, for example, were settled by soldiers stationed there who were given grants of land by the state while other parts were sold to developers for opening to agriculture. Both kinds rapidly passed into a market in which households competed vigorously, as in more settled regions.

Elvin describes the shift from large manorial landholdings in the eighteenth century:

During the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) and the earlier parts of the Ch'ing (or Manchu) dynasty, the manorial order with serfdom and a serf-like tenancy continued to dominate the
countryside, though with diminishing vigour as time passed by. In the course of the eighteenth century they finally disappeared, and a new and distinctive rural order took shape. The landlord and the pawnbroker took the place of the manorial lord; financial relationships displaced those of status. . . . society became restless, fragmented, and fiercely competitive (1973 235).

Elvin's descriptions of the Song manorial system indicate sales of land by both landlords and peasants (71, 76).

Labor, too, especially in agriculture, was subject to the market from the eighteenth century on. Agricultural laborers were widely employed on yearly or seasonal terms, and there were "man markets" for day laborers in north China village centers early in this century (Gamble 1968, 221).

Agricultural labor was not completely free to move to any job to take the best return it could find, for most people were members of kin groups with prior claims on their labor. In practice, this meant that only after household labor demands were met did people sell labor to others. Only landless families and those with too many members for their means of production sold their labor, and some sold it outright, permanently, into slavery -- another pool of unfree labor that limited the scope of the market.

Among merchants and artisan/laborers, the market for labor was constrained too by the existence of other social groups. Guilds produced "practically all manufactured goods sold in pre-twentieth century China, and the majority of the town population live[d] by their handicraft, working in small shops (Burgess 1966, 29). These guilds "establish rules and compel obedience to them; they fix price and enforce adhesion; they settle or modify trade customs and obtain instant acquiescence" (Morse 1966, 31).

An important area of production (and sales: artisan products were typically sold by the producing enterprise) therefore employed labor was organized against competition by non guild-members. Some laborers -- porters, water-carriers -- also formed guilds. Wages therefore were not set entirely by market mechanisms, and entry into some occupations was impeded by guild monopoly.

But guilds did not control occupations as completely as the quotations from Morse and Burgess might indicate. Their tendency in the late nineteenth century to make an occupation
hereditary may be a late trend resulting from competition with foreign commerce and technology. According to Fewsmith, "this tradition achieved its golden age only after the impact of the West" (1983, 626). Even where they were strong, guildsmen did not always insist on their trade monopoly. When Burgess investigated a Peking carpenters' guild in the mid 1920's, he found that "guildsmen hesitate to report the independent shops for fear of giving offense" (1966, 126). In any case, guilds were typically not difficult or extremely expensive to join, and they responded rapidly through their rules and wage-levels to changing economic conditions (Burgess 1966, 99, 102). Their existence and considerable power surely affected the market for skilled and semi-skilled labor, but a market for it existed nonetheless.

The responsiveness of China's late imperial labor market was made yet more sticky by the tendency for the TMP to generate self-defensive economic groups among the populace. Guilds were organized as much to defend members against excessive exactions by officials as against competitors. Protests and boycotts against such demands were often successful (Burgess 1966, 78, Morse 1966, 30, 31, 45-46). Responsiveness to market pressures was also slowed, though not precluded, by the tendency of employers to require introductions by guarantors from employees. This requirement was based, in part, on distrust for strangers who might lack the necessary loyalty or solidarity to the enterprise; such mutual distrust has frequently been cited by western observers as a notable Chinese characteristic (Davis 1972, I: 243).

Markets in money, land, and labor were also necessarily affected, if only indirectly, by the constraints the state placed on the transport of goods by sea (Davis 1972, II: 375), and by the willingness and ability of officials to construct and maintain such infrastructural supports to production as irrigation systems, roads, and canals. In the words of Marie-Claire Bergère, "[t]he growth of trade, the creation of thousands of markets, and the development of monetary transactions in themselves were not enough to subject the Chinese economy as a whole to the laws of competition and profit" -- capitalism did not gain hegemony -- but capitalist transactions nevertheless became a major part of late imperial life.

This incomplete but important market economy was certainly productive of economic and social inequalities in which ownership
of the means of production was a critical element, as I have already noted. The question of whether surplus value was extracted by owners from non-owners, in short of whether exploitation occurred under this regime has, however, been obscured at its Marxist roots by Marx’s incomplete understanding of the Chinese economy.

Marx was well aware of the importance of small-scale commerce and production in China. When discussing the unlikelihood of the Chinese ever purchasing quantities of British exports, he stressed that "the present economical framework of Chinese society ... turns upon diminutive agriculture and domestic manufactures as its pivots" (Avineri 1968, 357). But he distinguished such petty commodity production with private means of production and personal labor from capitalism because the means of production and subsistence, while they remain the property of the immediate producer, are not capital. They only become capital under circumstances in which they serve at the same time as means of exploitation of, and domination over, the worker" (1977, 933).

His image of China as a vast empire of owner-operators oversimplified the degree to which accumulation, propertylessness, and exploitation had become commonplace there, and, as elsewhere in his writings, he failed to pursue the possibilities for the economic exploitation of women inherent in patriarchy.

Exploitation, the extraction of surplus value from a worker’s unpaid work, was a normal part of Chinese life, where landlessness was common and many earned their livelihood through labor alone. Exploitation occurred too in households, where daughters were legally and customarily excluded from membership in the agnatic corporation, but obliged to work for that corporation as long as they lived at home. It can be argued that women came close to being outright property of their male agnates. Even today in Taiwan, parents often say that daughters "belong to other people," not to their natal families, and hold the view "What's the good of having a daughter if she doesn't bring any money home?" (Kung 1983, 119). Along the "exploitation" dimension, economic relations outside the TMP in traditional China more closely resembled those of a capitalist than of a petty commodity mode of production.

Whether this exploitation resulted in the accumulation of capital as in capitalism proper, however, is another question. Here we
must consider Marx's concern for the historical tendencies of the CMP. If capital accumulates and is reinvested, and reaps an even bigger harvest of surplus value and thus accumulates further, we expect to see an expansionary thrust to the entire economy. In the west, capitalism developed during the late middle ages to a point where it triggered revolutions in science, technology, and economic growth with the industrial revolution. From there it became the dominant mode of production first in the world of Europe, the Caribbean, and North America, and then, through imperialism, in the rest of the world (v. Mintz 1985; E. Wolf 1982). The CMP enabled favored classes and countries to amass capital, power, and knowledge at an unprecedented rate. In China, this did not occur.

Rather, we encounter in the late imperial period an economic pattern that closely resembles that explored in the work of those researching "proto-industrialization" in Europe (e.g. Mendels 1972; Kriedte, Medick, and Schlumbohm 1981). Like petty commodity production (or the PCMP), proto-industrialization uses household premises, household means of production, and household labor in handicrafts, resulting in a good deal of economic output, but none of the technological innovation of capitalism in its industrial form. The economic dynamic of proto-industrialism is one of involution, with increasing dependence on labor-intensive activities and a resulting expansion of population.

In one recent view of the consequences of proto-industrialization in China, "pauperization is just as likely to result from the logic of protoindustrial systems as is the breakthrough to development" (Bergère 1984, 331). Bergère concludes that a pattern resembling what I wish to label the PCMP was leading in just such a direction in China by the mid-Qing, and she is very likely correct. But the PCMP has a different significance in China, where it has been shaped by its long and historically specific relationship with the TMP, from that of proto-industrialization in politically fragmented Europe. It would be hasty to assume too great an identity between the European proto-industrial pattern and the Chinese PCMP, although they hold some elements in common. Nor did all European proto-industrialization lead to the CMP; Fernand Braudel's volume The Wheels of Commerce (1982) speaks to the current interest among European economic historians in the pre-industrial phases of capitalism, and to the breadth
of form such economic patterns may assume.

While China surely failed to develop a hegemonic capitalism like that of the west, nevertheless, the Qing especially was an era of extraordinary absolute growth. Though the population expanded more than four-fold from the Northern Song (ca. 1080) to the time foreigners forced an entry for the CMP in the mid-nineteenth century, rice-production per capita remained stable throughout the period (Feuerwerker 1984, 300) and the general standard of living does not seem to have fallen significantly. Chinese productivity came close to keeping up with population growth, even though the amount of arable land did not increase by much. As we know from Elvin, this was largely accomplished through labor intensification rather than through the technical innovation or greater use of capital characteristic of the CMP.

The characteristic pattern of reproduction of the PCMP, which separates it so decisively from the CMP, entwines reproductive values with production values in the economy's molecular unit, the household. It can be argued that China owes not just the Qing expansion, but the repeated expansions of a population devastated by the wars, famines, plagues, and floods of post-Song China to the profoundly pro-natalist position that both traditional modes of production enjoined upon households. Rapid population growth after a demographic collapse is "natural" only in non-human populations; in humans, the rapidity of increase depends on cultural as well as biological factors. The dense peasant populations of parts of Mesoamerica, for example, may not yet have recovered from the demographic disaster of the fifteenth century Spanish conquest: that of Mixteca Alta, in Oaxaca, Mexico, was only half of its sixteenth century level in 1960 (Cook and Borah 1971, I: 105).

Not only was the Chinese PCMP pattern demographically resilient, but it was apparently economically resilient and effective as well. As the Chinese are so fond of pointing out, there simply is no parallel in history to the degree of stability and continuity displayed by Chinese culture. Part of this strength derives from a population which sprang back after disasters and worked to accumulate and retain resources in better times, as people in less dynamic economies are neither permitted nor motivated to do. The PCMP, based on flexible, human-scaled, and profoundly ideologized production units competing for profits contained an
inherently expansionary thrust. Though this thrust did not result in higher per capita wealth, it quite clearly resulted in the aggrandizement of societal wealth on an exceptional scale.

The expansionary potential of the PCMP operated on different premises from those of the CMP. Household enterprises accumulated capital, reinvested in more land or shops, and in the maintenance of more laborers, but they also expected to divide the accumulation to allow new households their independence. The Qing penal code clearly mandated this form of property transfer (George Staunton, cited in Davis 1972, II: 378). Laws can become dead letters when resisted by the populace, as have laws under the Republic that award daughters equal inheritance with sons. But farm and shop households regularly divided in the Qing, as frame-knitting households (Harrell 1982) and ceramic insulator manufacturing households (Stites 1982) do in today's Taiwan. The profits of a petty capitalist household do not typically transform it into a big capitalist enterprise; rather, it divides into two or three petty capitalist households instead. Capital is dispersed almost as soon as it is accumulated, by the very people who have scrimped and suffered to accumulate it, and who fervently believe in the power of undivided capital.

Petty capitalism remained household-based in China primarily because the state had, over centuries, developed effective mechanisms for limiting capital accumulation. Some of these mechanisms were obvious and direct, such as confiscating "excessive" property and monopolizing highly profitable commerce (in salt, camphor, and foreign trade); others were more subtle, such as basing taxation and property rights on the patrilineal household and fostering kinship as the ultimate good. Nor should it be forgotten that the state engaged in horrifying acts of terrorism to underline the legal unity of the family and the mutual responsibilities of its members. Gary Hamilton (1984, 417) cites a memorable case quoted originally by Hsu Dau-lin:

In October 1865, Cheng Han-cheng's wife had the insolence to beat her mother-in-law. This was regarded as such a heinous crime that the following punishment was meted out. Cheng and the wife were both skinned alive in front of the mother, their skin was displayed at city gates in various towns and their bones burned to ashes. Cheng's granduncle, the eldest of his close relatives, was beheaded; his uncle and two
brothers, and the head of the Cheng clan, were hanged. The wife's mother, her face tattooed with the words "neglecting the daughter's education," was paraded through seven provinces. Her father was beaten 80 strokes, and banished to a distance of 3000 li. The heads of families to the right and left of the Chungs were beaten 80 strokes and banished to Heilung-kiang. The educational officer in town was beaten 60 strokes and banished to a distance of 1000 li. Cheng's nine-month-old boy was given a new name and put in the country magistrate's care. Cheng's land was to be left in waste "forever." All this was recorded on a stone stele, and rubbings of the inscriptions were distributed throughout the empire.

Very few really large private enterprises existed in pre-CMP China except in the form of collective institutions the state found acceptable on moral grounds as promoting harmony among kinsmen, sojourners from a common home region, and workers in the same competitive trades: huiguan ("fellow provincial associations"), and hanghui ("guilds").

Huiguan and hanghui, unlike lineages, did not accumulate and protect capital. Workers in a common trade banded together not only "brotherhood," and to limit competition from fellow tradesmen (not a petty capitalist goal), but to avoid excessive taxation or regulation by officials. Huiguan, organizations of fellow provincials, often merchants, in an alien town also organized in large part to defend themselves against local officials' exactions, as well as to assist one another in economic transactions. Fewsmith has argued that official distaste for commerce left an important arena for private associational activity which hanghui and huiguan members exploited effectively in their own economic interests (1983, 620) from their position in both the PCMP and the TMP.

But lineage corporations especially reveal the manipulation of kinship ideology to gain tax shelter and protect the accumulation of substantial property where the legal system had little regard for social entities without a basis in official morality. Especially in south China where the PCMP had greater strength than in the north, groups based on real and fictive kinship formed very large and long-lived lineage corporations. Multi-functional, they served to organize labor power to pioneer and improve arable land, defend it from prior aboriginal owners and other lineages, and meet educational, social, and political needs of their members.
But they were also property-holding corporations, often owning large tracts of lineage land whose rental produced wealth for at least some lineage members. While the ancient ideal of lineages was common use or fair distribution of proceeds from this land to members, by late imperial times their revenues were often appropriated by some members who became landlords (and, sometimes, merchants) on a grander scale than was typically possible for household enterprises that stood alone. At the same time, the poorest members were not uncommonly disqualified from membership in these rich corporations for failure to meet ritual standards (Freedman 1958, 79-80). Such lineages challenged the power of local officials on their own territory; the ability of the lineage to evade land taxes and thus divert resources from the TMP to the PCMP was supported by both its own manpower and its use of officially-sanctioned kinship ideology to legitimize its capital accumulating tendencies. Lineages especially protected member households who through kin seniority or informal manipulation had come to control corporate revenues.

Chinese lineage organizations of the modern type appear to have originated and flourished during the Song (Freedman 1958, 7). Indirect historical evidence for hanghui organizations points to their origin in about the same era (Burgess 1966, 69). This accords neatly with the idea that these were popular organizational responses to the limits that economically active Song officials placed on the rapidly expanding PCMP of that time.

China is unusual among state-level societies for retaining complex lineage organizations that include both ruling-class and commoner members, just as it is for harboring a PCMP. The hegemony of the TMP and its articulation with the PCMP help explain both the "petty" nature of traditional Chinese enterprises, and the existence of lineages, the major exceptions to that pattern.

Petty capitalism was kin-based and generally small-scale because officials constrained and channeled it into kin corporations to further the interests of the TMP. But it took this form also because of its inherent capitalist relations and the economic competition they produced. Market processes generated pressures which hanghui attempted to limit, but against which agriculturalists had few defenses other than lineage and much weaker village solidarities. Where each producer household's
earnings threaten every other’s, the long-term tendency of capitalism is to dissolve the bonds of human relationship in the impersonality of the market where everything can be bought and sold. Such an economy breeds fear and distrust of one’s neighbors in addition to that felt for the autocratic authorities.

Distrust and fear of strangers, or even of those who are simply outside the circle of kin are striking characteristics of Chinese people (as well as of others, like rural Italians or Mexicans who struggle on the fringes of capitalist production [Foster 1965]). This distrust is vividly dramatized in the near-universal Chinese anxieties about ghosts and strangers.

According to both David Jordan (1972) and Arthur Wolf (1974), strangers are symbolized in Taiwan Chinese culture by ghosts. A ghost is not just the filthy, polluted essence of a dead person come to trouble one’s home, life, and property. It is the essence of someone who either died horribly and unnaturally, or -- worse -- of one who died unmourned. A ghost comes either from a family which cannot get to the body to bury it and care for its soul (because it drowned, or died abroad in war), from a family too poor to do these things, or it comes from no family at all. Ghosts represent perhaps the ultimate fear in traditional Chinese life, the fear of being alone in an exacting, competitive world with no economic base, no household, no family. In life, such a person is a wandering stranger, or beggar (v. Weller 1984), the ultimate propertyless person. The many vivid rituals and beliefs about ghosts are foils for those, like funeral and marriage rites, that stress the family as the only safe haven in a dangerous world. The chasm between the household and the outer economy is built into China’s highest ethics, and into its deepest fears.

Anxieties about strangers did not completely prevent the development of non-kin, non-guild economic relations. The Chinese developed an extensive repertory of business skills which were mostly learned informally, based on personalistic ties and local reputation for probity, and secured by unofficial rather than legal sanctions (see Omohundro 1981, De Glopper 1972, and Fried 1953). Recourse to the law was too dangerous to complainants to be popular; informal business agreements were upheld by some because the gods enjoined such economic morality (Saso 1982), by others to protect their reputation and future creditworthiness, and by some because their creditor could enforce repayment
through political clout or sheer physical muscle. These sanctions apparently worked well enough for the regular transaction of business. In addition to unofficially securing contracts, petty capitalist enterprises arranged for the extension of credit out of household savings through rotating credit clubs, personal loans, the transfer of brideprice and dowry, outright usury, and other small-scale mechanisms. A family’s reputation in its neighborhood or village was gained through a combination of neighborly observation and patterns of conspicuous household expenditures on high-consumption rituals which could inform associates of the household’s capacity to put money up front.

Acting as part of the PCMP, people produced their own ideologies, symbols, and rituals through which common folk articulated their perceptions of their world, instructed the young and each other in these, and enacted them into reality. The scope of these ideologies is vast and protean, responsive as they were to problems of practical production, of ecological balance, of political power, gender definition, ultimate meaning, and a myriad of other cultural complexities (v. Johnson et al., eds. 1985, Gates and Weller 1987). They are similar in many ways to those produced by peasant peoples generally. Fertility, for example, whether of people, animals, vegetation, or the soil itself is stressed, symbolized, and sacralized. But some PCMP ideological preoccupations are unique to and characteristic of petty capitalist culture. Money is a sacred substance in Chinese folk culture, offered to gods and spirits, used for purification and to symbolize productive and reproductive increase. Folk rituals support the virtue of getting rich, paying one’s debts, and investing for profit. A contemporary Taiwan funeral rite which Hou Ching-lang believes may derive from much older sources (1975, 15, 16, 101) teaches the capitalist lesson that the wise and powerful gods draw profits from invested capital, while ordinary humans consume their wealth and thus remain only human (Gates 1987).

Other aspects of PCMP ideology, and of Chinese culture in general, are best understood in the wider context of the articulation of this mode with the TMP. While space limitation precludes their examination here, the analysis of China’s "gentry," Confucianism, popular religion, kinship, gender roles, cities and central place hierarchies, and regional differences is rendered sharper when these entities are viewed as conditioned, in part, by the operation of these two complexly related modes of production.
In Taiwan, the PCMP has always been strong. Until the Japanese period, the state and its tributary economy based on tax collection and control of land was weak in the island, as it must have been in many peripheral parts of China. Throughout the centuries, trade with China's coast created markets and the opportunity for petty capitalist endeavors; foreign interest in tea and camphor from the 1860s greatly expanded those opportunities for growers, processors, packers, shippers, and providers of services to labor. As I hope in the future to argue more fully, the PCMP may have supplied the only real growth in the island's economy during the first fifteen years or so of Guomindang rule. Today, patrilineal family corporations, a strong and avowedly Confucian state, and capitalist-like values, combined with elements of traditional business practice, form a familiar petty capitalist complex that articulates with the national and international capitalist export sector that has so greatly expanded Taiwan's twentieth century place in the world economy. This slightly evolved version of the PCMP, incarnated in the island's numerous small-business households, urban and rural, also exists in complex articulation with a major state enterprise sector.

As I have argued elsewhere (Gates 1979), big private and state enterprise has benefited greatly from the relationship that exists between small business households and the part-time proletariat of the industrial sector. A very large proportion of Taiwan's industrial labor force is made up of the young sons and daughters of small business households, who retire from factory work when marriage and childbearing oblige them to seek work that can support a family, as factory wages typically cannot. With luck, prudence, and family ties behind them, they take up the household business or a new one of their own, and go on to produce another generation of docile, hard-working factory hands and future entrepreneurs. The continuity, as well as the economic importance of the PCMP thus seems assured.

Society and culture, economy and polity in Taiwan are all shaped and colored by the organization, dynamic, and inner logic of this peculiarly East Asian mode of production. While James Davidson would not have to haggle for his fare on today's Taiwan railroads, beneath the visible changes in innumerable shophouses and small manufactories throughout the island, Davidson would find business as usual.
Taiwan constantly posed problems of control to the imperial court during its 212 years under Ch'ing rule (1683-1895). Regarding the island as a frontier before 1874 when Japanese invaded southern Taiwan during the Moutan Incident, the Manchu court adopted a passive attitude toward civil administration, military arrangement, emigration, ethnic relationships, and land reclamation. Its restrictive policies not only weakened political maneuvering but also engendered social unrest. It was not until after popular uprisings and foreign encroachment that the Ch'ing government reconsidered its policies in an attempt to resolve political and social problems on Taiwan.

The Ch'ing imperial court was confronted with problems of political control immediately after wresting Taiwan from the Cheng family in 1683. The Manchus initially intended to abandon the island; although they retained it in the empire for strategic considerations the following year, they were disinclined to develop it according to a plan. Established as a prefecture, Taiwan was under the jurisdiction of Fukien until 1887 when it became a province. An Intendant was sent to govern the island, but he and other officials who received the lowest "stipends for the cultivation of incorruptibility" (yang-lien yin) in the empire tended to regard it as a "gold cave" where they could even out their deficits in Fukien. At the sub-county level, the Ch'ing government allowed a certain degree of conventional local autonomy in which it invested neither money nor talent. The pao-chia policing system was occasionally enforced after 1733 and only rarely effective. Military defense, on the other hand, was imposing only on paper. Before the 1860s, Taiwan annually maintained some ninety warships and seven thousand to fourteen thousand soldiers, but official figures were often inflated; in 1866 none of the warships existed and less than five thousand soldiers were stationed. Troops were sent over from Fukien and Kwang-tung, making Taiwan the only region where soldiers were not recruited from the local residents. Although these soldiers were required to marry and leave their families on the mainland during their three-year service on the island, often they were unmarried.
The government's delay in the construction of city walls and the lack of mounted troops further undermined defense. The earthen city-walls of Tainan, the prefectural seat of Taiwan, were not built until 1790, more than a century after the island was incorporated into the empire. The soldiers without the support of mounted troops were especially vulnerable to attack in the countryside.

The overall weakness of Ch'ing rule in Taiwan originated mainly in its negative policies. Prior to the 1874 Moutan Incident, Ch'ing policies were dictated by expediency rather than principle and were directed toward control rather than governance. An analysis of the Ch'ing court's major policies regarding Chinese migration, aboriginal control, ethnic relationships, and land development indicate that before 1875 the Ch'ing government's main concern about the island was minimizing the problems it caused, and not making it a livable place. This article examines these policies to illustrate the ways in which the Ch'ing government discouraged Chinese migration, neglected indigenous people under the guise of protection, segregated Chinese from aborigines, and impeded Chinese colonization of Taiwan.

MIGRATION POLICY

The Ch'ing policy regarding migration to Taiwan was formulated under the presumption that the island was a retreat for rebels and with the concern that population growth there would curtail the island's rice supply to Fukien. The Manchu imperial court did not treat the people crossing the straits as immigrants in either a legal or a demographic sense and indiscriminately considered them "temporary residents" (liu-yu or chi-chi) of Taiwan, registering them in accordance with their ancestral places of residence. From 1684 to 1789, the government adopted a highly restrictive policy which allowed only married men to migrate, with the exception of the ten years (1732-1739, 1746-1747, 1760-1761) during which the immigrants' families could also legally cross over. From 1790 to 1875, it maintained a less restrictive policy, stipulating that Chinese people take government-authorized ships to sail to the island. Only after 1875 were Chinese allowed to cross the strait by whatever means they chose (Table 1). The restrictive migration policy com-
pelled the Chinese to sail to Taiwan illegally, a situation that com-
plicated the problem of control.

TABLE 1
Fluctuations in Ch'ing Migration
Policy toward Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>People Permitted to Emigrate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1684-1875</td>
<td>Married Fukienese men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1692-1875</td>
<td>Married Hakka men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1732-1739</td>
<td>Migrants' families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746-1747</td>
<td>Migrants' families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760-1761</td>
<td>Migrants' families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791-1875</td>
<td>Chinese people through government-authorized crossing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875-1895</td>
<td>All Chinese people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Ch'ing government did not draw up a reasonable policy of
Chinese migration to Taiwan shortly after the subjugation of the
island in 1683. It permitted only those who had both wives and
property to remain, but they would be sent back to their places of
origin for punishment if they perpetrated serious crimes. A num-
ber of Chinese settlers apparently left Taiwan in compliance with
this order. On November 6, 1684, Shih Lang (1621-1696), who
commanded Ch'ing troops ousting the Chengs, reported that
about half of the Chinese population had sailed back to the main-
land. A significant loss of population, whatever the actual size,
meant a serious setback for Taiwan's development. But the
Ch'ing government couldn't rule an island without people. As a
step to permit Chinese emigration to Taiwan, the maritime prohibi-
tion that had been in force in the empire since 1656 was lifted on
December 1, 1684. About this time married men in Fukien
were allowed to emigrate from Amoy to Lu-erh-men on the
southeastern coast of Taiwan. These married emigrants,
however, were enjoined from taking their families, and the Hakka
from the Hweichow and Chaochow prefectures of Kwangtung
province were forbidden to sail to Taiwan. The proscriptive rule
against the Hakka migration was formulated partly because of
their suspected role in sea piracy and partly because of Shih Lang's discrimination against them. Only after Shih died in 1696 was the interdiction against the Hakkas rescinded. The injunction preventing the migrants from sending for their families was concocted not only to discourage their permanent settlement on Taiwan, but to make the stakes high should they attempt to cause trouble there. In a sense, their families were not unlike hostages.

The restrictive measures prevented neither illegal entry nor social unrest and the major issue in the Ch'ing migration policy from 1684 to 1789 became whether to allow women and unmarried men to sail to Taiwan and how to stem illegal migration. In 1711, after Taiwan Prefect Chou Yuan-wen reported that both private trading ships and government revenue cruisers carried stowaways, the prospective emigrants were required to state the places where they would live and the relatives who would support them in Taiwan.¹² In 1714, the government also assigned numbers to all ocean-going vessels to tighten control.¹³ As illegal entry into Taiwan continued, the Ch'ing court in 1719 imposed more restrictions: (1) both trading and fishing ships required surety; (2) crews were limited to a specified number; (3) fishing junks and government revenue cruisers could not carry either merchandise or passengers; and (4) warships escorted all privately-owned junks sailing between Amoy and P'eng-hu.¹⁴ After the Chu I-kuei Uprising in southern Taiwan in 1721, Lan Ting-yuan (1680-1733), who helped put it down, attributed the rise of social unrest to the unbalanced sex ratio of the Taiwan population and suggested that not only all prospective emigrants be married and take their families to the island, but those who had already settled down should also send for their families.¹⁵ His proposal, however, was rejected. After the Wu Fu-sheng Uprising in 1732, Governor of Kwangtung Omid (d. 1761) broached the issue and recommended that the Chinese settlers having fields or a business and owning a house be permitted to send for their families. He envisioned that, "Within several decades, as all people would have family ties and devote themselves to making a good living, they would have no leisure time for wrongdoing." The Grand Secretaries were convinced this time and repealed the ban against women's migration for the first time since 1684. But Chinese women could move to Taiwan legally for only seven years in the early eighteenth century.¹⁶
Before the ban was reactivated in 1739, Taiwan Prefect Shen Ch’i-yuan advocated unrestricted migration, and considered the draconian policy self-defeating and detrimental to the empire. He observed that Southern Fukienese went to Taiwan because they had "no fields to till, no manual work to do, and no food to seek," and even if they were sent back to the mainland after being discovered, they would attempt to sneak onto the island again. He also argued that uprisings occurred not because too many people lived on the island but because too few officials and soldiers were sent there and they did little but upbraid the people. Perceiving no deleterious consequences, he recommended the repeal of the restrictions. The Ch’ing court was at first leery of his proposal, but in response to the plea by the Manchu censor Liu-shih-ch’i in 1746, it granted the settlers with immovable property in Taiwan one year to send for all family members, from grandparents to great-grandsons.

In 1760 the Ch’ing migration policy was questioned again by Governor of Fukien Wu Shih-kung in his long memorial to the emperor. Wu attributed the motives of people’s continuous illegal emigration to the human desire for family reunion:

Those who left their families and sailed alone to Taiwan ten years ago have now tilled fields and built houses; they are capable of supporting their families. Even boys have grown up, established themselves, and owned property. If they abandon their possessions to return to the mainland, they will lose their livelihoods. If they forsake their parents, wives, and children, they will feel distraught. Their longing for reunion with their families made them use whatever illegal means is available.

The Ch’ing court was moved by his impassioned plea and granted one year for those eligible to send for their families. During the three decades ending in 1790 only in this year (from July 8, 1760 to June 27, 1761) could Chinese women legally sail to
Taiwan. The government not only refused to change its restrictive policy, but in 1775 it even enforced the same harsh regulations against the Chinese migrating to Manchuria from Hopei and Shantung.\textsuperscript{21} As illegal migration to Taiwan continued, the Ch'ing court in 1784 decided to open two more seaports, Han-chiang near Ch'üan-chou in southern Fukien and Lu-kang near Chang-hua in central Taiwan, both of which had long been used by the illegal Chinese entrants.\textsuperscript{22} The official opening of two more seaports, however, did little to bring Chinese migration under control.

The Ch'ing migration policy was revamped in the wake of the largest rebellion led by Lin Shuang-wen in 1787. After assessing the situation on the island, General Fu-k'ang-an concluded in one of his reports to the emperor that the Chinese "crossed the sea in search of food." He proposed a means to simplify migration procedures and systematize political control, which he called "officially authorized crossing" (k\textit{uan-tu}). The regulations were promulgated in 1790 and two more seaports, Wu-hu-men in Fukien and Pa-li-fen in northern Taiwan, were opened.\textsuperscript{23} Any emigrants who received a permit could pay a fixed fare to take a government-authorized private junk across the straits.\textsuperscript{24} With the implementation of this policy, women and unmarried men could legally migrate to Taiwan.

The Ch'ing court enforced the policy of "officially authorized crossing" from 1791 to 1875. Yet as Chinese people still opted for unauthorized entry, the government reiterated its prohibition of such passage in 1795, 1800, 1833, and 1834, and Fukien revenue cruisers also occasionally captured the stowaways.\textsuperscript{25} On February 15, 1875, in the wake of the Moutan Incident, the Ch'ing court finally repealed all the restrictive rules against Chinese migration to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{26} The announcement came almost two centuries late. By 1875 Chinese had increasingly chosen to emigrate to Southeast Asia, even though the risk of aboriginal attack on settlers had diminished in Taiwan.
ABORIGINAL CONTROL POLICY

Ch‘ing aboriginal control policy was designed to separate the Chinese from the indigenous people in Taiwan. The Manchu imperial court divided the indigenous people into uncivilized mountain tribesmen (sheng-fan) and civilized plains aborigines (shu-fan). The mountain tribesmen were considered "tigers possessing no humanity" because of their headhunting custom and were exempt from taxation unless they had pledged allegiance to the government. The plains aborigines, in contrast, were listed in the population registers, and their adult males were obligated to pay a poll tax (fan-hsiang) and render labor services such as transmitting local government dispatches and carrying the luggage of officials. The government exerted little effort to edify them. Although some officials occasionally established schools for the aborigines after 1686 and, beginning in 1758 instructed them to the end of adopting Chinese customs, it was through their own contacts with the Chinese that they gradually became sinicized.

The government allowed all indigenous people to enjoy autonomy within their own tribes. Each tribe, whose male population was generally between 80 and 400, elected a chieftain and one to six male or female deputy chieftains, depending upon group size. The local authorities gave them "identification certificates" (hsin-p‘ai) and appointed a Chinese intermediary called t‘ung-shih (literally, a person who comprehends and mediates [aboriginal] affairs) to supervise a tribe or a cluster of tribes. The control mechanism was not systematized until after 1767, when two posts of assistant prefect for aboriginal affairs (li-fan t‘ung-chih) were created at Chang-hua and Tainan. The hierarchy of functionaries charged with aboriginal control was gradually established, as shown in Figure 1.
The main functionaries in charge of aboriginal affairs were the T'ung-shih. As the interpreters and intermediaries for the Chinese and the natives, they collected taxes and supervised trading between the two ethnic groups. Although the post was in principle offered to Chinese who knew aboriginal languages, it was often held by Chinese who had married native women (fan-ko) and tax-farmers. In practice, it was so common for the tax-farmer to hold such a post that compilers of a local history took T'ung-shih as a synonym for a tax-farmer. Some sinicized plains aborigines such as Tirosan, Doroko, Bacealuan (Bakloan), Matteo, Soulang, and Sinkan near Tainan elected and remunerated their own T'ung-shih. After 1758, these sinicized aboriginal T'ung-shih were officially appointed by the government. In most aboriginal areas, however, the Chinese T'ung-shih intermediaries remained the key functionaries representing the local government.
Though enjoined from interfering in intra or intertribal affairs, the Chinese t'ung-shih often dominated the aborigines. They forced the aborigines to do manual work, partook of aborigines' harvest and game, and made native women their wives or concubines. They also lured Chinese settlers into the mountains to satisfy the headhunting custom of some uncivilized tribesmen. As the post was lucrative, avaricious Chinese without any knowledge of the native languages bribed local officials to obtain appointments. Each year they gave officials "bonuses" ranging from tens up to seven hundred taels to have identification papers renewed. This illicit practice prompted Chu-lo Magistrate Chou Chung-hsüan to order the t'ung-shih to stop exacting money from the tribesmen in 1715. Their exploitation, however, continued unabated, and the aborigines' resentment against the Chinese was exacerbated. Some of aboriginal uprisings in Ch'ing Taiwan were in fact directed at the tyranny of these intermediaries. In some Chinese revolts, such as the Chu I-kuei Uprising in 1721, the rebels also instigated the aborigines to kill the t'ung-shih to redress their grievances and thus escalated the disturbances. In an attempt to tackle the grave problems of aboriginal control, Intendant Yang Ching-su expelled all those judged to be malicious Chinese intermediaries in 1758. The efforts of conscientious officials notwithstanding, the venality of t'ung-shih continued to undermine the Ch'ing policy of ethnic segregation during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

ETHNIC SEGREGATION POLICY

The legal consequences of the ethnic segregation policy were stipulated in the Ch'ing Penal Code:

People who clandestinely enter Taiwan aboriginal areas are to be flogged one hundred times with a heavy bamboo stick. If they cut rattan, hunt deer, fell trees, or pluck millet, they are to be flogged one hundred blows with a heavy bamboo stick and condemned to servitude for three years.

Rewards were meted out to officials and soldiers who captured at least ten trespassers each year; those who took a perfunctory stance on this question were subject to demotion. Before it
was abrogated in 1875, the ethnic segregation policy was enforced mainly through two measures: the erection of partition earthworks (t’u-niu, literally, "earthworks resembling an ox") and the prohibition against intermarriage.

The erection of partition earthworks began during the Cheng period (1662-1683). The Ch’ing court preserved them and constructed more, but since the government assigned no guards to patrol these areas, the earthworks were never effective in holding back members of either ethnic group. The futility of this earthwork demarcation system was brought to light in times of popular disturbance. During the Liu Ch’ueh Uprising in 1702, for instance, the uncivilized tribesmen easily crossed the line to bushwhack the Chinese settlers. During the eighteenth century officials occasionally erected the earthworks or posted stones, especially after popular revolts. In the wake of the Chu I-kuei Uprising in 1722 stones as demarcation marks and warning signposts were placed about ten to several tens of li apart in western Taiwan.40 After 1729 punitive measures were taken against derelict officials who allowed Han Chinese to cross demarcation lines.41 From 1773-1779 Taiwan Prefect Li Chung-chien reportedly constructed some 1,400 watchtowers between Ta-ku mountain in the south and Keelung in the north.42 After the Lin Shuang-wen Rebellion in 1788, however, General Fu-k’ang-an observed that Chinese settlers had ignored the earthworks outright, and that 11,200 kah (about 123,000 mou) of fertile paddy fields were being cultivated beyond the fixed demarcation lines.43 Although more earthworks were constructed during the nineteenth century, they were later either removed by the Chinese settlers or they collapsed by themselves.

The ban against intermarriage was outlined in the Regulations and Precedents of the Board of Revenue (Hu-pu tse-li):

Taiwanese people should not marry the aborigines. The violator should be divorced; he and the aboriginal chieftain as well as the t’ung-shih are to be penalized. Local officials who permit people to intermarry are also subject to punishment. The mixed-blood children living in Chinese settlements may not cross back and forth into the aboriginal areas.44

The punishments were ninety heavy bamboo blows for both the aboriginal chieftain and the t’ung-shih, and demotion of one
rank for local officials. The Ch’ing court officially prohibited racial intermarriage in 1737 after learning that it had caused a decrease in the aboriginal population. The ban, which was also decreed for the Miao areas in Kwangsi and Szechuan provinces was never effective in Taiwan.

Chinese colonists had married native women ever since they first arrived in Taiwan during the late Ming period. When the Dutch Commander Cornelius Reijersen sailed there in 1623, he heard that Chinese had aboriginal wives. Both the Dutch and the Chengs did not formulate any specific rules against intermarriage. In 1626, Georgius Candidius, the first Dutch missionary on the island, suggested to his East India Company superiors at Batavia that missionary work on Taiwan would benefit if Dutch preachers were encouraged to marry natives. After the Ch’ing takeover of the island, racial intermarriage continued as a result of the ban against the migration of Chinese women. Affection may have motivated most Chinese settlers to take aboriginal wives, but there were those who married for ulterior reasons. As in the matrilineal tribe a husband lived at his wife’s home, a Han Chinese man married to a native woman would also acquire her land. Moreover, some plains aborigine women, like those of Lang-ch’iao at the island’s southern tip, preferred intermarriage because the Chinese way of life was easier.

The Han Chinese taking of aboriginal wives aggravated problems of control in the mountains. They not only sold the tribesmen such contraband goods as iron and gunpowder but also instigated them to kill settlers and rise up in arms. After the Chang Ping Rebellion in 1833, the Ch’ing government stiffened the penalty by decreeing that Chinese marrying natives be flogged one hundred blows with a heavy bamboo stick and sentenced to three years’ servitude. In addition, they were to be banished to the frontier for military service if they had grown long hair and dressed like tribesmen. Those who fomented disturbances were sentenced to death. Local officials, however, continued to be derelict in the enforcement of laws. As the increase in intermarriage caused more tribes to lose their land, the aborigines had to take action to protect their own interests. In lease documents, for example, they would state that Chinese could not marry their
women. This kind of contractual agreement, however, was often nugatory because Chinese tried every means to acquire aboriginal land.

LAND RECLAMATION POLICY

The Ch'ing court in principle encouraged Chinese to reclaim the wilderness on the mainland, but it discouraged them from doing so on Taiwan. The government's main concerns were to avoid disturbing the aboriginal regions and to prevent lawbreakers from fleeing to outlying areas under the pretext of farming. Before 1875, except for seventeen years from 1725 to 1742, the Ch'ing imperial court generally enforced a restrictive land reclamation policy. Chinese could apply to the government for permits to clear the wilderness, but they were forbidden to cultivate the land owned by the aborigines unless it was deserted. Chinese settlers, however, clandestinely leased and purchased lands from the aborigines. While farmers cultivated small parcels of land themselves, big landlords or leaseholders (k'en-hu or ta-tsu-hu) would recruit cultivators (hsiao-tsu-hu), who further sub-leased to peasants to actually till the soil.

Ch'ing officials sometimes discussed the issue of land reclamation of Taiwan. About 1684 the first Chu-lo magistrate Chi Chi-kuang suggested promoting land cultivation by providing immigrants with traveling expenses, land, and oxen, by deferring their taxes for three years, and by rewarding local officials who recruited them. This was the first proposal urging the government to spur the development of the island, but it fell on deaf ears. In the early 1700's, Ch'en Pin (1656-1718, Tainan Magistrate 1702-1705 and Taiwan Intendant 1710-1715) appealed to the Ch'ing imperial court to open up the uncultivated areas. In 1721, after hearing that a number of rebels had retreated to the mountains during the Chu I-kuei Uprising, Governor General Man-pao proposed that all Chinese settling within ten li of the mountains abandon their dwellings and fields and that more partition earthworks be constructed. Lan Ting-yuan not only opposed such a harsh measure but also suggested the repeal of the ban against Chinese entering the aboriginal areas. Three years later, he further recommended commanding the plains aborigines to farm their land; if after one year they
failed to change it into paddy field, Chinese should be allowed to
cultivate the land. Despite the rejection of Lan's proposal by the
Ch'ing government, Chinese trickled into the aboriginal areas as
far as Ha-tzu-nan, Ch'ung-wen, and Pei-nan on the east coast.61
Much of the land in the north, however, remained unreclaimed in
the early eighteenth century.

The government discovered in 1725 that too much land was
unused in Taiwan and decided to allow the Chinese to lease
natives' land as a measure to increase revenue.62 With this partial
repeal of the ban, Chinese leased and purchased as much
aboriginal land as they could, especially in the north. This led
Tan-shui Assistant Prefect Wang Ch'ien, who from 1724 to 1728
was virtually in charge of Taiwan's northern region, to propose
that each Chinese farmer be limited to five kah (about 55
mou) of homestead. He also suggested that 500 kah be reserved for a
large tribe of civilized aborigines, 400 kah for a medium-size tribe,
and 300 kah for a small one. Ironically, the Ch'ing government
not only balked at this plan to protect the aborigines against
wanton Chinese encroachment, but in 1738 it even reduced the
rate of land tax on the newly-developed areas.63 Nevertheless,
six years later the government renewed the injunction against
Chinese cultivating aboriginal land, either through lease or pur­
chase, and ordered that the natives' fields occupied by Chinese
settlers be given back.64 In 1767 the Ch'ing imperial court
imposed heavier penalties on people who secretly leased and
farmed natives' land by sending them back to the mainland.65 But
local officials continued to wink at Chinese farming of aboriginal
land.66 Chinese settlers gradually dispossessed the plains
aborigines from their land before the end of the eighteenth
century.

As more natives' land was lost to the Han Chinese, the Ch'ing
government instituted a system of aboriginal military colonization
(fan-t'un) to cultivate hillside land after the Lin Shuang-wen Rebel­
lion in 1788.67 Twelve military colonization posts (t'un) were set
up among the ninety-three civilized tribes: four large posts were
each manned by 400 select peasants, and eight small posts each
had 300 peasants. Each native peasant was allotted two kah
(22.6 mou) of land (yang-shan-t'i) and given eight Mexican dollars
a year for his sustenance; he was also exempt from both the land
tax and the corvee.68 But the system had faded by 1830. Not
only was the land allotted to the aborigines far from their tribal areas, but they themselves also lacked the skills and equipment requisite for farming. Even if Chinese petty officials and settlers did not encroach upon their land, the aborigines preferred to lease it to Chinese farmers and collect rent.69

During the nineteenth century, some officials, such as Hsü Tsung-kan (1790-1866 Taiwan Intendant, 1848-1854) and Liu Yün-k’o (Governor-General of Fukien and Chekiang, 1843-1850), urged the central government to let Chinese people settle the wilderness without restrictions as a means of relieving the poor, removing bandit hideouts, and keeping the aborigines under control.70 The Ch’ing court remained impervious to constructive proposals until 1877 when it set up "bureaus for bringing in cultivators" (chao-k’en-chu) at Amoy, Swatow, and Hong Kong to promote Chinese immigration to Taiwan in order to develop its eastern coast and southern cape. Every prospective immigrant was given one kah of land, some farm implements, and an ox.71 This marked the first time that the Ch’ing government had on its own initiative taken serious efforts to speed up the development of Taiwan. In 1891, it was reported that some 2,555 kah of land had been cultivated in the Pei-nan area on the southeastern coast of Taiwan.72 Before the island was ceded to Japan in 1895, Han Chinese had developed its western and northeastern regions without encouragement from the Ch’ing government.

To sum up, the Ch’ing imperial court adopted restrictive policies toward Taiwan during its 212-year rule. None of the initial prescriptive and proscriptive measures ever succeeded, yet not until after popular uprisings did the Ch’ing government revamp its policies. The government discouraged Chinese from moving to Taiwan and in a sense, treated them as refugees rather than as emigrants. Before 1790, except for ten years, only married men were allowed to sail there. Although after 1790 women and unmarried men could also go to Taiwan by means of the "officially authorized crossing," it was only after 1875 that all Chinese people could freely emigrate to Taiwan. After the Chinese arrived on the island, the Ch’ing government separated them from the indigenous people and discouraged them from cultivating aboriginal land. It implemented an ethnic segregation policy by granting the aborigines a certain degree of "self-government," by stationing Chinese t’ung-shih intermediaries, by
erecting partition earthworks, and by prohibiting intermarriage. Though the Ch'ing imperial court generally prevented the two ethnic groups from forming a coalition against its rule, it could not prevent conflict between them. Conflict arose mainly from a Chinese drive to acquire aboriginal land. For all the restrictions on land reclamation, Chinese overcame whatever obstacle was placed before them. In 1875, when the Ch'ing court officially desegregated the two ethnic groups, Chinese had already completed their colonization of the western plains of the island.
AUTHORIZED SEA ROUTES BETWEEN SOUTHEAST CHINESE COAST AND TAIWAN
Some Observations on Social Discourse Regarding
Taiwan's "Primordial Inhabitants"
Fred Y.L. Chiu

In everyday language the category "Taiwan" represents a "society," a material entity with fixed contents. Viewed in the mode of positivistic inquiry, these assumed fixations have been taken for granted and again naturalized and reified as "social facts." These facts are taken to speak for themselves rather than matters argued about by social scientists or various others. From a very different perspective, that of discourse analysis, this apparent fixity dissolves into a most interesting case study of historically contingent social classification. This paper is part of a larger project, an analysis of the coming-into-being of the notion of Yüan-chu Min -- original inhabitant -- as an end point of a complicated process of ideological interpellation. Some theoretical implications will be touched upon, although space does not allow extensive elaboration.

I. "TAIWAN" THE PLACE

When the term "Taiwan" is used, reference may be to the place, the people, place and people, or in connection with other categories in accord with the author's wish. But beyond the author's desired reference, the use of a specific term invariably invokes -- explicitly or implicitly -- the framing of the term in time and its historical concurrences. Consider the following terms which are usually regarded as purely geographical terms:

(1) Yi-chou. Yi refers to peoples "without culture" or with different cultures that live to the east of China. Yi-chou thus refers to an area inhabited by the Yi (often recorded as Shan-yi, mountain Yi). Noteworthy here is that Yi is a Chinese term used to demarcate Chinese and non-Chinese to the east in cultural terms. The point of reference is a self-proclaimed Chinese-ness juxtaposed to cultural elements exogenous to it.

(2) Liu-ch'iu Kuo. The geographical term was used for centuries by Chinese to refer to the islands off the east coast of the Asian mainland. The object of description varied depending on the speaker: it could mean Taiwan, Okinawa, Japan, or the
Philippines. In the earliest documentation (the *Sui-shu*), reference to Taiwan made clear that there were people culturally different from the Han Chinese residing on the island. Moreover, they were organized into some sort of polity. They were reported to have lived for many generations under the rule of a "king."

(3) *P'i-she-yeh.* The twelfth-century writer Lo Yao and Wang Ta-yüan wrote about native people in southern Taiwan known as *P'i-she-yeh.* Modern scholars suspect that the term indicates a tribe in the south called "Siraryr" or "Bisaya" -- in either case not a name drawn from Han nomenclature. Known to the Chinese at the beginning of their migration to Taiwan, the name was not officialized. The place had yet to be appropriated by the Chinese World System.

(4) *Ta-yüan, T'ai-yüan, T'ai-wan.* In the thirtieth year of the reign of Ming emperor Shen-tzung, Chen Ti wrote the *Tung-fan Chi,* the *Records of the Eastern Fan* in which he referred to the island as *Ta-yüan.* Later many documents appeared labelling the big island to the east as *T'ai-yüan* or *T'ai-wan.* These terms are basically inflections of a single name, *Tai-wo-wan,* referring to a tribe residing near the present Tainan. In the Southern Min dialect all these notations are pronounced "Dai-wuan." The use of "Dai-wuan" to indicate an island across the strait is obviously a Southern Fukienese practice. In contrast to the fate of *P'i-she-yeh,* the local became a part of the Ming dynastic vocabulary prior the year 1620.

(5) "Ihla Formosa." In the early 1620's, the Portuguese again discovered a beautiful island which they named (along with more than 10 other islands "discovered" by Iberians worldwide) Formosa. The island which would later turn out to be the most famous of these Formosas is the one which we now refer to as Taiwan. According to Isao Yanaibara, the reason for the plethora of Formosas stems from the inclination of Portuguese sailors to cheer "Ihla Formosa!" when bits of land broke the bleak uniformity of transoceanic travel. If he is right, the name Formosa is a non-name with no connection to whatever is of or of the island.

(6) Takasago, *Kao-hsiung, Kao-shan Kuo.* These names are said to derive from a tribe named "Takoasa" living near today's Kaohsiung. The Japanese used Kanji to record the name and transform it to read "Takasago," a term later used by the Japanese to denote not only Kaohsiung the port city but also Taiwan as an island in its entirety.
(7) Tzu-yu Chung-kuo. During the 1950's, at the height of the Cold War, the government in Taipei found it necessary to distinguish itself from the government in Beijing without weakening its claim to be the legitimate ruling body of the whole of China. They came up with this name rendered into English as "Free China." This name, regardless of its over exposed ideological connotations, has been used as a geographic referent.

Quite a few things might be said about the terms briefly reviewed above. Here we focus on a few key points.

First, even as geographic terms, the names of Taiwan have proceeded through a range over time. These names were not conditioned by an earlier pristine existence or a compelling physicality of the place -- as port, tribe, stretch of scenery, or even as an island. On the contrary, it has been the other way around. It is the naming party's naming process that has defined and given meanings to a "physicality" that has been perceived in a limited way, at a specific time, and in particular historical contexts or pretexts. While this is not the place to decompose the complicated process of naming or to penetrate the thickness of these specific historical contingencies, it is clear that it is not possible to comprehend any of these names as "natural" or simply "geographical."

Second, consider the ways in which geographical names were produced: Taiwan was named referring to its appearance at first glance, e.g. Ihla Formosa. Taiwan was named in reference to the peoples as cultural groups who were said to reside there, e.g. Yi-chou, Liu-ch'iu Kuo, and P'i-she-yeh. The island was named with an eye to the port of entry, e.g. Dai-wuan and Takasago. Taiwan was named in reference to the Asian mainland, thereby becoming a residual category in one of two forms, either as the residue of a cultural group defined partly with reference to the otherness of the named object (Taiwan or Yi-chou), or as the residue of a ruling body (Tzu-yu Chung-kuo).

Third, there is another way to group these naming processes. The reported existence of a people/cultural group formed a point of reference as in Liu-ch'iu Kuo, and P'i-she-yeh. Alternatively, the existence of a people/cultural group was totally disregarded, e.g. Formosa. Lastly, names referred to a people/cultural group as seen through the perceptions of the naming parties, as in the cases of Takasago, Yi-chou, and T'ai-yüan.
Fourth, these names, in various ways and to varying degrees, reflect the juxtapositions of and tensions between categories of in-out and we-they, as well as subject-object relations which take the following largely ideological forms:

Discriminatory -- Yi-chou, Tzu-yu Chung-kuo, and P'í-she-yeh. To a lesser degree, Formosa, Takasago, and Liu-ch'íu Kuo also take this form.

Exclusive -- Yi-chou, Tzu-yu Chung-kuo, P'í-she-yeh, Liu-ch'íu Kuo, Takasago. To a lesser degree, Formosa, and Ta-yüan mean through exclusion.

Inclusive -- Dai-wuan and Taiwan are terms of imperial encompassment while Formosa and Takasago are terms of imperialist expropriation.

Fifth, from all of this we see naming is a complicated process, and the products of this process have no fixed or comprehensive relation to what has been named. In the naming of Taiwan as a geographic entity throughout history, these names have been attempts to capture wholes from parts. Once the linguistic value of a term has been fixed -- in other words, once the original violence has been done to the signified even as partially conceived -- a decision has to be made whether to give up capturing all that has escaped, taking the term as a closed referent, or incorporating whatever is required to shift the term into an open-ended signifier. Historically speaking, I would say that the first decision is responsible for the obsolescence of Yi-chou, P'í-she-yeh, Liu-ch'íu Kuo and to a lesser extent Formosa, Takasago, and Tzu-yu Chung-kuo.

The open-ended strategy, however, is no less precarious. This strategy openly acknowledges the subversive nature of the signifieds. The only difference is that this strategy actually appropriates a process of subversion, making it a self conscious one and thereby render it less destructive. The practice of this strategy is an exercise of violence upon all possible proliferations of signifieds, a constant squeezing of whatever comes to the surface of discourse into a prefabricated basket. A process of appropriation -- even at the level of linguistic manipulations is never non-violent, let alone "natural" or "neutral."

In Taiwan these things happened in a rather conspicuous fashion. Boundaries -- whether geographical, cultural, or political-economic -- were dismantled at the very moment they were set
up. Historical specificities, the very existence and particularization of which rendered a particular naming possible, were violently blurred and immediately denied. Using part to present whole, using specificity to usurp generality, using signs to modulate diversity -- these are an everyday business by no means exclusive to mythologization and theologization in the religious sphere.

Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn from this discussion:

(1) Taiwan has been named differently by different people and will probably again be named differently by different people.

(2) Taiwan was named differently under different historical circumstances, and will probably again be named differently at different historical junctures.

(3) Taiwan was named differently according to different ideological persuasions and geo-political expediencies, and will probably again be named differently according to different ideological persuasions and political expediencies.

(4) Even if "Taiwan" as a sign is retained to signify the place -- under different historical circumstances, by different naming agents, using different ideological persuasive forms, in light of different political expediencies -- the nomenclature's referencing power and its circumscriptions cannot but be open-ended, and therefore can never be taken for granted or taken at face value.

Given this conclusion, it is legitimate to ask whether names matter much. From a discourse analysis point of view, name matters precisely because a name is by no means simply a name. Here a preliminary exposition of my position is necessary.

- Referring to Saussure's principle of value, Benveniste states, "To say that values are 'relative' means that they are relative to each other. Now, is that not precisely the proof of their necessity?" Laclau argues and I agree that Benveniste's necessity derives "not from an underlying intelligible principle but from the regularity of a system of structural positions." Here the sense is that "everything is so necessary in it that modifications of the whole and of the details reciprocally condition one another" (second italics mine). Any language game, in the original Wittgensteinian sense, therefore involves a discursive structure which "is not a merely 'cognitive' or 'contemplative' entity; it is an artificiatory practice which constitutes and organizes social relations." In this sense, the "practice of articulation" as fixa-
tion and dislocation of a system of differences manifests the existence of asymmetry, and therefore tension, existing between floating signifiers and a "proliferation of signifieds."

Although any discourse can be understood as an attempt to dominate the field "to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center," still the center itself cannot be thought in the form of a present being, having a neutral site or a fixed locus. The consequence of this Derridaian position is that "in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse." That is to say every social practice is articulatory in one of its dimensions. Precisely because of the generalization of discourse, the practice of articulation "cannot consist of purely linguistic phenomena, but must instead pierce the entire material density of the multifarious institutions, rituals and practices through which a discursive formation is structured."

Following this line of thinking, a discourse analysis, informed by work from Gramsci to Derrida, must distinguish itself from linguistic analysis in several respects. Discourse analysis is not the same as analyzing a set of terms, a system of ideas, or the "false consciousness" of social agents; instead it takes the materiality of ideology as a focus of inquiry.

Second, discourse analysis must be extremely context sensitive in contrast to the Saussurian tradition that amounted to a context-free exercise, as Terrence Turner has put it. A third point of variance from the linguistic approach is the view that a surplus of meaning in a signifier entails a proliferation of signifieds; if there is an act of hegemonization, there must be something hegemonized and therefore something counter-hegemonic; if there is dominance there must be resistance.

The phenomena approached through discourse analysis -- suture and subversion, dominance and resistance, hegemony and counter-hegemony -- do not simply happen; therefore, discourse analysis must face the problem of agency. As bearers and mediators of structure, individuals as subjects are not "natural beings" and the positing of the existence of certain types of subjects will never be neutral. From this standpoint, individuals are the product of the ideological interpellation that constitutes individuals as subjects. This fourth particularity of discourse analysis leads to a central question in our discussion of Taiwan. "Who is the interpellator? Who is the interpellated?"
II. "TAIWAN" THE PEOPLE(S)

Before we travel back in time to meet the peoples denoted in these names, a couple of "safety rules" are in order. Our visualizing of the past happens deeply embedded in the present. This present is, however the end point of a process and history, sheerly by its perceived body weight, breaks through into the present. While history covers the field of discourse with a glacial sheet, the present it partially constitutes also uses history to the ends of its own praxis. In the extreme, history becomes the vocabulary for whatever purposes the present dictates. What is claimed as a past is invariably posed in the language of the present. My own "tourist guide" to the past is no exception.

A second caution: in our journey overtime through the naming discourse, the agent is understood as "in suspension." In interpelling identity and constituting a subject, agents are transformed even as they seek to transform the present or a past. In this sense, a historical social discourse between groupings of peoples assumes changing agencies even as we treat the groupings as constant. The agents in question must be implied rather than identified.

As the initial discussion suggests, Taiwan was named discretionally ("arbitrarily," as the Saussurian tradition would have it) by different peoples, at different times, and for different purposes. Nomenclatures still retained in discourse have little in common except that they are the creations of people having little or nothing to do with the place -- in most cases total strangers to the place.

This recalls not only Edward Said's major argument in *Orientalism*, but also seems relevant to a major theme in Eric Wolf's *Europe and the People without History*. In Wolf's words, the ability to bestow meanings -- to 'name' things, acts and ideas -- is a source of power. Control of communication allows managers of ideology to lay down the categories through which reality is perceived.22

Moreover, this naming and categorization conversely, entails the ability to deny the existence of alternative categories, to assign them to the realm of disorder and chaos, to render them socially and symbolically invisible [italics mine].23
This is precisely the politics of "rectification" (Cheng-ming). In other words, the politics of ideological hegemonization is a form of interpellation aiming at dominating and subjecting "the other" by an act of appropriation on the most general symbolic level. Predicated on the notion that history is a business of "account making" and "performance," the peoples who have had the longest and most intimate relations of coexistence with Taiwan are not without their own names and voices -- their voices have been overwhelmed, their names stolen, co-opted under layers and layers of accumulated fig leaves of historical accounts in alien languages. The following section demonstrates how these peoples have not only survived this process, but are trying to speak out once again.

Taiwan: The People in Chinese Accounts, Chinese Categories

Among the 10 existing "tribes" in Taiwan, the Atayal, Bunun, Tsou, and Tau (Yami) use their names of self-address. The names Atayal, Bunun, Tsou, and Tau actually mean "human being." The self-appellation of the Tsarsisan means "people of the mountains;" they are now called Rukai, a term whose meaning is unclear. Panapanaya (now Puyama) is a name originally used by neighbors to the north, the Ami. This term means "guests." Ami itself is a name used by the Panapanaya meaning "the northerners." The meanings of the terms of self-reference used by the remaining two groups (Thao and Paiwan) are unknown.

These particular names have been restricted in use. Most often, the peoples have been compressed through the discourse of outsiders into single categories. On page 133, I introduced some of the names used by outsiders. Now we are in a position to better understand them as part of a discourse.

The characters employed in Tung-ti-jen mark the people as Yi who live to the east. The character Ti (which can be written in such a way as to convey the Yi meaning) is a sheatfish and implies that these less cultured people are either fish like or people who engage in fishing. Among the other terms rooted in Yi, a marker for the culturally inferior to the east of the Han, are Shan-yi (Mountain Yi), Tao-yi (Island Yi), Tao-yi-hao Pi-she-yeh (Island Yi named Pi-she-yeh), and Tung-fan-yi -- East Fan Yi.
Fan is a central term in this discourse. Chen Pi-sheng reports that the Ming Dynasty State, in order to distinguish the fan of Taiwan and Szechuan, labeled the former as "Eastern Fan" and the latter as "Western Fan." How is it possible to subsume two unrelated peoples living thousands of miles apart form each other into a single category? Operating within the Han-centered classification system, the assignment is non-problematic: non-Han are automatically dumped into this container. The categorization is not made in ignorance of the particularities of the peoples thus named. What is central in a discourse analysis is that this naming was a process that refused to acknowledge any content of the other, except as elements useful in the construction of the Han self.

What is this category, fan? In a 1952 article advocating the standardization of the Chinese nomenclature for Taiwan natives, Ruey Yih-fu insisted that fan does not indicate contempt. Quoting the adjetival form of "fan fan" he offers that the character originally meant "brave." Noting the classical use of "fan people" and "fan tribe," Chou Hsien-wen contends that the term is obviously pejorative. He quotes the Shuo-wen in which fan means the foot of the beast, the claw shaped imprint left in the field by an animal.

A return to the classics is not necessary to demonstrate the negative loading. Fan has disappeared in all modern discourse based in alleged republican or egalitarian ideologies. In its broadest connotations, fan encompasses whatever is excluded from what is deemed to be "Han." As a residual category, fan became so encompassing as to be virtually meaningless. Consequently, prefixes and suffixes were added to sift desired significata from whatever was to be discarded.

The modifiers east and west in "East Fan" and "West Fan" mark the peoples as east or west of the Han people -- the quintessence of self-centering. Another modifier is employed in Tu-fan, which can be used as a general category to indicate the "fan" as a totality. The modifier Tu (dirt) means native and carries a degrading tone in modern discourse. When juxtaposed to Ye-fan ("Wild-Fan"), it refers to the relatively "civilized" -- that is to say Sinicized -- fan. In this opposition, Ye-fan refers to those who are relatively less civilized. The prefix Ye is not only disparaging, it also conveys the sense of beast-like.
Another binary opposition of prefixes in *Sheng-fan* ("Raw" *Fan*) and *Shou-fan* ("Ripe" or "Cooked" *Fan*), comes very close to Levi-Strauss' use of the raw/cooked relation as the cultural/natural opposition. The asymmetries within the two sets are also similar. Presupposed is a possible transformation from raw to cooked and cultural to natural, but not vice versa. The cooked is the thing *in presentia*; the raw, however, is also the thing *-- in potentia*. This opposition can be indicative of socio-personal distance: *sheng* (raw) is strange and remote, while *shou* (cooked) indicates acquaintance and proximity. Although consideration of both parties is essential to the concept of social distance, the Han perspective is the source of the distancing. It is then the responsibility of the "other" to move, to transform themselves from raw into cooked. In this view, the others come towards the Han; the Han in the center do not reach out.

The pairing *yi kui-hua fan* (already-assimilated-fan) and *wei kui-hua fan* (not-yet-assimilated-fan) continues this logic. The linear and unidirectional process of civilizing can not but be conflated with Sinicizing. "*Kui-hua* assimilation" bears an evangelist message reminiscent of the "white man's burden." Assimilation is seen as an equilibrium to be reached sooner or later, hence all that matters is distinguishing "already" from "not yet." The standard American English rendering of *kui-hua* the ironic term "naturalization." Someone has to be "naturalized" away from what they naturally were. The irony is present in the original Chinese where one must "come home" and "transform into" that which has never been one's home.

In these categories we see humanity divided into *fan* and Han. *Fan* are in turn bifurcated into Raw-*fan* and Cooked-*fan*. To mark place in the civilizing journey from raw to cooked, the Ch'ing period saw a mediating category of *Hua-fan* -- the *fan* in transition. It conveys the degree to which a *fan* is cultivated. *Hua-fan* by no means negates the opposition of raw and cooked. There is no third category of half-raw or half cooked. Rather, the *Hua-fan* is a kind of *fan* in the process of transition from raw to cooked. Raw and cooked as concepts are conveniently absolutized, positivized, and naturalized.\(^{30}\)

The opposition of *Shan-fan* (Mountain *Fan*) and *P'ing-pu-fan* (Plains *Fan*) appears to define the *fan* with reference to topography. In actual usage, however, the latter term refers to
the highly Sinicized groups living on the western plains. Groups living in the flat areas of the east coast were called Raw Fan in disregard of the topographical reality because of their low degree of assimilation. Neither are Plains Fan and Cooked Fan coterminous. Just as there are Raw Fan who live on the plains, so there are Cooked Fan who live in the mountains. No simple equation can be made between Dirt Fan, Plains Fan, and Cooked Fan, nor can an equation of Wild Fan, Mountain Fan, and Raw Fan be ranged as an opposite. Historically informed perceptions, cultural bias, and environmental connotations are of different dimensions of découpage. It is highly unlikely that their discursive significances could remain intact once efforts are made to reduce any one of them to the others. This is why positivistic efforts to pinpoint the physicality of the above terms always results in failure and always leaves one confused and frustrated in efforts to apply the reductive categories.\(^3\) Actually, the different diacriticals that have been superimposed on the original category fan are by no means discrete phenomena existing independently of each other. Such terms in discourse are like tangent lines cutting into each other at any number of points. Each has its specific angle and trajectory as it pieces through the texture of the existence of the others. Owing to the arbitrary nature of any fixing of signifier/signified pairings and the impossibility of complete suture, any discursive steering and manipulation is potentially double-edged. The proliferation of signifiers in Chinese historical accounts regarding the indigenous peoples in Taiwan is case of categories imposed from without. It is a process of repeated failed attempts to freeze meanings for a constantly changing social formation. Lebenswelt -- indicative formulation in which "objects" can never be totally deprived of "subjectivity" or be thoroughly subjected.\(^3\) No matter how "formless," trivial, obscure . . . etc., resistance is there to stay and contributes to the interpellation of self into subject whenever there is subjugation. In this sense, historical accounts generated by Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan reveal a genuine effort to appropriate existing categories as well as devise new ones in an effort to dominate and hegemonize.

**Taiwan: The Peoples in Japanese Colonial Accounts**

Over 50 years of colonial rule, the Japanese produced at least six to seven thousand written accounts of the non-Han peoples in
Taiwan. These accounts covered various aspects of life and were published in more than 70 newspapers, periodicals, official reports, and books. One way to view this literature is an examination of the referencing terms for the non-Han employed in the titling of a selection of these works. This terminology can be divided into 3 major categories: ban, zoku, and the opposition of zumin/min-zoku.

Ban appears in Japanese publication as early as the 1896, the second year of occupation. It is generally accepted as a rendition of the Chinese fan, designating similar phenomena with very similar implications. This reading is confirmed in a brief review of compound terms predicated upon this master category:

- 1896 "already assimilated ban/ not yet assimilated ban"
- 1896 "raw ban"
- 1896 "cooked ban"
- 1896 "Taiwan ban tribe"
- 1897 "plains ban" (p'ing-pu fan in Chinese)
- 1898 "various ban tribes"
- 1899 "high mountain ban"
- 1899 "plains ban" (p'ing-ti fan in Chinese)
- 1900 "Taiwan ban peoples"
- 1901 "Taiwan ban place"
- 1905 "Taiwan ban situation"

Japanese perceptions of their relations with the non-Han population during the first decade position them as surrogates of the Chinese. As other usurping rulers have found, substitution is the safest route to a complete and stable assumption of power. This entails the assumption of existing positioning, but as the late-Ch'ing withdrawal and inertia was replaced by a more aggressive Japanese colonization, a new formulation emerged -- zoku (tsu in Chinese).

Zoku originally connoted a relatively distinctive racial subgroup. The modern usage broadened to indicate any somewhat distinctive cultural or societal grouping, even sub-cultures and age groups as in the post-war novel Tribe of the Sun. Zoku indexes any grouping of people which can be separated from the mainstream, regardless of the diacritica used to distinguish it.

In this latter sense, Zoku employs a logic of exclusion. Consider the terminology of the "Ban Affairs" policy of confinement, segregation, and control before the end of the 1930's:
1903 "savage tribe"
1923 takasago-zoku

As I mentioned on page 134, Takasago is an inflected place name based on a tribal name and later used to refer to Taiwan as a whole. Takasago-zoku refers to all the tribes of Taiwan and inflected again yields the term "high mountain tribes." This secondary inflected term, owing to its face value, has been taken to sound like a primary (here topographical) descriptive term. The transformation has been so subtle that even later Chinese have conceived the non-Han populations as mainly shan-ti jen (mountain peoples) or kao-shan tsu (high mountain tribes), without being aware of the conflations behind the term.

Once the non-Han peoples were transformed into mountain peoples, the non-Han elements in the lowlands are not categorized. Consequently, the term rendered in Chinese as p'ing-pu tsu (plains tribes) starts to appear in Japanese documents in 1940. The term is Fukienese in origin and is little used in other dialects. The original applications of this term in Japanese were made physical anthropologists and anatomists with Chinese names -- Chang Shan-chung (1940), Yu Ching-ch'uan (1942), and Hsu Yüan-che (1947). The term is obviously a transformation of the p'ing-pu fan of Chinese historical accounts. Perhaps this early use by Chinese scholars was a highly sophisticated way of emphasizing the Han cultural traits of these peoples as much as it declared their non-Han physical traits. This usage becomes obvious during the 1950's when it was used to imply the Chinese-ness of the people in question. At the same time this use of the category for historical reconstruction served to deny any concrete present existence in political and cultural terms -- an exemplary case of the double edged nature of ideological interpellations.

Let us now consider the final category of zumin and minzoku. In 1928, the Ban Affairs Division of the Taiwan Police Bureau published a report using the term gen zu minzuko (yüan-chu-min in Chinese) which later became a standard in Japanese bureaucratic discourse. Seemingly neutral, the term looks quite different in a context sensitive discourse analysis.

First, it is crucial to realize that the bureaucratic discourse in which the term is deployed happens in a colonial context: it not only articulates with a broader discourse, it may also be unwit-
tingly taken up by the subject population as part of a hegemonic discourse.

Second, *minzoku* (*min-tsul*) means "ethnic," a general category that needs further definition. Its linguistic value is by no means equal to "The Nation" or "The Japanese Nation." Third, *gen zu* (*yūan-chu* in Chinese) may or may not be related to the more neutral term *zumin* (*chu-min* in Chinese). *Gen* means original; *genzu* as a compound term means originally residing or inhabiting people. Compared with *senzu minzoku* or prior resident peoples (in Chinese *hsien-chu min-tsul*), the term seems more pejorative.

Lastly, similar formulations emerged in the post-war period. In 1956 we see *zaizu minzoku* (resident peoples) used in the Taiwan. *Kenzu minzoku* was used at the same time in the case of the Australian Aboriginals with strong connotations of their primordial rights.

In light of these points, I suggest the bureaucratic appropriation of *genzu minzuko* could be understood as taking aboriginal existence as a natural state. This natural state is to be acted upon by an administrative system to be transformed and civilized, and only then become amenable to incorporation into the larger polity. Since what is original is relatively inferior, *genzu minzuko* is actually a rather appropriate official designation in an "evangelistic" colonial bureaucracy.

**Taiwan: The People in the Post-war Chinese Reformulation**

During the 50 years of Japanese rule, the political scene in continental China changed abruptly and drastically. In 1911, Manchu rule (the Ch'ing Dynasty) ended. The sectarian ideologies of Han-restoration movements led by secret society-like revolutionary groups gave way to an expedient patchwork of the "Republic of Five Nations." The stillbirth of a new polity and the ideological lacunae that went with it placed China in a constant state of civil war. The situation, not surprisingly, also placed the restructuring of ethnic relations in limbo. Nevertheless, the existence of Taiwan and its peoples was finally brought home to Chinese consciousness with the direct invasion of China by Japan. The return of Taiwan became an inseparable component of the notion of total victory over Japan. Taiwan was seen as a place ceded to Japan as a result of war and unequal treaties. To
take it back was a simple geo-political act which hardly needed to be justified. People in Taiwan who were the bearers of Chinese culture were considered to require a return to their real family. But what about those peoples who weren't? It is here that Chinese hegemonic force runs into some real problems.

First, as republic modern China claims to have severed all ties with dynastic China and its feudalistic past. In the matter of ethnic relations it is obviously impossible to use the category fan. However, failing a complete break with the basic frame of reference of fan categorization, no genuine new formulation is possible. Within such a dilemma, acts of appropriation are most likely to take the form of trivial linguistic manipulation.

The best candidate for a movement back one step from fan is tsu. Tsu can be translated as tribe as well as nation. Precisely because of this ambiguity, the term is available for all kinds of intended abuse. For instance, in the "Republic of Five Peoples" formulation, the five peoples were supposed to be five nations. However, the four non-Han peoples were clearly of inferior status as they were subsumed under the umbrella of Chung-hua Min-tsu, the Chinese Nation. The problem is not that the term "Chinese Nation" lacks a tangible referent: as soon as an enumeration of referents is undertaken the problem becomes even more difficult. Why five and not six, ten, or even fifty? If there must be five, why this five and not another? These questions are unanswered and unanswerable.

Taking up the same problem from a slightly different angle, isn't the Han people supposed to be a tribe? Some implicit replies seem to answer yes. Relatively early (1947) the Ministry of Education published a "map of population/race distribution in the Republic of China" for the use of elementary schools nationwide. The map listed seven big groups and, with the exception of Taiwan, each major group was declared to contain several sub-groupings. Han is one among seven. However, judging from the representations examined and corrected by Ku Chieh-kang what the map refers to is language groups based on philological classification. The people of Taiwan became a language group called "Malay Tribe" owing to their allegedly Malayo-Polynesian (or Austronesian) linguistic origin.

The intractable nature of the problem finds another expression in the reformulations produced by administrators and scholars
over the past 30 years. Immediately after "Retrocession" (Kuang-fu) and before the February 28 Incident, sentiments of Han restorationism prevailed. Very few proposals were developed for the island's non-Han population. In 1951 Ch'en Ch'i-lu published a comparative ethnological study using the term "Taiwan High Mountain Tribe." This term later became standardized in portions of academic discourse and culminated in Wang Chen-ying's much quoted essay "Population Change Among Taiwan High Mountain Tribes."

During approximately the same time frame other scholars used the term $t'u-chu$ to denote those groups whose material cultures, social organizations, languages, myths, etc. were conspicuously non-Han. $T'u-chu$, literally "dirt elements," means people of the land or the children of the soil. This term, although not totally neutral is less pejorative than $t'u-jen$ (dirt people). I suspect that this term was used as a counterpart for the English terms "aborigines" or "natives." Prefixed by Taiwan, this term (especially in view of the "Taiwan High Mountain Tribe" formulation) does nothing to diminish the conceptual difficulties.

One outstanding dilemma was the failure to account for the relatively Sinicized $fan$ of the western plains. As early as 1954, Li Yi-yuan pioneered the study of these peoples as the $p'ing-pu-tsu$. Originally a Japanese transformation of the earlier Chinese $p'ing-pu-fan$ (see page 145), some Chinese of the 1950's found $fan$ unacceptable and so continued the Japanese usage. Li himself was sensitive enough to point out that $p'ing-pu-tsu$ is a conventional term, not a "scientific" concept. Adopted for want of a better term, it was redefined by Li to designate those groups of the Taiwan "dirt-element" tribes "whose customs and habits had been 'Han-ized,' and whose languages had already become 'dead languages'."$^{36}$ And it was precisely because of this, he argued that they must be treated apart from "those high mountain tribal groups who still use their own languages and practice their primitive customs."$^{37}$ With this orientation, and as a good ethnographer in the classic sense, Li took great pains to study and preserve a so-called "dying culture" and a "vanishing people." Ironically, such well defined and limited academic efforts undertaken in the interest of knowing and acknowledging "what used to be" had an impact on the groups in their presents. When situated in a broader social discourse, this exercise was
appropriated to deny the present existence of these peoples in concrete social formations.

As kao-shan tsu (high mountain tribes) rose to the nodal point to become the center of discursivity, yet another schizophrenic effect was produced.\textsuperscript{38} The Ami and Yami in their totalities as well as sections of other groups had never lived in the mountains, nor had they been Sinicized. Reality notwithstanding, they are subsumed under high mountain tribes -- and not only for the officials on Taiwan. The PRC census uses this heading\textsuperscript{39} to mark all the "minority nationalities" on Taiwan.\textsuperscript{40} Discrepancies are neglected for as long as possible, except at the lowest levels of government administrative practice, the operatives of which must deal in one way or another with what is actually on the ground.

In the setting of Taiwan's general administrative discourse (multi-layered, including the central government, provincial, and local authorities) we run into a totally different formulation which at times penetrates into the everyday language of the population at large. The basic category is t'ung-pao -- literally "of the same placenta" or "out of the same womb." Biologically speaking, the products of the same womb or placenta can only be full siblings. As such, it may be used as a term of fictive kinship to the end of manipulating social distance and social relations. Because of its status as official jargon the term elicits resentment and often outright rejection from those to whom it is applied. To understand why, simply consider how this term has been used.

People in Taiwan call people in mainland China ta-lu t'ung-pao, mainland t'ung-pao. People on the Mainland refer to people in Taiwan as T'ai-wan t'ung-pao. The usage is heavily ironic since neither group practices anything close to the relationship obtaining between real t'ung-pao.

During the early Republican period, Tibetan and Mongolian peoples were described respectively as Hsi-tsang t'ung-pao and Meng-ku t'ung-pao, and Kang-ku t'ung-pao has been invented to designate the peoples of Hong Kong and Macau. Such terms are deployed precisely because those peoples are or were in reality relatively outside the realm of Chinese political domination, however much they may be under the heavy pressure of hegemonic forces originating in China.

When these terms are abbreviated we get Meng-pao (Mongolian t'ung-pao), Tsang-pao (Tibetan t'ung-pao), and the
neologism *T'ai-pao*. This reduction is most eloquent. There are, after all, no terms like *Han-pao* or *Kuang-tung-pao* (Canton *t'ung-pao*) or *Pei-ching-pao* (Beijing *t'ung-pao*). These terms have the air of impossibilities. The implication is clear: where there is a relation which is actually *t'ung-pao*-like, there is no need to label it as such. On the contrary, it is precisely in relation to those elements where one knows there is no hint of brotherhood that the term *t'ung-pao* is superimposed.

This is a classic case of abusing language in an asymmetrical political discourse backed by asymmetrical relations of power in realpolitik. It is classic in the sense that the signifier has been used to do violence to its signifieds, showing its power in its ultimate brutality and nakedness. This is the heart of a discursive analysis.

In this vein, the situation of one group of *t'ung-pao* seems particularly bad, that of the *shan-pao* (Mountain *t'ung-pao*). The major axis of reference is not the people, but rather a topographic description suggesting a place. In administrative terms, the things to be managed are the mountain areas, hence the term "mountain administration" (*shan-ti hsing-cheng*) best exemplifies and indicates. To deal with the peoples in those areas is but an added part of managing the place. Comparison could be made with Japanese colonial administrative terms like Ban-managing Division, Ban-affairs, Ban-situation or even Ban-disaster; these cannot be taken up owing to limited space.

Given the above bureaucratic context, permutation of the ill-formulated "mountain-pao" into yet another characterization became not only possible but in a sense necessary. Consequently, we have terms like *shan-ti shan-pao* (mountain-area mountain-pao), *p'ing-ti shan-pao* (plains-area mountain-pao) appearing in provincial Government bulletins, and later in academic reports. The most recent permutation of such characterizations actually reflects the exodus of these peoples from their long-designated habitations in the "mountains" to city slums, so now we hear of a new breed of strange beings called *tu-shih shan-pao* (city-dwelling mountain-pao). If we use occupation as a designation, somebody has suggested, the most appropriate categorization of them nowadays will be "*k'uang-k'eng shan-pao*" (mountain-pao in the coal pit), *hai-shang shan-pao* (mountain-pao on the high sea), "*ying-chia shan-pao*" (mountain-pao hanging on
the scaffold) and chi-yūan shan-pao (mountain-pao of the whorehouse).

Outside of both official academic discourse and bureaucratic discourse we found a third formulation in use. In 1954, Chou Hsien-wen published a paper entitled "Tai-wan chi Hsien-chu Min" in the Taiwan Bank's research quarterly, he uses the term hsien-chu min as a substitute for the Japanese term Takasago-zoku for four reasons: (1) terms like fan-jen, fan-tsu appearing in Chinese classics are obviously discriminatory against other peoples, (2) Takasago-zoku is a Japanese term, (3) kao-shan tsu (high-mountain tribes) is the inflected version of Takasago-zoku, at the same time implying mountain areas, (4) hsien means the earliest residents. Following his lead, a few of his colleagues who wrote for the Taiwan Bank Quarterly adopted the same term for similar reasons, but this term is seldom used (if at all) and has never been explicitly defined. In Chou's original formulation, it seems to indicate priority in an absolute sense and that seems to hold over in the other uses noted above.

In 1956 Li Yih-yuan used the same term to denote "non-present dirt elements" (fei-hsien-t's'un t'u-chu) in contrast to "present dirt elements (hsien-t's'un t'u-chu)." This usage also appears in archaeological reports to refer to peoples in an archaeological past. In this sense hsien means "previous" and implies non-being in the present.

A third usage contrasts with "later residents" (hou-chu-min). In a rather awkward fashion, this usage tries to relativize the meaning of hsien so that it can be reduced to meaning only antecedence in time. This strategy is also loaded with political connotations.

III. YŪAN-CHU-MIN

Having reviewed the official discourse of historical accounts, the stage has been set for the "Real Natives" to speak out on the ultimate question of "who and where are the people?" Here none of the authoritative voices are relevant for none of them are native voices. Deep in the "archaeological silence" of the suppressed are voices remote and unfamiliar to social scientists. Native voices are largely inaudible not because they don't exist, but rather because we lack the conceptual tools to capture and com-
prehend them. The hope in this paper is that the discursive analysis and decomposition of modes of historical praxis will enhance the sensibilities of both those who perform and those who observe.

During the past thirty-some years, aborigines in Taiwan have been labelled "mountain people" or "brethren of the mountains." From a position at the outer periphery they have been gradually transposed to the lowest stratum within Taiwan's social formation and power structure. First enclosed in remote mountain hideouts, they have been gradually herded into city slums, recruited into the mines, drawn off to the high seas, or dumped into the darkest brothel. Recent events have brought this out of silence and the anguish of Taiwan's natives has found a social voice.

On May 1, 1983, *The High Mountains Are Green (Kao-shan Ch'ing)*, the first magazine by and for aborigines made its debut. The front cover of the first issue reads "We have to say that the Taiwan High Mountain Tribes are facing a deadly crisis of genocide." Two big mining disasters in 1984 took almost 200 lives. Half were aborigines. Weaving together the daily struggle and the immediacy of disaster, the first independent aboriginal organization declared its existence at the end of 1984. The Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines published a bimonthly newsletter entitled *Yüan-chu-min* -- literally "the original inhabiting people." The reasons for choosing this name are expressed in the first essay on the first page of the first issue. Translated into English as aborigines or indigenes, the term lack the pejorative flavor of the Chinese term for aboriginal: *t'u-jen* (dirt people) or *t'u-chu* (dirt elements). *Yüan-chu-min*, a newly coined term, had not been contaminated. Its pure meaning is the original people of the place.

They then explain why they reject other terms. One candidate, minority nationality (*shao-shu min-tsu*), is rejected as it is used by the government in mainland China. The Association did not want to create trouble with the current regime on Taiwan. For reasons apparent above, they rejected outright terms such as "mountain people" or "brethren of the mountains." To appreciate the significance of these rejections we turn to the positive act, the term actually chosen -- *Yüan-chu-min*.

*Yüan*, the first character, can mean much more than original. In the case of *Yüan-chu-min*, it stresses the primordial tie of
people to place. Taiwan being an island, the aboriginal claim to primordality is appropriate. On this pivot, many historical accounts can be turned to the service of the aborigines. For instance, Chen Chi-lu uses a Southern Sung document which stated that residents [presumably of Han origin] suffered at the hands of the Pi-she-ye to prove that there were Han immigrants in Taiwan as early as 1170 A.D. However, what he proved to the Yuan-chu-min was nothing but the primordiality of the aborigines. It is precisely on the ground of this primordiality that different groupings lay claim to basic rights: survival as a group, land, and the right to preserve and develop one's own culture.

Min, the last character in Yuan-chu-min, means people, but it has at least two more levels of connotation. In classical usages like "the people's life is most important," and "people are most precious, then the community, after that, the aristocrats," min includes the rights of the people and their positioning in the political system. Once their rights were denied, actions ranging from exile to rebellion were legitimated. In more current uses like the compound terms kuo-min, kung-min, and jen-min is a socially defined type of collective existence underwritten in legal terms. This rights accruing to this status are not subject to alienation by arbitrary power. In this case, once Yuan-chu-min becomes a socially accepted term, a set of rights is established by implication.

In the process of ideological interpellation the boundaries of groupings are constantly redefined and re-marked. In the struggle for group and in individual struggle, the term Yuan-chu-min should strengthen the identities of persons and groups. It is of no small importance to this strategy that the p'ing-p'u-tsu (plains tribes) be included in the ten officially recognized tribes. Voices are already being raised calling for the restoration of their land rights. As long as it is possible to manipulate a category so as to emphasize the past while negating the present it is still possible to use the category in creating a future.

Judging from what has been said and done, the leaders of this new social movement show creativity and mature judgment. They by no means aim to return to an imagined "primordial state." On the contrary, they are consciously creating something which has not existed before. To grasp what has been achieved and what may be accomplished in the future by the Yuan-chu-min
themselves, a new agenda must be set for anthropologists, one that addresses the goals, strategies, tactics, and forms of resistance under particular circumstances. To face these issues the conventional bias of the discipline which sees problems in international and national dynamics of whole societies must be avoided. The indigenous people are not passive objects or victims. The logics and dynamics of the indigenous peoples themselves must be taken as major components of their political situation.

Future discussion ought to focus on three key points. Attention must be directed to the dynamics by which social categories are penetrated and transformed, with special attention to domesticating alien découpage and the nativization of analytic categories which we have begun to recount in this paper. Second, we ought to examine two modes -- the dragon mode and the phoenix mode -- of valorizing identities in a Chinese social formation. Finally, anthropologists will be looking at the various discursive axes upon which action can be predicated: totemism, ethnicity, primordiality, nationalism, and others. Of special import will be the how and why of shifting between one axis and another.

This preliminary discussion seeks to demonstrate the coming-into-being of Yuan-chu-min as an end product of a long history of ideological interpellation. In it, the aboriginal people of Taiwan emerge as participants in and creators of history. They are alive and well and are a point of departure for my future work.
ENDNOTES, GLOSSARY AND APPENDIXES

1
A Semeiotic Analysis of Sajiao as a Gender Marked Communication Style in Chinese
Catherine S. Farris

1. This is a revised version of a paper by the same title presented at the second International Symposium on Taiwan Studies at the University of Chicago, July 1986. It is based on field work carried out in Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, in 1983-84. The research was supported by grants from the Woodrow Wilson National Science Foundation, Women Studies Research Grant, the Pacific Cultural Foundation, and a Northwest Center for Research on Women Dissertation Fellowship, for which I am very grateful. This paper is part of a larger study of the mediating role of language in the sex-role acquisition process in a preschool population. Parts of the paper were incorporated into the first chapter of my dissertation (Farris 1988). This revision is informed by my later work, and by numerous discussions with Chinese and American colleagues both at the original symposium and later. The following people were particularly helpful to me in reading and discussing this paper and its topic: Carol Eastman, Stevan Harrell, E.V. Daniel, Eugene Hunn, Anne Yue-Hashimoto, Shih Yuhwei, William Boltz, Ku Yenlin, Mary Erbaugh, John Shepard, Linda Arrigo, Hsieh Shih-chung, and James Dew.

2. As can be seen in the quote from Pierce, he uses "sign" both to refer to the triadic relation and to the sign vehicle or representamen itself. In the text I use 'sign' to refer to the triadic relation, unless I am specifically discussing the sign vehicle itself.

3. Sentential particles are an areal feature of many languages on the Asian mainland (Erbaugh 1985). Their encoding and decoding is relevant to the speech context (i.e. they are "shifters" (Silverstein 1976) such that a strictly grammatical description is inadequate to explain their function or meaning. See also Chao 1968, Li and Thompson 1984, and Huang 1986 for English language literature about some of these particles.

4. The particles, including ma, have different expressive overtones depending on prosodic features such as voice quality, pitch, and vowel length. Ma can convey sarcasm or irritation, in which
case the pitch is low, the vowel lengthened, and the voice is often nasal. When 《ma》 is used in a pleading style, the pitch is higher and the vowel shortened (i.e. it is in a neutral or unstressed tone). Whether in irritation or pleading, 《ma》 is read as "softening" a statement's impact. Linda Arrigo (personal communication) assisted with this exegesis.

5. 《Renjia》 as a first person reference is also used by young children to elicit sympathy. In an ongoing study of language use and sex role acquisition in a preschool setting, I find both boys and girls use this strategy. For example, children will say to the teacher, "Laoshi, ta da renjia" (Teacher, he [or she] hit others/me). Prosodic and kinesic 'pleading' accompany such statements.

6. This brief summary cannot due justice to Arrigo’s analysis, which includes a discussion of a lower working class ideology of rough gender equality and an upper class ideology that address most closely to traditional norms of modesty and chastity for girls.

REFERENCES


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Characters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bendan</td>
<td>stupid egg</td>
<td>笨蛋</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen</td>
<td>vessel; &quot;I&quot;</td>
<td>臣</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>haixiu</td>
<td>bashful</td>
<td>害羞</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hen roumei</td>
<td>very soft and yielding</td>
<td>很柔媚</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>keai</td>
<td>adorable</td>
<td>可愛</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nujia</td>
<td>slave; &quot;I&quot;</td>
<td>奴家</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sajiao</td>
<td>adorably petulant</td>
<td>撒嬌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shengdiao</td>
<td>tone, intonation</td>
<td>聲調</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shou</td>
<td>familiar, intimate</td>
<td>熟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taoyan</td>
<td>annoying</td>
<td>討厭</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>texing</td>
<td>defining characteristic</td>
<td>特性</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tiaopi</td>
<td>naughty</td>
<td>調皮</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yang gang yin rou</td>
<td>&quot;yang&quot; is hardness; &quot;yin&quot; is softness</td>
<td>陽剛陰柔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yuqi</td>
<td>tone of voice</td>
<td>語氣</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yuzhu ci</td>
<td>emphatic particle</td>
<td>語助辭</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Japanese Ideal and Ideas of Assimilation in Taiwan, 1895-1945

Ching-chih Chen


3. Some results of the studies can be found in Goto Shimpei monjo (Goto papers), (in National Diet Library, Tokyo), pt. 8; Ito Hirobumi, ed., Taiwan shiryo (Source materials on Taiwan), (Tokyo, 1936).

4. For information on the Taiwan Affairs Bureau, see Toyama Shigeki and Adachi Kiyoko, Kindai Nihon seiji shi hikkei (A handbook on modern Japanese political history), (Tokyo, 1961), p. 64; Den Kenjiro denki hensan kai, ed., Den Kenjiro den (a biography of Den), (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 90-91.

5. The Japanese translation of Michel Lubon's proposal entitled "Ryoto oyobi Taiwan tochi ni kansuru togi" can be found in Ito, pp. 399-409.

6. Hara's proposal is reproduced in Ito, pp.32-34.


8. Hara's proposal in Ito, pp. 32-33. The term "Taiwanese," as used in this paper, refers to the inhabitants of Chinese descent.
who comprised approximately 96% of the island's population. No attempt will be made here to deal with the island's tribal groups, a relatively small minority during the Japanese period.


10. Montague Kirkwood, "Taiwan seido, tenno no daiken oyobi teikoku gikai ni kansuru ikensho," Goto Shimpei monjo, pt. 8, no. 37; Montagne Kirkwood, "Taiwan oyobi Bokoto o ite ikko no shokumin o sotetsushi, sotoku gyoseikaigi oyobi rippoin o setchishi, sonoto doshokuminchi no ippan seido ni tsuite kiteisuru chokurei soan," Goto Shimpei monjo, pt. 8, no. 36. See also Mizusaki Kiichi, "Taiwan tochi no konpongi," Taiwan jiho (Taiwan times), 73:6-7 (October 1915).

11. Among the Japanese officials who favored Kirkwood's approach were Katsura Taro, the 2nd governor-general of Taiwan (June-October 1896), and Goto Shimpei, the chief of civil administration in Taiwan from March 1898 to November 1906. Both of them adopted many of the measures that Kirkwood had proposed.


13. To most Japanese, the term "colony (shokuminchi)" had the undesirable connotation of a distant territory with its own political system set apart from that of the mother country. Hence, those who were anxious to see Taiwan transformed into an integral part of Japan strongly resented the idea that the island was a "shokuminchi," albeit Japanese. Indeed, the Japanese dislike for the practice of using the term to refer to their overseas territories was so great that the common practice was to replace it with terms such as "shinryochi" or "shinhanto" (both meaning new territories), which, for the Japanese, did not imply that the territory concerned was distant and alienated from the motherland as did "shokuminchi." (See Ching-chih Chen, "Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895-1945," (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1973), pp. 98-102, esp. 101.)


16. Washizu Atsuya, Taiwan tochi kaikodan (A recollection on the administration of Taiwan), (Taipei, 1943), pp. 260-261; Takekoshi, p. 156; Mitsui Kunitaro, ed., Warera no shirareru Goto Shimpei haku (Count Goto whom we are acquainted with), (Tokyo, 1929), pp. 166-168.
17. Ibid., p. 167.
20. Ito Hirobumi’s instruction to Kabayama is reproduced in Ito, pp. 1-8; Ide Kiwata, Taiwan chiseki shi (The administrative record of Taiwan), (Taipei,1933), pp. 212-216.
22. In 1900 there were 17,394 licensed opium-smokers out of a total Taiwanese population of about 3 millions. For the number of licensed Taiwanese opium-smokers during the Japanese period, see T’ai-wan-sheng wu-shih-i-nien-lai t’ung-chi t’i-yao (A statistical summary of the province of Taiwan for the past fifty-one years), T’ai-wan-sheng hsing-cheng-chang-kuan kung-shu t’ung-chi-shih, ed., (Taipei, 1946), pp. 1374-1377, esp. p. 1374.
23. The essentials of this gradualistic approach were: the sale of opium was to be made a government monopoly; confirmed opium addicts were to be granted certificates and permitted to purchase opium from authorized pharmacies; a prohibitive tax was to be levied on opium to discourage opium addicts from excessive smoking and to gradually reduce the number of smokers; and through education, the Taiwanese youth were to be informed of the evil of opium-smoking and dissuaded from smoking. (See Mizuno, pp. 26-34; Tsurumi Yusuke, I, 880-885.)
24. A copy of Matsukata’s instruction is found in Goto Shimpei monjo, pt. 8, no. 2. Some writers, such as Ide Kiwata, have mistakenly attributed the authorship of this particular document to Nogi Maresuke. (See Ide, Taiwan chiseki shi, p. 168.)
25. Ide Kiwata, Nanshin Taiwan shiko (A history of the southward advancement toward Taiwan), (Tokyo, 1943), P. 326. See also Ozono Ichizo, Taiwan rimen shi (A secret history of Taiwan), (Taipei, 1936), p. 134; Takekoshi, p. vii.
26. Goto Shimpei, "The Administration of Formosa," in Okuma Shigenobu, ed., Fifty Years of New Japan, (London, 1909), II, 530. 27. The suggestion was made in an article
entitled "Japan as a Colonial Power," Standard (1897). (See Ide, Nanshin Taiwan shiko, p. 326.)

28. Washizu, p. 105; Ide, Nanshin Taiwan shiko, p. 325.


32. For Kodama's opinion on the eventual assimilation of the people of Taiwan, see Naikaku kirokuka, ed., Taiwan ni shikosubeki horei ni kansuru horitsu sono enkaku narabi genko rit-surei (The development of law governing laws and ordinances to be applied in Taiwan and special executive orders currently in force), henceforth TSH, (Tokyo, 1921), p. 135. Goto expresses his view in a statement he made in March 1906 in the House of Representatives. (TSH, pp. 252-253.)

33. For examples of pro-assimilation talks, see TSH, p. 275; Taiwan sotokufu, ed., Taiwan sotokufu keisatsu enkaku shi (A history of the development of the Taiwan government-general police), 6 vols, (Taipei, 1933-1941), VI, 116-117, 125, 128, 161; Sasazima Haruo, Taiwan tochi kankei gikai shishiku roku (A collection of Diet speeches critical of the Taiwan administration), (Taipei, 1928), p. 298.

36. For Akashi's views on the governing of Taiwan and its residents, see Komori Tokuji, Akashi Motojiro, 2 vols, (Taipei, 1928), II, 52-60.
37. Ibid., pp. 56-58.
40. Hara Kei nikki, VIII, 193.
41. Ibid., p. 370.
42. These Japanese leaders, such as Yamagata Aritomo and General Terauchi Masatake, were primarily concerned about the possible adverse effects of the proposed programs on the defense of Japan's interests in Korea and Manchuria. (Ibid., pp. 240-241.)
44. For Den's major policy statement entitled "Taiwan shisei kunshi" which was delivered on November 12, 1919, see Taiwan jiho, pp. 11-26 (December 1919).
45. Den Kenjiro, "Assimilation Keynote of Taiwan Policy," The Trans-Pacific, 8.2-3:45 (Special Formosa Number, February-March 1923).
48. Ibid., p. 12.
53. Ibid., p. 15.
55. Ibid.
56. Den Kenjiro nikki, November 5, 1919.
59. Izawa's policy statements are found in Izawa Takio denki hensan ii in kai, pp. 149-150; and Ide, Taiwan chiseki shi, pp. 722-723.
60. Ibid.
61. Itagaki Taisuke, a liberal politician and an important leader of the People's Rights Movement in Meiji Japan, was one such advocate. He headed the short-lived Taiwan doka kai (Taiwan assimilation association) of 1914 and proposed to bridge the differences between China and Japan by employing Taiwanese. For information on Itagaki's involvement in the assimilation movement, see Harry Jerome Lamley, "Assimilation Efforts in Colonial Taiwan: The Fate of the 1914 Movement," Monumenta Serica, 29:496-520 (1970-1971).
63. Kamiyama's policy statement made in July 1926 can be found in Kamiyama kun kinen jigyo kai, ed., Kamiyama Mitsunosuke, 2 vols, (Tokyo, 1941), I, 323-324. See also various drafts of Kamiyama's official statements as reproduced in Kamiyama kun kinen jigyo kai, I, 324-330; Kamiyam Mitsunosuke, "Taiwan wa teikoku no zettai musabetsunaru ichibu," in Kamiyama kun kinen jigyo kai, I, 378-380.
64. Kamiyama kun kinen jigyo kai, I, 324-328.
65. Ibid., p. 329.
66. Ibid., pp. 324-328.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., p. 326. Like his predecessors, Kamiyama, in spite of his relatively liberal inclination, would definitely prohibit the Taiwanese advocacy of the doctrine of autonomous dominion (jichiryoshugi). (Kamiyama kun kinen jigyo kai, I, 323-324.)
70. Ibid., p. 326.
71. For the policy statement of Kamiyama’s successors in the Taiwan governor-generalship, see Ide, Taiwan chiseki shi, pp. 772-773, 782-783, 829-830, 843-845, 847-848.
72. Kawamura Takeji, Taiwan no ichinen (One-year stay in Taiwan), (Tokyo, 1930), p. 6.
73. Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, pp. 692-700.
75. Ibid., pp. 56-57; George Kerr, pp. 50-55; Yamamoto Kazuo, Taiwan ni okeru Nihon tochi to sen go naigai josei (Taiwan under the Japanese rule and its post-war internal and external situations), (Tokyo, 1958), p. 53.
78. See references to a speech Ito made before the Taiwan kyokai (Taiwan association) in Tokyo, in April 1897 as cited in Ide Kiwate, Kyomi no Taiwan shiwa (Interesting historical stories about Taiwan), (Taipei, 1935), p. 139.
79. It is significant that all of the Japanese assimilationists underlined the fact that Japanese and Taiwanese shared racial and cultural origins and argued that their racial and cultural similarities would make them natural partners. For examples, see Izawa Shuji, Izawa Shuji senshu (Selected works of Izawa Shuji), (Nakano, 1958), pp. 583-588, 608-626, 632-641; Mochiji Rokusaburo, Taiwan shokumin seisaku (The colonial policy of Taiwan), (Tokyo, 1912), pp. 86-87.
80. For Japanese effort at popularising the Japanese language in Taiwan, see E. Patricia Tsurumi, Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); Taiwan kyoiku kai, ed., Taiwan kyoiku enkaku shi (A record of Taiwan's educational development), (Taipei, 1939), pp. 1044-1053.

1. This research covers the period from 1957 to 1982. The first field trip, in 1957-58, involved a seventeen-month residence in the village of Hsin Hsing. This was followed by two separate studies, in 1965-66 and 1969-70, of out-migrants from the area. The most recent research spanned two months in 1979, and one month in 1982. During these visits, we collected data using both anthropological and sociological techniques, including participant observation, in-depth interviews, surveys, censuses, and collection of official statistics contained in family, land, school, and economic records.

2. Thirteen of the women categorized as living in conjugal units considered themselves to be members of stem of joint families. Nine, however, had no daughters-in-law living in the village and the mothers-in-law of four women were dead.

3. Despite implementation of the Land Reform Program and changes in the tenancy/ownership ratio, most families cultivated small* farms: 45 percent of the village families cultivated below .5 hectare and 84 percent cultivated below 1.0 hectare. (See B. Gallin 1966 for a detailed discussion of the village in the 1950s).

4. Industry began to disperse to the countryside to gain access to low-cost labor and raw materials. By 1971, 50 percent of the industrial and commercial establishments and 55 percent of the manufacturing firms in Taiwan were located in rural areas (Ho 1979). Ho's data are not disaggregated by area, but our observations suggest that throughout the 1960s industry mainly penetrated towns and rural areas within commuting distance to cities, not the more distant countryside such as the Hsin Hsing area.

5. The ideal number of children was considered three: two boys -- in case "one turned out bad" -- and one girl.

6. Of the remaining nine families which did not own refrigerators, one was the extended family of the 41-year-old farmer whose husband, and only son, also farmed. Two others were the conjugal families of women who worked off-farm: the
35 year old deaf mute, married to the farmer 25 years her senior, and the 40-year-old woman whose husband also worked off-farm. The remaining six families were also of the simple type and the mean age of the women living in these units was 59.8 years: five women were housekeepers in their sixties, while one was the 56-year-old widow who worked off farm.

7. The largest landholding in the village was 2.3 jia. It was operated by the son and daughter-in-law of the 86-year-old retiree.

8. Married-out daughters frequently gave their mothers the money their brothers and sisters-in-law failed to provide (see R.S. Gallin and B. Gallin 1988).

APPENDIX

Table 1. Population of Hsin Hsing by Period and Age, 1958-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1979</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-15</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-44</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-64</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;64</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sex ratio 95 (m/100f)

Sources: 1958, Household Record Book, Puyen Township Public Office; 1979, Field Interviews

Note: The figures for 1958 are for all people registered as members of Hsin Hsing households, regardless of whether they were resident or only registered there. An estimated 509 people actually lived in Hsin Hsing in 1958. The figures for 1979 record
only people resident in the village; 606 people living in 170 households, however, were registered in the records of the township office in 1979. Although the sources of data contained in the Table differ, correlations with other statistical materials confirmed the accuracy and comparability of the two data sets. These materials included enumerations based on our own surveys and interviews with individual village families cultivating land, maintaining livestock, and owning farm implements.

Table 2. Activities of Unmarried Hsin Hsing Women by Location and Type of Activity, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory Worker</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Skilled Worker</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker in Family Business</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Interviews, 1979

Note: Data include only unmarried women sixteen years of age and over who have graduated from lower-middle school. Most young people graduate at the age of fifteen or sixteen and the majority immediately enter the wage labor force.
Table 3. Ages of Married Women in Hsin Hsing by Living Arrangements, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Conjugal</th>
<th></th>
<th>Extended</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;59</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Interviews, 1979

Table 4. Primary Activity of Married Women in Hsin Hsing by Living Arrangements, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Activity</th>
<th>Conjugal</th>
<th></th>
<th>Extended</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Laborer</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker in Fam. Business</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeper</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Interviews, 1979
Table 5. Ages of Married Women in Hsin Hsing by Living Arrangements and Primary Activity, 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Activity</th>
<th>Living Arrangements</th>
<th>Conjugal</th>
<th>Extended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Laborer</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>36-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>38-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker in Fam. Business</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>31-60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeper</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>20-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Interviews, 1979

\(^a\) The 56 year old woman was a mother-in-law. If she is omitted from the calculation the mean age of wage laborers in extended households decreases two years to 32.1 years.

\(^b\) Six of the farmers were mother-in-law; their mean age was 54.0 years with a range of 48 to 60 years. The mean age of daughters-in-law who farmed was 44.3 years with a range of 39 to 53 years.

\(^c\) Nine of the housekeepers were mothers-in-law; their mean age was 60.1 years with a range of 54 to 70 years. The mean age of the eight daughters-in-law who were housekeepers was 33.0 years with a range of 25 to 51 years.
Table 6. Primary Activity of Mothers-in-Law (N=24) in Hsin Hsing by Primary Activity of Daughters-in-Law (N=28), 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Daughters-in Law</th>
<th>Mothers-in-Law</th>
<th>Primary Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>Farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepren.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker in Fam.Bus.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Interviews, 1979

REFERENCES


ENDNOTES


3 Using data from the income and expenditure survey, the log of income was regressed on occupation (b = .01) and sector (b = .37), with very little likelihood of these being artifacts of chance (p = 0.00). The two factors were associated with 19% of the variance in income.


7 Lieberson, p. 100.


10. Here $M_i$ is the proportion of Mainlanders in the occupation $i$, while $T_i$ is the proportion of Taiwanese in occupation $i$. $C_{M_i}$ is the cumulated proportion of Mainlanders ranked in occupations below occupation $i$. $C_{T_i}$ is the cumulated proportion of Taiwanese in occupations that are ranked lower than occupation $i$. Data are from the *Tai-min Ti-ch'u Hu-k'ou chi Chu-chai P'u-cha Ch'ou- yang Tiao-ch'a Pao-kao* (TMHK) for years through 1981. Data for 1985 and 1988 come from the *Income and Expenditure Survey*, and the two-part *Survey of Social Change* was used to check
these results and verify the consistency between occupational categories and their aggregations.


12 Reforms since this paper was written now recognize birthplace as means of codifying the next generation.


This paper is published in the form in which it was presented at the International Symposium on Taiwan Studies in 1985.

1. "Sprouts of capitalism" research in China is explored in Myers (1976), Wakeman (1980), Fu Yiling (1980), and Fu Zhufu (1981). See also Kishimoto-Nakayama (1984). Such analyses, while often of great interest for the historical complexities they reveal, differ from my own in that, first, they employ mode of production categories taken directly from the Marxist classics, with only limited attempts to adapt these to China's historical particularities and, second, they do not attempt to integrate kinship relations and gender roles into the process of social reproduction of the "capitalist" mode of production they describe.

In 1982, Arif Dirlik called for reconceptualization of the problem of capitalist-like tendencies in Chinese economic history, but suggests no solutions. And, as he believes that "[s]ome of the elements that are fundamental to capitalism (commerce, commodities, even production for exchange value) are universal in the sense that they have existed everywhere at all times" (1982, 123), he is unlikely to provide them.

Japanese Marxist scholarship, to which I have only limited access, also appears to hesitate to tamper with classical mode of production categories. In a useful summary by Grove and Eshrick, they are criticized for ignoring the European protoindustrialization literature (1980).

2. Recent research is disclosing the interesting details of this tendency for late imperial land tenure to move to private smallholding rather than manorial and other forms of large-scale tenure. See Elvin 1973; Marks 1983; and Philip Huang 1985.

3. The importance of state economic goals must be stressed, I believe, because of the tendency of some specialists to perceive the Chinese state, as Geertz perceives the Balinese (1980), as a kind of administrative end in itself. Feuerwerker, for example, refers to the administrators' "unwitting intervention (e.g. through the collection of taxes)" [emphasis supplied] in the economy.
(1984, 297). While Chinese officials may have given priority, at times, to the cosmological order-creating aspect of their duties, they were certainly not blind to the need of the government for cash.

4. The word "household" is a better term in this context than "family" because it implies, as does the Chinese *jia*, a unity of people and property, reminding us to the Greek roots of the word "economy" -- a productive property and its people. Also, Chinese households in practice include so many "kin" whose external origins make their loyalty suspect (wives, adoptees, bought slaves, children, and concubines) that the semantics of the English "family" miss important components of the Chinese meaning of "*jia*."  

5. The term "petty commodity production" at present is generally used (e.g. by Kahn 1982, Currie 1982) to refer to the small-scale production of goods (including agricultural goods) by people whose economic environment has been partially penetrated by European capitalism. Incompletely monetized, with relatively immobile and sometimes unfree labor, their societies are not considered capitalist. Joel Kahn, analyzing recent Southeast Asian societies, develops a concept of a petty commodity mode of production (1978) which he treats in isolation from the rest of the social formation, taking the relations and dynamic of international capitalism as givens.
REFERENCES

Amin, Samir. 1972. Modes of production, social formations, interconnection of the various levels of a formation, classes and social groups, nation, and ethnic groups: introduction to the concepts. Dakar, United Nations African Institute for Economic Development and Planning.


Endnotes/Glossary


______1968. *Karl Marx on colonialism and modernization; his dispatches and other writings on China, India, Mexico, the Middle East and North Africa.* Edited and with an Introduction by Shlomo Averini. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.  


***** 1976. The 'Sprouts of Capitalism' in agricultural development during the mid-Qing period. *Ch'ing-tai wen-t'i 6* (December).


ENDNOTES

6

Ch'ing Policies Toward Taiwan

Wen-hsiung Hsu

Addreviation used in the endnotes:


2 For the pao-chia system in Taiwan during the Ch'ing period, see Ch'ing hui-tien T'ai-wan shih'li 清會典台灣事例 (Precedents involving Taiwan in The Collected Statutes of the Great Ch'ing) TWWHTK, no. 226 (1966), p.38; Ino Yoshinori 伊能嘉矩, Taiwan bunka shi 台灣文化志 (Treatises on Taiwan Culture) (Reprint; Tokyo: Tokoshoin, 1965), I: 676-694; Kobayashi Rihe 今井利平, "Hokô seido" 保甲制度 (Pao-chia system), Taiwan kanshu kiji 台灣慣習記事 (Journal of Taiwanese customs), III, no. 5 (1904): 414-421; III, no. 6 (1904): 495-507.

3 T'ai-wan t'ung-chih 台灣通志 (General gazetteer of Taiwan), TWWHTK, no. 130 (1968), pp. 680, 698-700, 713-715, 720-725.

4 For studies on the soldiers stationed in Taiwan, see Li Ju-ho 李汝和, Ch'ing-tai chu-T'ai pan-pingk'ao 清代駐台班兵考 (A study on the soldiers stationed in Taiwan during the Ch'ing dynasty) (Taichung: Taiwan Historical Commission, 1971), pp. 1-123; Hsü Hsüeh-chi 許學姫, Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan ti lü-ying 清代台灣的綠營 (Green standards in Taiwan during the Ch'ing dynasty) (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1987), pp. 260-297, 337-378.

5 Yung-cheng chu-p'i tsou-che hsüan-chi 雍正諭批奏摺選輯 (Selections from the memorials to Yung-cheng with the emperor's comments), TWWHTK, no. 300 (1972), p. 175; Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan hsien-chih 重修台灣縣志 (Revised gazetteer of T'ai-wan county), TWWHTK, no. 103 (1961), p. 555.

6 Hsü-hsiu T'ai-wan hsien-chih 續修台灣縣志 (Third revised gazetteer of T'ai-

7 According to the *Hu-pu tse-li 戶部則例* (Regulations and precedents of the Board of Revenue) (Reprint of 1865 ed.; Taipei: Ch'eng-wen ch'u-pan-she, 1963), 3.2a, sons and grandsons were not allowed to set up separate residences if their parents or grandparents were alive. Cf. also G. Jamieson, Chinese Family and Commercial Law (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1921), p. 16.


11 *Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu 重修歷朝實錄* (Veritable records of successive dynasties of the great Ch'ing) (Reprint; Taipei: Hua-lien shu-chii, 1964), Sheng-.tsu 聖祖, 117.10b; *Ch'ing Sheng-tsu shih-lu hsuan-chi 清聖祖實錄選輯* (Selections from the veritable records of Emperor Sheng-tsu), *TWWHTK*, no. 165 (1963), p. 134.

12 *Ch'ung-hsiu T'ai-wan fu-chih 重修台灣府志* (Revised gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture), *TWWHTK*, no. 66 (1960), p. 325.


14 *Sheng-tsu shih-lu, 2 77.19a-b (hsüan-chi, pp.167-168); Ch'üan-chou fu-chih, 9b-10a.*

15 Lan Ting-yuan 藍鼎元, *Ping-T'ai chi-lüeh 平台紀略* (Accounts of the
Taiwan Unbound

16 T'ai-an hui-lu 台案彙錄 (Collections of various archives on Taiwan), *TWWHTK*, no.14 (1958), p. 52.
17 Kao-tsung shih-lu, 100.9b (*hsüan-chi*, *TWWHTK*, no. 186 [1964], pp. 16-17); Ch'ing hui-tien T'ai-wan shih-li 清會典台灣事例 (Precedents of Taiwan in the Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien), *TWWHTK*, no. 226 (1966), p. 38.
18 Ch'ing ching-shih wen-pien hsüan-lu 清經世文編選錄 (Selections from various editions of the *Ch'ing ching-shih wen-pien*), *TWWHTK*, no. 229 (1966), pp.2-4.
20 T'ai-an hui-lu, III: 236-240.
22 T'ai-an hui-lu, III: 244-247.
25 Hsüan-tsung shih-lu (Veritable records of Emperor Hsuan-tsung), 248.20a-b; 309.8a, (*hsüan-chi*, *TWWHTK*, no. 188 [1964], pp. 162, 208); Ta-Ch'ing lu-li, 36a-b; Ch'ing hui-tien T'ai-wan shih-li, pp.31, 172; T'ai-an hui-lu, I: 107.
26 Shen Pao-chen, Fu-chien T'ai-wan tsou-che, pp.11-13; Te-tsung shih-lu, 3.4b (*hsüan-chi*, *TWWHTK*, no. 193 [1964], p. 2); Ch'ing hui-tien T'ai-wan shih-li, pp. 172-173.
27 T'ai-wan fu-chih, p. 189; Huang Shu-ching 黃叔敬, T'ai-hai shih-ch' a lu 台海使槎錄 (Records of a circuit censor in Taiwan), *TWWHTK*, no. 4 (1957), pp. 148, 153, 158; Inō Yoshinori, Taiwan bansei shi 台灣番政志 (History of aboriginal affairs in Taiwan) (Taipei: Taiwan sotokufu minseibu shokusankyoku, 1904), pp. 73-75.
29 For various functions of t'ung-shih, see YinChang-i 尹章義, "T'ai-wan pei-pu t'uo-k'en ch' u-ch'i t'ung-shih so pan-yen chih chiao-se yu kung-neng" 台灣北部拓墾初期通事所扮演之角色與功能 (The roles and functions of t'ung-shih in the early development of northern Taiwan) in his T'ai-wan k'ai-fa shih yen-chiu 台灣開發史研究 (studies on the history of development of Taiwan) (Taipei: Lien-ch' ing ch'u-pan she, 1989), pp. 184-274.
30 Chu-lo hsien-chih 諸羅縣志 (Gazetteer of Chu-lo county), *TWWHTK*, no. 141 (1962), p. 103. For the appointment of t'ung-shih, see Tai Yen-hui 戴炎輝, "Ch'ing-tai T'ai-wan fan-ti ti tsu-chih chi yun-yung" 清代台灣番地的組織及運用 (The organization and operation of the aboriginal areas in Taiwan during the Ch' ing period). T'ai-wan wen-hsien, the combined issue of XX, no. 4 and XXVII, no. 1 (1976): 344-345.
31 Chu-lo hsien-chih, p. 103; An-p’ing hsien tsa-chi 安平縣雜記 (Miscellaneous accounts of An-p’ing [Tainan] county), TWWHTK, no. 52 (1959), p. 68.
33 Yü Yung-ho 郁永河, P’i-hai chi-yu 神海紀遊 (Small sea travel journal), TWWHTK, no. 44 (1959), pp.36-37; T’ai-wan fu-chih, p. 249; Huang Shu-ching, T’ai-hai shih-ch’a lu, p. 170.
34 Wu Ch’en-ch’en 吳振臣, Min-yu ou-chi 閩遊偶記 (An account of a trip to Fukien), in T’ai-wan yu-ti hui-ch’a lu 台灣各地彙鈔 (A collection of seventeen accounts of Taiwan), TWWHTK, no. 216 (1965), p. 22.
35 Huang Shu-ching, T’ai-hai shih-ch’a lu, p. 170.
36 Chu-lo hsien-chih, p. 103.
37 Hsü-hsü T’ai-wan fu-chih 續修台灣府志 (Third revised gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture), TWWHTK, no.121 (1962), p. 813.
40 Huang Shu-ching, T’ai-hai shih-ch’a lu, p. 167.
41 Ch’ing-hui lien T’ai-wan shih-li, p. 148.
42 Ch’ing ch’i-hsien lei-cheng hsüan-pien 清耆獻類徵續編 (Selections from the Kuo-ch’ao ch’i-hsien lei-cheng ch’u-pien), TWWHTK, no. 230 (1967), pp.892-893.
44 Hu-pu tse-li, 4.17b-18a.
45 Liu-pu ch’u-fen tse-li, Hu-pu: 20.3b; Ch’ing hui-tien T’ai-shih-li, p. 27.
46 Huang Shu-ching, T’ai-hai shih-ch’a lu, p. 170.
47 Lui-pu ch’u-fen tse-li, Hu-pu: 40.6b-7a.
50 Inō Yoshinori, "Taiwan ni okeru minban no kekkon ni tsukite" (Intermarriage between the Han Chinese and aborigines in Taiwan), Taiwan kanshu kiji III, no. 11 (1904): 1018-1020.
51 T’ai-an hui-lu, VI: 71-73.
52 Huang Shu-ching, T’ai-hai shih-ch’a lu, pp. 143, 154, 157.
53 Yung-cheng chu-p’i tsou-che hsüan-chi, p. 74: Ko-ma-lan t’ing-chih 哥瑪蘭廳
Taiwan Unbound


54 *Hsuan-tsung shih-lu*, 248.24a (hsüan-chi, p.164); *Ta-Ch'ing lu-lí*, 19.39b.
57 *Taiwan shihô* 台灣私法 (Taiwan private law) (Kobe,1910), I, Part I: 249-266.
58 *Tai-wan hsien-chih* 台灣縣志(Gazetteer of Taiwan county), *TWWHTK*, no. 103 (1961), p. 228.
62 *Shih-tsung shih-lu* (Veritable records of Emperor Yung-cheng), 38.21b-22a; *Ch'ing Shih-tsung shih-lu hsüan-chi* 清聖宗實錄選辑 (Selections from the veritable records of Emperor Yung-cheng), *TWWHTK*, no. 167 (1963), p. 12.
63 *Ch'ung-hsiu Fu-chien T'ai-wan fu-chih* 重修福建台灣府志 (Revised gazetteer of Taiwan prefecture, Fukien province), *TWWHTK*, no. 74 (1961), p. 129.
64 Kao-tsung shih-lu, 52.19b (hsüan-chi, p. 9).
66 *Hsüan-tsung shih-lu*, 77.9b-10a (hsüan-chi, p.31); *Ch'ing hui-tien T'ai-wan shih-li*, p. 44; Inō Yoshinori, *Taiwan bansei shi*, pp. 142-148; Rinji Taiwan tochi chôsa kyoku 臨時台灣土地調査局 (Temporary Taiwan land survey bureau), *Taiwan tochi kanko ippan* 台灣土地慣行--典(Customs concerning land in Taiwan) (Taipei, 1905), I: 128.
Glossary

Ch'ing Policies Toward Taiwan
Wen-hsiung Hsu

Chang-hua 彰化
Chang Ping 張丙
Chaochow 潮州
Chao-k'en-chü 招墾局
Ch'en Pin 陳寘
Ch'en Tsung-pao 陳東寶
Chi-chi 寄籍
Chi Chi-kuang 季麒光
Chou Chung-hsüan 周鍾宣
Chou Yu-an wen 周元文
Chu I-kuei 朱一貴
Chu-lo 諸羅
Ch'ung-wen 崇文
fan-hsiang 番桁
fan-ko 番舸
fan-t'un 番屯
Fu-k'ang-an 福康安
Ha-tzu-nan 哈仔蘭
Han-chiang 蝠江
hsiao-tsu-hu 小租戶
hsin-p'ai 信牌
Hsü Tsung-kan 徐宗幹
Hu-pu tse-li 戶部則例
Hweichow 惠州
kah 甲
k'en-hu 鎭戶
kuan-tu 官渡
LanTing-yüan 藍鼎元
Lang-ch'iao 琅瑊
Li Chung-chien 李仲堅
Li fan t'ung-chih 理番同知
Lin Shuang-wen 林爽文
Liu Ch'üeh 劉卻
Liu-yü 流寓
Liu-shih-ch'i 六十七
Liu Yün-k'o 劉鍾珂
Lu-erh-men 鹿耳門
Lu-kang 鹿港
Man-pao 滿保
mou 猬
Moutan 牡丹
Omid 鄂爾達
Pa-li-fen 八里坌
pao-chia 保甲
Pei-nan 卑南
she-shang 社商
Shen Chi'i-yüan 沈起元
sheng-fan 生番
Shih-kang 石岡
Shih Lang 施琅
Shih-p'ai 石牌
shu-fan 熟番
Ta-ku 逹谷
ta-tsu-hu 大租戶
T'u-ch'eng 土城
t'u-mu 土目
T'u-niu 土牛
t'un 屯
t'ung-shih 通事
Wang Ch'ien 王汧
Wu Fu-sheng 吳福生
Wu-hu-men 五虎門
Wu Shih-kung 吳士功
YangChing-su 楊景素
yang-lien-yin 養廉銀
yang-shan-ti 養瞻地
Some Observations on Social Discourse Regarding Taiwan's "Primordial Inhabitants"
Fred Y.L. Chiu

2. For concept of "naturalization" see Taussig, M. The Devil and Commodity Fatishism in South America, 1980.
3. "Reification" as a social phenomenon, was extensively dealt with by Foucault, M. see his The Archaeology of Knowledge, 1972, and The Order of Things, 1973.
6. 230. A.D. 三國志孫權傳
7. 610 A.D. 隋書卷81, 流求國傳
8. 1171 A.D. 檢補〈宋〉樓鑲 魏情集
9. 1602 A.D. 明 陳謙〈東番記〉
10. 1956 矢冨原忠雄Yanaibara 日本帝國主義下之台灣
11. Mouffe & Laclau 1985 p. 145
12. Mouffe & Laclau 1985 p. 106
14. Mouffe & Laclau 1985 p. 96
15. Mouffe & Laclau 1985 p. 112
16. Mouffe and Laclau 1985 p. 96, 112
17. Derrida, J. Writing and Difference, 1978 p. 280
20. Feuerbach on "Species Being" see his various works, especially The Essence of Christianity and Lectures on the Essence of Religion.
26. 芮逸夫〈中國民族及其文化論稿〉，中冊，頁527。 All the terms used by
Taiwan Unbound

the aborigines in the island, whether as self-addressing or reference to neighbors, are terms basically asserting the subject is human existence. This is quite different from the Han-centered formulation.

27. 芮逸夫《中國民族及其文化論稿》，中冊，頁523
28. 1959, p. 1, 周憲文《台灣的原始經濟》

29. Given the rather prevailing logic and practice which makes a beast out of the "others" as a means to re-humanize oneself, this particularly revealing case of using 「番」 as representation is hardly surprising. This can be seen as a typical situation exemplifies what I called the zoological perspective of in/out relations in contrast to that of anthropological and demonological.

30. This is used in the sense Taussig uses the same term in his The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America, 1980.

31. This situation manifested itself in tremendous amount of documents, to cite a few:〈台灣通志稿〉，李亦園〈台灣土著民族的社會與文化〉，陳碧笙〈台灣地方史〉。

32. The notion of "Lebenswelt" is crucial in all of Wittgenstein's later works, see especially Philosophical Investigations 1983, Philosophical Remarks, 1975, or Gier, Nicholas F. Wittgenstein and Phenomenology, 1981.

33. 1967，〈考古人類學刊〉「日文書刊所載有關台灣土著論文目錄(一)」。
34. personal communication from my colleague Mr. Tomio Kentaro.
35. Both Mandarin and Fukienese 「高砂」/「高山」 also easily inflects into each other.

36 37. 1982, p.2，李亦園〈台灣土著民族的社會與文化〉。
38. Mouffe & Laclau, 1985, p. 112.
39. The Chinese in Mainland seems somewhat sense the problems, (see陳國強〈台 湾史話〉，1982, p. 6.) However, they intend to neglect it until "Taiwan returns" to the motherland and is subjected to their national ‘nationalities identification’ project which last for almost four decades.

40. 〈中華人民共和國民族分佈略圖〉，中國社會科學院民族研究所民族學研究 室編。
41. 1971，〈中華民國五十八年台灣省平地山胞經濟調查報告書〉，台灣省政府 民政所製印。
42. 1983，瞿海源〈台灣山地山胞的社會經濟地位與人口〉。
44. Ruey Yih-Fu, this translation first appeared in A Handbook of Taiwan, Ch. IV of W.C. Liu et al of The Human Relations Area Files, Inc. 1958.
45. see various newspaper during this period published in Taiwan as well as overseas.
46. 1983，〈高山青〉
47. 1984, After the second issue, as they prepared to shift to magazine format, the publishers were told that 〈原住民〉 was an inappropriate name —— hence the
change to〈山外山〉。
48. 陳奇祿〈中華民族在台灣的拓展〉，台北市文獻委員會編印(無日期)。
49. Turner, Terence S. "Anthropology and the Politics of Indiginous Peoples Struggle", Cambridge Anthropology Vol.5. No.1
Glossary

Some Observations on Social Discourse Regarding Taiwan's "Primordial Inhabitants"
Fred Y.L. Chiu

Chang shan-chung
Ch’en Ch’i-ku
Chen Pi-sheng
Ch’en ti
Cheng-ming
chi-yuan shan-pao
Chou Hsien-wen
chung-hua min-tsu
Fan
fei-hsien-ts’un t’u-chu
gen zu minzuku
hai-shang shan-pao
Han-pao
hou-chu-min
Hsi-tsang t’ung-pao
hsien-chu min
hsien-chu min-tsu
hsien-ts’un t’u-chu
hua-fan
Hsu Yuan-che
Isao Yanaibara
jen-min
Kang-Au t’ung-pao
Kao-hsiung
Kao-Shan Ch’ing
Kao-shan Kuo
Kao-shan tsu
kenzu minzuku
Kuang-tung-pao
kui-hua
Ku Chieh-kang
kuang-fu
k’uang-k’eng shan-pao
kung-min

張山鐘
陳奇祿
陳碧笙
陳第
正名
"妓院山胞"
周憲文
中華民族
番
非現存土著
原住民族(Japanese kanji)
"海上山胞"
"漢胞"
後住民
西藏同胞
先住民
先住民族
現存土著
化番
徐渭智
矢內原忠雄
人民
港澳同胞
高雄
高山族
高山國
高山族
現住民族(Japanese kanji)
"廣東胞"
歸化
顧顥薦
光復
"礦坑山胞"
公民
Endnotes

kuo-min
Liu-ch’iu Kuo
Lo Yao
Meng-ku t’ung-pao
Meng-pao
minzoku
Pei-ching-pao
P’i-she-yeh
P’ing-Pu-fan
P’ing-pu tsu
ping-ti-fan
p’ing-ti shan-pao
Ruey Yih-fu
senzu minzuku
shan-fan
shan-pao
shan-ti hsing-cheng
shan-ti jen
shan-ti shan-pao
shan-yi
shao-shu min-tsu
Shen-tzung
sheng
sheng-fan
shou
shou-fan
Shuo-Wen
Sui-Shu
Takasago
ta-lu t’ung-pao
Ta-yuan
T’ai-pao
T’ai-wan
T’aiwan t’ung-pao
tai-wo-wan
T’ai-yuan
Tao-yi
tao-yi-hao pi-she-yeh
Ti
Tsang-pao
tsu

國民
流求國
樓鑾
蒙古同胞
蒙胞
民族(Japanese kanji)
“北京胞”
毗舍耶
平埔番
平埔族
平地番
平地山胞
芮逸夫
先住民族(Japanese kanji)
山番
山胞
山地行政
山地人
山地山胞
山夷
少數民族
神宗
生
生番
熟
熟番
說文解字
隋書
高砂 (Japanese kanji)
大陸同胞
大國
台胞
台灣
台灣同胞
台窩窩
台員
島夷
島夷號毗舍耶
是
藏胞
族
Taiwan Unbound

t'u-fan
i'chu
i'jien
Tung-Fan Chi
Tung-fan-yi
t'ung-pao
Tung-ti-jien
Tzu-yu Chung-kuo
Wang Ta-yuan
Wang Chen-ying
wei kui-hua fan
Ye-fan
Yi
Yi-chou
yi kui-hua fan
yin-chia shan-pao
Yu Ching-ch'uan
yuan
Yuan-chu Min
zaizu minzuku
zoku
zumin

上番
上著
上人
東番記
東番夷
同胞
東亜人
自由中國(Free China)
汪大淵
日本人
未歸化番
野番
夷
夷州
已歸化番
“鷹架山胞”
余錦泉
原
原住民
在住民族(Japanese kanji)
族(Japanese kanji)
住民(Japanese kanji)
APPENDIX:

International Symposium on Taiwan Studies
Conference contents (1985-1989)

The First Annual International Symposium on Taiwan Studies (July 8-9 1985)

PANEL ON SOCIAL DYNAMICS

July 8, 1985 Monday, 9:30 a.m.-12:00
Chair: Lee Che-fu, Catholic University of America

Social Change and the Family System in Taiwan
Tse-han Lai
National Taiwan Normal University

The Sociocultural Construction of Femininity in Contemporary Urban Taiwan
Catherine S. Farris
University of Washington

Modern Organization Management in Taiwan
Peter Cheng
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

An Inquiry into the Immobilization of Taiwan Society
Wang Shing-ching
China Times weekly

Labor Union Participation in Taiwan
Tsai Yung-mei
Texas Tech. University

Discussant: Lee Che-fu, Catholic University of America

PANEL ON TAIWAN HISTORY

July 8, 1985 Monday, 1:00-3:30 p.m.
Chair: Edward Ch’ien, The University of Chicago

Ch’ing Policies Toward Taiwan: 1683-1895
Wen-hsiung Hsu
Northwestern University

Chronicle of the Liu’s: An Early Taiwanese Christian Family
John Yung-hsiang Lai
Harvard University
The Ideal and Ideas of Japanese Assimilation in Taiwan
Ching-chih Chen
Southern Illinois University

Nationalism and Communism in Taiwan During the 1920's
Chiung-jen Chien
The University of Chicago

A Critique of Chen Bisheng's Taiwan Local History
Chiu-kun Chen
Stanford University

Discussants: Ching-chih Chen, Southern Illinois University
Chiu-kun Chen, Stanford University

PANEL ON ECONOMY

July 8, 1985 Monday, 4:00-6:30 p.m.
Chair: Robert D. Hsu (Citibank, N.A.)

The Economy of Taiwan and Its Future Relationship with the PRC
Jack F. Williams
Michigan State University

State Apparatus in Taiwan Economic Development
Robert D. Hsu
Citibank, N.A.

The Process of Original Accumulation in Taiwan (1952-1960) and China (1952-1957)
Mark Selden and Ka Chih-ming
SUNY, Binghamton

The Petty Capitalist Mode of Production
Hill Gates
Central Michigan University

Discussants: C.K. Ko, The University of Chicago
Thomas Gold, U.C. Berkeley
PANEL ON ETHNICITY

July 9, 1985 Tuesday, 9:00-11:30 a.m.
Chair: Hill Gates, Central Michigan University

The Genetic Features and The Social Organization of the Taiwanese Business Elites
Ichiro Numazaki
Michigan State University

Some Observations on Social Discourse Regarding Taiwan’s ‘Primordial Inhabitant’
Chiu, Yen-liang
The University of Chicago

Migration Paths of the Gaoshan Ethnic Groups on Taiwan
Chen, Kuang-ho
California State University, Long Beach

Discussants: Terrace Turner, Jean Comaroff & Lin Kai-shih
The University of Chicago

PANEL ON LITERATURE

July 9, 1985 Tuesday, 12:30-3:00 p.m.
Chair: Hung Ming-shui, Brooklyn College

On Taiwan Xiangtu Literature
Wu Zhicun
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Spirit of Resistance in Lai-ho’s Poetry
Lee Kuei-shien
Asia Enterprise Center

The Realist Tradition in Taiwan Literature
Hung Ming-shui
Brooklyn College

The Sexual Division of Labor: a societal phenomenon as reflected in the stories of Yang Ch’ing-ch’u
Shen Hung-Kuang
Indiana University

Discussants: Shen, Hung-Kuang, Indiana University
Wuo, Young-ie, U.C. Berkeley
PANEL ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY and ENVIRONMENT

July 9, 1985 Tuesday, 3:30-6:30 p.m.
Chair: Lin Jun-yi (Tunghai University)

Ecology and ROC’s Future
Allerd Stikker
Transform Inc.

The Conception, the Problems, and the Ideology of “Basic” Science
Daiwie Fu
Columbia University

An Overview of Environmental Policies in Taiwan
Juju C.S. Wang
Texas Tech. University

The Environment and Nuclear Development in Taiwan
Lin Jun-yi
Tunghai University

Taiwan Environmental Protection Movement: a retrospective
Huang Shun-hsing
former Representative, Legislative Yuan
former publisher: Life and Environment monthly

Taiwan’s Garbage Crisis and Its Solution
James M. Ning
Society for Better Environment & Economic Development, Inc.
The Second Annual
International Symposium on Taiwan Studies
(July 7-9 1986)

JULY 7, 1986 MONDAY

11:00 a.m.-11:30  Welcoming Remarks
P'ing-Ti Ho, The University of Chicago

PANEL ON LITERATURE

Monday, 1:30 - 3:00 p.m.
Chair: Marshall Johnson, The University of Chicago

Development of Modern Taiwan Poetry
Chen Chien-wu
Taichung Cultural Center

The Rise of Children's Poetry as a Cultural and Aesthetic Phenomenon
Jing Wang
Duke University

Social Realism in Taiwan Literature in the Early 1980's
Xu Yixin
Guangdong Academy of Social Sciences

An Inquiry into Taiwan Literature in the 1980's
Wang Jinmin
Zhongshan University

Postmodernist Tendencies in Ch'en Ying-Chen's Fiction
Andrea Paradis
The University of Chicago

Taiwan's Garbage Crisis and Its Solution
James M. Ning
Society for Better Environment & Economic Development, Inc.

Discussant: Wang Meifu, National Taiwan University

PANEL ON ANTHROPOLOGY

Monday, 3:30 p.m.-5:30
Chair: Huang Shu-Min (Iowa State University)

Genetic Population Study of Hanren in Taiwan
Kuan-Ho Chen
California State University, Long Beach

Ethnic Contacts, Stigmatized identity, and Pan-Aboriginalism
Shih-Chung Hsieh
University of Washington, Seattle
Taiwan Aborigines and the Three Regimes
Ichiro Numazaki, James Lewis, and David Wu
University of Hawaii, East-West Center

Rice Collection Policy in Taiwan before 1973 and its Socioeconomic Effects
Xiao-jia Ge
Iowa State University

Discussant: Chiu Yen-liang, The University of Chicago

JULY 8, 1986 TUESDAY

PANEL ON SOCIOLOGY

Tuesday, 9:00 a.m. - 11:00
Chair: Mab Huang, New York State University, Syracuse

Modernization and Changing Welfare among the Elderly in Taiwan
Wen-Hui Tsai
Indiana University at Fort Wayne

“Underdeveloped” Mental Health Care in a Developing Country: The Case of Taiwan
Yong-Shing Chen
Taipei Medical College

Modernization and Taiwanese Rural Families
Su-Ming Huang
Iowa State University

Discussant: Che-fu Lee, Catholic University of America

PANEL ON ENVIRONMENT

Tuesday, 12:30 p.m. -2:30
Chair: Chen Meei-Shia, The University of Chicago

Taiwan’s Changing Environment
Goanghwa L.Y. Cheng & Winchi Cheng
The Institute of Occupational Medicine, China Academy, Taipei

Investigation of the Chemical Industry in Taiwan
Li Ron-wu
Columbia University

Waste Management in Taiwan
Huang, Chin-Hsien
National Taiwan University
Appendix

Energy Policy & Nuclear Power Plants in Taiwan
Chang, Kuo-Lung
National Taiwan University

Discussants: Robert D. Hsu, Citibank N.A.
Hsiao Yu-Cheng, Illinois Ins. of Technology

PANEL ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

Tuesday, 3:00 p.m. - 5:30
Chair: Robert Hsu, Citibank N.A.

Bureaucratic Politics & State Capacity in Taiwan's Auto Industrial Policy
Walter Arnold
Miami University

Development Strategies & Growth With Equity: The Re-Evaluation of Taiwan's Experience: 1950s-70s
Cheng-Chung Lai
National Tsing Hua University

Opposition Political Party over the Last Ten Years in Taiwan
Chung-hsin Chen
Free Lance Writer

Discussant: Chen Chu-Po, University of California, Davis

JULY 9, 1986 WEDNESDAY

PANEL ON HISTORY

Wednesday, 9:30 a.m. -12:00
Chair: Wen-hsing Hsu, Northwestern University

Some Problems Concerning the Violent Confrontation Between People of Different Origin in Taiwan
Cheng Kongli
Taiwan Research Institute, Xiamen University

The Creation of Imperial Censors in Taiwan and Their Functions
Liu Ruzhong
Chinese History Museum
The Political Thought of Chiang Wei-sui
Chiung-Jen Chien
The University of Chicago

A New Evaluation of Taiwan's Position: The Qing Government's Discussion on The Problem of Coast Defence in the 1870s and the 1880s
Cheng Zaizheng
Taiwan Research Institute, Xiamen University

Taiwanese in Mainland China, 1895-1945
Ching-chih Chen
Southern Illinois university

Taiwan Social Groups in Mainland China and Politics
Masahiro Wakabayashi
University of Tokyo

PANEL ON WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY TAIWAN

Wednesday, 1:00 p.m. - 4:00
Chair: Rita Gallin, Michigan State University

Womens' Marital Condition in Taiwan 1945
Zheng Qiu
Taiwan Research Institute, Xiamen University

A Semiotic Analysis of “Sa Jiao” As a Gender Marked Communication Style in Chinese
Catherine S. Farris
University of Washington

A Qualitative Study of Childcare in Taiwan
Wang Su-ing
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

Organizing Women’s Growth-Groups in Taipei
Lin Mei-Shu
“Awakening” monthly

Current Status of the Women’s Movement in Taiwan
Hsu Shen-Shu
“Awakening” monthly

Discussants: Karen Hsu, Research Library, N.Y. Public Library
Hsiu-Lien Lu, Free Lance Writer
The Third Annual
International Symposium on Taiwan Studies
(August 1-3, 1987)

August 1, 1987 Saturday

PANEL ON SOCIOLOGY

Saturday 9:30 - 12:00 a.m.
Chair: William Parish, The University of Chicago

Attitudinal And Sociocultural Factors Influencing Language Maintenance, Language Shift, And Language Usage Among The Chinese On Taiwan
Russell L. Young
San Diego State University

Kinship And Family Support In Taiwan
Edward J. Tu
Center For Demographic Studies, SUNY, Albany

Discussant: William Parish, The University of Chicago

PANEL ON HISTORY

Saturday 1:30-5:30 p.m.
Chair: Ching-chih Chen, Southern Illinois University

Major Historical Conditions For The Spreading of Ma-chu Belief After Ching
Zhu Tian-shun
Xiamen University

Creating A New Society: Activism In Postwar Taiwan
Douglas L. Fix
University of California, Berkeley
Impact Of Japanese Colonial Rule On Taiwanese Elites
Ching-Chih Chen
Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville

The Hoko System And Social Elites In Taiwan During The Japanese Period (1895-1945)
Caroline Hui-yu Tsai
University of Columbia

Discussant: Wen-hsiung Hsu, Northwestern University

August 2, 1987 Sunday

PANEL ON LITERATURE
Sunday 9:30-12:00 a.m.
Chair: Irving Lo, Indiana University

Taiwan Literary Trends: 1950-1980
Gu Jitang
Chinese academy Of Social Science

Comparison Of Contemporary Literature in Mainland China And Taiwan
Chen, Gongzhong
Jianki University

Contemporary Poetry From Taiwan As Studied In Mainland China
Tu Kuo Ching
U.C. Santa Barbara

Contemporary Poetry and New Literary Movement in Taiwan
Zhang Guang-zheng
Chinese Writers Union

The Characteristics Of Modern Taiwan Poetry
Chen Chien Wu
Taichung Culture Center

New Literary Movement In Taiwan: 1920-1945
Lin, Jui-ming
National Cheng Kung University
PANEL ON ARCHITECTURE, PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

Sunday 1:30-5:30 p.m.
Chair: John Liu, John K.C. Liu Associates

The Changing Regional Spatial Structure of Chang-Hua
Hsia, Chu-joe and Chang, Chin-seng
National Taiwan University

The Informal Sector In The Construction Industry In Taiwan: A Case Study Of An Informal Contractor
Wuo, Young-ie
U.C. Berkeley

The Evaluation of The House Form And Its Social Mechanism In Jinmen
Wang, Wei-jen
U.C. Berkeley

The Production of Architecture In Contemporary Taiwan: A Preliminary Inquiry
Kuo, Wen-liang
U.C. Berkeley

The Relationship Between “Fong-shih-Yeh” And Settlements In Kimmen: A Preliminary Study
Kung, Shiann-far
Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand

The Development of Urban Planning And Its Practice In Taiwan After 1945 -- A Critical Review
Wang, Hon Kai and Chen, Kun Hon
National Taiwan University

August 3, 1987 Monday

PANEL ON WOMEN’S STUDIES

Monday 9:30-12:00 a.m.
Chair: Rita S.Gallin, Michigan State University
Office of Women In International Development

Petty Capitalist Women
Hill Gates
Central Michigan University
Taiwan Unbound

Attitudes Towards Rape Victims: Are They Really Guilty?  
Jeaw-Mei Chen  
National Cheng Chi University  
Phylis Lan Lin  
University of Indianapolis

The Comparisons Of Job Women And Housewives On Sex-Typed Characteristics, Self-Assertiveness And Fear Of Success  
Li Mei-Chih  
National Cheng Chi University

Women and Export Industry In Taiwan: The Muting Of Class Consciousness  
Rita S. Gallin  
Michigan State University

Discussant: Bernard Gallin, Michigan State University  
William Parish, The University Of Chicago

PANEL ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN TAIWAN

Monday 1:30-5:30 p.m.  
Chair: Meei-shia Chen, The University of Chicago

Occupational Health In Taiwan: A Review Of Past And Present Facts And Discussions For Future Development  
Yuan-ching Ko  
National Taiwan University

Environment Problems In Taiwan Comparing With The History Of Environmental Pollution In Japan  
Junichi Ohnuma  
Aichi Environmental Research Center, Japan

Dilemma And Problems of Environmental Protection In Taiwan  
Shun Dar Lin  
Illinois Dept. of Energy And Natural Resources, U.S.A.

Industrial Pollution And The Regional Variations Of Life Expectancy At Birth In Taiwan  
Tin-yu Ting  
Kansas State University
Appendix

Anti-Pollution Grassroot Movement In Taichung, Taiwan
Mo-bai Liao
Taichung Center For Environmental Protection

Pollution From Night Soil And Its Disposal In Taiwan
Whei-may Lee
National Taiwan University

Discussant: Jack Lee, Columbia University
William Liu, University of Illinois at Chicago

Risk of Nuclear Accident And Situation of Workers In Taiwan And Other Asian Nuclear Power Stations
Masaharu Kanata
Nagoya University
The Fourth Annual
International Symposium On Taiwan Studies
September 12, 1988
“Transformation of Rural Taiwan”

Changing Social Contexts
10:00a.m. - 12:25p.m.
Chair: Lee Ou-fan, The University of Chicago

Taiwan’s Agricultural Development Policy
Re-examined: Is the End Inevitable?
Human Shumin
Iowa State University

Rural Taiwan’s Farmers’ Association
Chen Chung-min
Ohio State University

Migration and Its Impact on the Rural Community
Bernard Gallin
Michigan State University

Discussant: Fei Xiaotong, Beijing University, China

Changing Social Relations
Chair: William Parish, The University of Chicago

Genealogy and the Study of the Chinese Lineage in Taiwan
Chuang Ying-chang
Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan

Traditional and Contemporary Taiwanese Religious Beliefs and Practices
Li Yih-yuan
Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan

The Changing Role of Women in Rural Taiwan
Rita Gallin
Michigan State University

Discussant: Fei Xiaotong, Beijing University

PROFESSOR FEI XIAOTONG BRITANNICA LECTURE

China’s Rural Development
Social Science Building
Room 122, 1126 East 59th Street,
The University of Chicago
The Fifth Annual
International Symposium On Taiwan Studies
September 1-3, 1989

“Cultural Change in Contemporary Taiwan”

CHANGES IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY

September 1, Monday, morning sessions
chair: William Parish, The University of Chicago

SESSION A(9:00-10:30): Political Culture

“Reflection on Taiwan’s Political Culture”
Yu-sheng Lin
University of Wisconsin

“Modes of Street Demonstrations in Taiwan”
Wang Hsin-ch’ing
Editor, The Journalist

Discussant: Fred Y. L. Chiu, The University of Chicago

SESSION B(11:00-12:30): Commercial Culture

“Consumerism and Urban Culture”
Ch’en Chung-hsin
Editor, Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies

“Modern Alchemy and Social Change in Taiwan: The Humanistic Foundations of Economic Development”
Joseph C. C. Kuo
Chairman, Asian-American Times

Discussant: Robert Weller, Duke University

Afternoon sessions:
chair: Anthony Yu, The University of Chicago

SESSION C(2:00-3:30): Values and Communication

“Incorporation: Politics and Journalism in Taiwan”
Chin-chuan Lee
University of Minnesota

“The Development of Media Photography in an Opening Society”
Kuo Li-Hsin
China Times Evening News

Discussant: Wang Hsin-ch’ing, The Journalist
SESSION D (4:00-5:30): Social Groups and Social Classification

“Ethnicity and Occupation”
Marshall Johnson
University of Chicago

“The Residential Pattern and Urban Commitment among Taiwan Aborigines”
Yang-chih Fu
Institutes of Ethnology, Academia Sinica

Discussant: Shu-min Huang, Iowa State University

ASPECTS OF CULTURAL CREATIVITY

September 2, Saturday: Morning Sessions

chair: Leo Ou-fan Lee, The University of Chicago

SESSION A (9:00-10:30): Literature

“Postmodernism and Contemporary Chinese Literature in Taiwan”
Ch’en Chang-fang
Tamkang University

“The Intellectual’s Image of the City”
Andrea Paradis
University of Chicago

Discussants: Hsu Wen-hsiung, Northwestern University
S. K. Chang, University of Pittsburgh

SESSION B (11:00-12:30): Architecture and Urban Planning

“Taipei: The City as Myth, Ideology, and Metaphor”
William Tay
University of California, San Diego

“The Culture of Housing: A Critical Approach”
John K. C. Liu
University of California, Berkeley

“Architecture and City Planning in Taiwan”
Hsia Chu-chiu
National Taiwan University

Discussant: Fred Y. L. Chiu, The University of Chicago

Afternoon Sessions:
chair: Guy Alitto, The University of Chicago
SESSION C (2:00-3:30): Art and Music

“New Painting in Taiwan”
Jason Kuo
Williams College

“The Development of Music and Music Composition in Taiwan”
Chang Chi-jen
Tung-wu University

“Art and Art Education in Taiwan”
Chiang Hsun
Tunghai University

Discussant: Fred Y. L. Chiu, The University of Chicago

SESSION D (4:00-5:30): Dance and Film

“Dance in Taiwan, Past and Present: A Personal View”
Lin Huai-min
Chinese Academy of Art

“Films and Film Reviews”
Chiao Hsiung-p’ìn
China Times Evening News

“Documentary Film and Social Change in Taiwan”
Li Tao-ming
University of Chinese Culture

Discussants: Wang Hsiao-ian, University of Iowa
Leo Ou-fan Lee, The University of Chicago

Saturday Evening: 8:00-10:00 p.m.

Organization Meeting of the International Society for Taiwan Studies (122 Pick Hall, 5828, University Ave.)

September 3, Monday:

PUBLIC FORUM: Cultural Creativity and Change in Taiwan
(Assembly Hall, International House, open to the public)
Chair: Leo Ou-fan Lee and featuring selected participants from Taiwan

Film Presentation: “The Terrorists”
directed by Yang Te-ch’ang
(Assembly Hall, International House)